ATP 3-13.5

Soldier and Leader Engagement

DECEMBER 2021

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

This publication is available at the Army Publishing Directorate (APD) site (https://armypubs.army.mil), and the Central Army Registry site (https://atiam.train.army.mil/catalog/dashboard).

Army Techniques Publication
No. 3-13.5

Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C., 21 December 2021

Soldier and Leader Engagement

Contents

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Figures

Tables

Preface

ATP 3-13.5, *Soldier and Leader Engagement*, provides guidance on Soldier and leader engagement (SLE), from planning and preparation, to execution, and assessment. SLE is a potent capability that commanders and staffs employ to create effects that can result in a decisive advantage over adversaries or enemies and opportunities with unified action partners. SLE occurs at all levels and across the full range of military operations; it is available to every Army unit and individual Soldier and civilian.

The principle audience for ATP 3-13.5 is all members of the Army profession. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or multinational forces. Trainers and educators throughout the Army will also use this publication.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States, international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of land warfare and the rules of engagement. (See FM 6-27.)

SLE, as described in this ATP, is an information-related capability that be used to both inform audiences and influence their behavior to achieve the commander's intent and accomplish the mission. ATP 3-13.5 applies to interactions with domestic audiences within public engagement programs and activities in support of community outreach efforts in accordance with AR 360–1. It is not to be used in an attempt to influence members of the U.S. government, congressional or staff delegations, for example.

ATP 3-13.5 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. Terms for which ATP 3-13.5 is the proponent publication (the authority) are marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. When first defined in the text, terms for which ATP 3-13.5 is the proponent publication are boldfaced and italicized, and the definitions are boldfaced. When first defining other proponent definitions in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition. Subsequent uses of the term are not italicized. This manual seeks to minimize the use of acronyms but will use three acronyms routinely: IO for information operations, IRC for information-related capability, and SLE for Soldier and leader engagement.

ATP 3-13.5 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, the United States Army Reserve, and the Army Civilian Corps unless otherwise stated.

The proponent for this publication is the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Information Operations Proponent Office. The preparing agency is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, United States Army Combined Arms Center. Send written comments and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (*Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms*) directly to Commander, United States Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATZL-MCF (ATP 3-13.5), 300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by e-mail to usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.cadd-org-mailbox@mail.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

This page intentionally left blank.

Introduction

ATP 3-13.5 provides Army commanders, leaders, staffs, and information operations (IO) professionals with essential information necessary to integrate SLE effectively into their operation. It guides leaders to plan, prepare, execute, and assess SLE in order to achieve effects that support the commander's intent and concept of operations. The information presented herein are suggestions for how to conduct SLE, and units will likely need to tailor these processes, tools, and techniques to suit the requirements of their unique mission and situation.

The 2016 publication of FM 3-13 reduced its coverage of SLE from a full chapter to a few paragraphs. This publication was created to ensure commanders, Soldiers, and civilians have access to the principles, techniques, best practices, and planning methodologies that undergird successful SLE.

Commanders, subordinate leaders, and all members of the Army Profession ensure they conduct SLE in accordance with the moral principles of the Army Ethic. They perform and accomplish SLE ethically, effectively, and efficiently, mindful of applicable laws, policies, regulations, and procedures, as well as the cultural norms and values of the relevant actors (See ADP 1 for more on the Army Profession).

ATP 3-13.5 contains five chapters and four appendices. The following is a brief description of each.

Chapter 1 provides an overview of SLE, starting with its definition. It outlines SLE principles, a framework for SLE, categories and types of SLE, and the role of SLE from tactical through strategic levels.

Chapter 2 overviews roles and responsibilities associated with SLE. The chapter presents the roles of the commander, the staff, specialized units and personnel, and individual Soldiers and Department of the Army (DA) Civilians when conducting SLE.

Chapter 3 describes how to plan and prepare for a SLE, starting with Army design methodology and progressing through the military decision-making process. It then overviews the engagement process, focusing specifically on the plan and prepare phases of this process.

Chapter 4 details the execution of SLE, breaking down execution into pre-engagement, intra-engagement, and post-engagement considerations and activities.

Chapter 5 details SLE assessment, starting with the logic of the effort and how to establish a baseline. It then describes the work involved with articulating the SLE objective and generating measures of performance and measures of effectiveness.

Appendix A describes individual and collective SLE training available to Army Soldiers and civilians.

Appendix B provides three checklists and a worksheet to assist with the pre-engagement, engagement, and post-engagement conduct of SLE.

Appendix C describes the role of SLE in the targeting process.

Appendix D provides an example of an SLE TAB to an SLE Appendix for an operation order.

The introductory table-1 outlines changes to Army terminology reflected in ATP 3-13.5.

Introductory table-1. New and modified Army terms

Term	Remarks
engagement subject	New term
Soldier and leader engagement	Assumed proponecy for term from FM 3-13

This page intentionally left blank.

Chapter 1

Soldier and Leader Engagement Defined and Described

SOLIDER AND LEADER ENGAGEMENT DEFINED

1-1.   Commanders integrate information operations (IO) into operations to produce a desired effect in audience decision making. IO takes place in all phases of military operations, and is one line of effort among many to achieve the commander's objective. Information operations consist of information-related capabilities (IRCs) intended to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp audience (friendly, neutral, or adversarial) decision making (see JP 3-13 for more on IO). IRCs are activities, techniques, tactics, or procedures. Soldier and leader engagement is one type of IRC that commanders and staffs can use in order to influence audiences and achieve desired effects (see JP 3-13 and FM 3-13 for more on IO and the range of IRCs available).

1-2.   ***Soldier and leader engagement* is interpersonal Service-member interactions with audiences in an area of operations**. Soldier and leader engagement (SLE) is an IRC with the purpose to create effects in an operational environment. These effects can inform, influence, and educate friendly and neutral audiences and relevant actors. SLE can also disrupt, corrupt, or usurp enemy or adversary decision making and everything that enables it, while enabling and protecting friendly decision making. The aim of SLE is to assist or enable the unit or commander to achieve specific objectives by changing the perceptions and behavior of an audience.

1-3.   SLE is an IRC that is available to every Army unit and is integrated and synchronized into operations by the IO working group aided by the psychological operations (PSYOP) planner or element. Where there is no assigned individual, the commander designates a staff representative to perform IO duties, to include overseeing the unit's engagement activities. SLE is one of few organic IRCs available to echelons below division.

1-4.   Soldiers and leaders engage with local audiences to achieve specific effects in the information environment. Engagement fulfills key requirements, achieves objectives, and supports mission accomplishment.

1-5.   SLE can occur as a random opportunity, such as a face-to-face encounter, or be planned. The medium for conducting SLE is any communications method, such as telephone calls or texts, video teleconferences, or other audiovisual mediums, including social media.

1-6.   Although the capability is referred to as SLE, civilians supporting military operations are included. Commanders consider and choose the best candidate to conduct deliberate engagements.

1-7.   SLE provides a construct for building relationships, solving conflicts, conveying information, calming fears, and refuting rumors, lies, or misinformation or disinformation. Effectively integrating SLE into operations increases the potential for commanders to mitigate unintended consequences, counter adversary information activities, and increase local support for friendly forces and their collective missions.

1-8.   Soldiers often face the challenging and complex tasks of operating with and among local populations. Audiences in an area of operations look, act, and think differently from Soldiers. Sometimes the aims and ambitions of even a friendly or neutral populace will not align with the mission assigned to Soldiers and leaders. Soldiers and leaders use engagement to—

- Help a populace make sense of military operations.
- Make introductions and learn more about an audience.
- Bridge differences and build alliances.
- Build trust and confidence that leads to enhanced legitimacy.
- Encourage cooperation and noninterference.

- Inform local audiences about enemy or adversary information (propaganda, misinformation, disinformation, or information for effect).
- Respond to or block enemy or adversary influence against friendly and neutral audiences.
- Conduct operations, such as humanitarian civic assistance.

1-9. SLE is a component of a commander's broader communication synchronization that typically includes—

- Public affairs engagements, especially with the media.
- Military information support operations (known as MISO) messages and actions, as well as information gathering, with selected foreign targets and audiences.
- Civil-military interactions and civil affairs operations, such as humanitarian civic assistance.
- Strategic partnering in which indigenous national or strategic leaders are directly engaged by their U.S. or coalition counterparts.
- Traditional communication, which employs personal, trusted channels of communication to influence audiences in an area of operations (AO).
- Community relations events, such as music performances.
- Military civic action projects.
- Official social media postings.

1-10. SLE should not be confused with surveillance and reconnaissance missions with the purpose of information collection. Techniques for information collection during operations among populations are covered in ATP 3-55.4.

SOLDIER AND LEADER ENGAGEMENT PRINCIPLES

1-11. Effective SLE is interest-based, consistent, human relationship-focused, adaptive, credible, habitual, balanced, timely, and pragmatic. The principles are discussed in paragraphs 1-12 through 1-35. Successful SLE planning, training, and implementation takes these principles into account.

INTEREST-BASED

1-12. SLE is planned and conducted in order to support and protect national interests. Commanders determine interests based on objectives and intended effects in their areas of operation. Local populations and local institutions in areas where commanders are based also make decisions and act based on their interests. Interests must be distinguished from positions, which describe a party's current way or method of satisfying an interest. Interests are the purpose(s) behind the positions.

1-13. Participants in SLE must define and understand their own interests as well as those of their counterparts. Doing so without unduly fixating on a given or pre-determined position allows for adaptive and pragmatic adjustments during the conduct of SLE (See paragraph 3-25 for more on identifying interests).

CONSISTENT

1-14. SLE is consistent when it communicates the same meaning as other operational activities. Achieving consistency requires that commanders and staffs understand effects in cognitive terms—the perceptions and interpretations that various actors and populations assign to operations and the conditions they cause (see JP 3-13). Soldiers and leaders lose credibility when audiences perceive engagement dialogue (words) as inconsistent with observable behavior (actions).

HUMAN RELATIONSHIP CENTERED

1-15. SLE is directed at human perception, understanding, will, and behavior. In keeping with this, SLE is as much about building rapport and relationships as it is about achieving effects. This interaction between humans forms the basis of common understanding that transcends cultures and clarifies perceptions, thus enabling common understanding. Rapport and common understanding may encourage compliance or agreement with required actions.

CULTURALLY AWARE

1-16. Soldiers and leaders conduct engagements in the context of local customs, beliefs, and ways of communicating. Doing so builds understanding and cooperation. It also serves to mitigate insensitivities and mistrust. Beyond familiarization with explicit cultural practices, interacting requires that Soldiers and leaders understand each population's more implicit communication style, the value they place on relationships (more task- or person-centered), and their attitude toward time.

1-17. When conducting SLE to inform or influence, local communicators and leaders are sometimes the most effective conduit to deliver messages for populations in an AO. In the past, commanders and staffs often developed messages unilaterally from their perspective and simply translated those into the local languages or dialects. This can lead to the intended meaning getting lost in translation or the message conflicting with local views or norms. Leveraging key leaders or actors allows units to draw on their familiarity and credibility with those audiences. Working with local communicators and leaders increases the likelihood that an interaction will inform or influence audiences as desired. Understandably, units balance the use of such individuals against security concerns.

1-18. Units employ trained influence specialists (such as an attached psychological operations unit) public affairs specialists (such as assigned public affairs personnel or attached public affairs detachments), and resident cultural experts (such as foreign area officers or political advisors at higher-level headquarters) to craft messages and delivery mechanisms that are culturally, technologically, and linguistically appropriate to the culture and context.

1-19. Soldiers with specialized skills or knowledge may be able to interact with indigenous populations where otherwise it would be viewed negatively or be culturally unacceptable. A specialized engagement team, consisting of women, medical personnel, veterinarians, engineers, or musicians may be necessary to facilitate a SLE in unique situations. Specially configured teams enable friendly forces to interact with key demographic groups while respecting local and/or cultural norms.

ADAPTIVE

1-20. Effective SLE depends on adaptability. Adaptive communication relies on Soldiers and leaders who can think critically and use reasonable judgment, are comfortable with ambiguity, are willing to accept risk, and have the ability to adjust rapidly to evolving situations.

1-21. Adaptability requires a commitment to learning and ongoing training. Soldiers and leaders must continually advance their understanding of the people (especially relevant actors and audiences), cultures, and subcultures in their AO. Continual learning and training informs changes to the methods and content of communication that lead to increases in rapport and success in achieving effects.

1-22. Engagement characterized by an assumed superiority—a conviction that a message's inherent rightness disqualifies it from audience scrutiny—or its rigid application fails to support the conditions necessary to discover and adopt effective communication approaches. Thus, effective SLE is more about dialogue, information sharing, advising, and persuasion rather than dictating expected behavior; all of these rely on the ability to adapt to audience and circumstance.

1-23. Psychological operations (PSYOP) Soldiers are particularly adept at engagement because they are trained in social sciences, psychology, culture, and languages. Public affairs Soldiers are also adept at integrating emerging communication platforms to stay relevant with communication trends and to communicate effectively with a diverse audience.

CREDIBLE

1-24. All information operations, to include SLE, should reinforce actions for maximum effects. Everything we say, do, and produce is messaging to support higher headquarters' desired effects; actions are the most important SLE efforts. Lasting and positive effects come from actions more than any other form of messaging and is vital in operating environments where populaces' cultures and languages differ from those in the United States.

1-25. SLE must be credible to have sustained effects. All actors make decisions based on their perceptions of the potential for risk and reward in a course of action. A fundamental criterion for such perceptions is the degree of confidence the intended audience has in the credibility and trustworthiness of those with whom they interact. Such credibility can only result from a pattern of words, images, and actions arising from shared understanding that is authentic, empirical, and factual. Openness and transparency are foundational to this effort. Facts matter, but commanders must understand that perceptions of truthfulness are based on more than merely getting the facts straight.

1-26. A central tenet of effective SLE is recognition that those executing the engagement must nest and adapt higher headquarters' themes, messages, talking points, and most importantly, actions to their local conditions. Commanders should not expect their higher echelon's talking points to neatly support the conditions in their AO. Rather, they shape their words and actions to synchronize higher headquarters themes and actions with conditions on the ground.

1-27. Successful SLE depends on the degree of confidence populations have in the credibility of the Army forces with whom they interact. Credibility results from an observable, sustained, and consistent congruence of words and deeds attuned to the local culture.

HABITUAL

1-28. Establishing habitual or persistent relationships between U.S. leaders or Soldiers and key local representatives or influencers helps promote trust. The habitual partner becomes the primary conduit through which information is passed and received. The habitual reliance on these conduits reduces the likelihood that key audiences will receive conflicting messages or commitments from the U.S. or its unified action partners. It also reduces engagement fatigue that happens when an audience becomes overwhelmed by the number of engagements in which it must participate.

1-29. At higher levels, these habitual engagements form the basis of strategic partnering, which is especially important to security force assistance and building partner capacity.

BALANCED

1-30. Soldiers and leaders balance their engagement efforts between the inclination to achieve the desired effect and the requirement to actively listen and understand another's point of view. During a single SLE, Soldiers or leaders may achieve little more than increased understanding of the audience with whom they interact. This is an acceptable objective for SLE. Understanding is critical to the success of subsequent SLEs as it lays the foundation for establishing solid relationships. A balanced approach to engagements helps to ensure both parties benefit.

1-31. Imbalanced SLE tends to be one-way, which makes relationship building difficult to impossible. Typically, one-way communication creates a perception in the audience that their ideas are irrelevant, leaving the audience feeling disrespected and marginalized. These perceptions can become obstacles to future engagements or achieving a commander's intent. Respect and empathy on both sides can overcome imbalance. Visits to residences, places of work, or events can improve respect and enable better empathy within a habitual relationship.

TIMELY

1-32. Timely engagement does not automatically imply speed, although speed is often required. Well-planned and sustained engagement achieves timely effects because it establishes information channels prior to the emergence of information dissemination requirements, thereby allowing commanders to anticipate and proactively manage consequences and outcomes. Being consultative rather than dictatorial often necessitates time and patience. Being consultative means allowing additional time for relational dynamics to play out; invariably, the engaged audience or person will need to consult with others before finalizing a decision.

PRAGMATIC

1-33. The outcome of communications is difficult to predict and control. Pragmatic SLE accepts the unpredictable, often opaque, nature of interpersonal communications and operates with realistic expectations

of message control. Leaders guide what their units say and do; however, they cannot fully control how others interpret friendly-force messages and actions. Soldiers and leaders understand that the cultural lenses, biases, beliefs, education, and experiences of audiences shape their perceptions and interpretations. Nonetheless, Soldiers and leaders shape SLE to ensure they promote clarity and shared understanding.

1-34. Pragmatism reflects an expectation and risk acceptance. Effective Soldiers and leaders expect setbacks. Developing relationships and building trusted networks sometimes entails interacting with untrustworthy individuals. SLE may even result in the unmasking of previously undetected malign actors or intentions.

1-35. Engagement with the local population and key leaders—particularly to shape, deter, and consolidate gains—is a long-term effort assessed in terms of months or years rather than in hours or days (see paragraph 1-47 for a description of SLE across the Army's strategic roles). Pragmatism acknowledges that effects of SLE may not be immediately achievable or recognizable. Influencing audiences in an AO requires trust and credibility by repeated and meaningful interaction. Recognizing any measure of effectiveness from these interactions often requires time that U.S. forces typically do not have. Leaders must plan SLE early and often in operations to ensure necessary effects can be achieved.

SOLDIER AND LEADER ENGAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

1-36. Engagements benefit from an understanding of psychology, cross-culture communication, and sociology, among other disciplines. Soldiers and leaders are encouraged to undertake self-study in these fields of knowledge. Soldiers and leaders can conduct meaningful and effective engagements using a framework in which they consider the various roles they fill as well as the roles of those they are engaging. These roles, which inform the approach Soldiers and leaders adopt when executing a specific engagement, include—

- Human being.
- Soldier or civilian.
- Business person.
- Leader.
- Commander.

1-37. Three of the roles apply to all members of a unit. The last two roles apply to those who are, by statute, so designated. Table 1-1 on page 1-6 provides a narrative for each role to illustrate its contribution to SLE planning.

Table 1-1. Soldier and leader engagement framework roles and descriptions

Role	First-person description of role's contribution to SLE
Human being	I am a human being, flawed and complex, just like the person or persons opposite me. In recognizing our common humanity, I better understand the possible motivations of my audience, allowing me to navigate to solutions that mutually benefit both or all sides.
Soldier or civilian	I have taken an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States, obey all laws, and follow lawful orders. The person I am engaging is likewise bound by rules and hierarchies that will likely compete with my own. Seeing myself in this role, I better understand the competing interests and dynamics that underlie all human interaction. Entering into engagements as a Soldier or civilian means upholding Army values and being the "face" of my unit, the U.S. Army, and the United States. I undertake SLE, as directed or expected, specifically to accomplish the unit's mission and fulfill my commander's intent. I know my limitations and seek help when necessary.
Business person	A business person or sales representative is often required to negotiate with another party in an effort to sell that party on their product or position. Soldiers and leaders conducting SLE may have to negotiate with another leader or FSF counterpart and can approach this engagement in a manner that resembles a sale. The Soldier or leader has a desired end state and a starting position, and they must engage with their counterpart in an effort to persuade them to accede to the Soldier's position. To do this, they may negotiate by modifying the terms of their position, much like a business person can modify the price or other terms of a sale.
Leader	Whether a formal or informal leader, I exercise disciplined initiative and engage relevant actors and audiences in the area of operations to influence their behavior in support of the unit's mission. I lead actions and engage others to shape the environment favorable to U.S. objectives, build trust and confidence in U.S. actions, and achieve outcomes necessary to bring about the commander's desired end state.
Commander	I am my unit's key engager; I foster a culture of engagement and model the way. I balance risk and make decisions regarding the expenditure of resources in pursuit of my objectives. I ensure the integration of SLE into operations and provide guidance and direction about the frequency, type, and purpose of SLE. I also ensure Soldiers and leaders are trained and resourced to conduct a robust engagement program. I nest and unify all engagements in the operational area and ensure themes, messages, and actions are completely aligned.

FSF	foreign security force	SLE	Soldier and leader engagement

CATEGORIES OF SOLDIER AND LEADER ENGAGEMENT

1-38. Two categories of Soldier and leader engagements exist: planned and unplanned. These engagements differ in planning and execution, but serve the same purpose of increasing the shared understanding necessary to achieve the commander's intent. Subsequent chapters will explain roles and responsibilities for engagements, incorporation into the planning process, and methods to prepare and execute.

1-39. SLEs occur often during stability operations and usually with partnered forces; this incurs consideration of how to mitigate threats to include insider attacks (ATP 3-37.15).

PLANNED ENGAGEMENTS

1-40. Planned engagements are deliberate interpersonal interactions to achieve a specified effect or accomplish a specific objective. These engagements may be face-to-face interactions or via other means, such as telephone or video teleconference. Examples of deliberate engagements include:

- Scheduled meetings with key communicators or formal leaders.
- Participation in a planned ceremony or event (school opening, attending a parade or concert).
- Delivery of information to a ministry or government official.

1-41. Effective deliberate SLE integrates with other IRCs to achieve or complement desired effects. Examples include—

- Humanitarian and civic assistance.
- Public affairs efforts, such as a post-engagement press conference.
- PSYOP, such as delivery of messages to target audiences.
- Combat camera to document the activity.
- Army bands, such as performances for local populations.

1-42. Planned engagements will benefit from using supporting PSYOP forces to conduct analysis of engaged leaders, recommend talking points, record the discussions to ensure continuity of message, that any promises made are carried out, and that any obligations incurred by the audiences are fulfilled. This intense program management is critical to ensure continuity and credibility of the commander and subordinate units (See FM 3-53).

UNPLANNED ENGAGEMENTS

1-43. Unplanned SLE are unanticipated or impromptu encounters for which Soldiers and leaders have not conducted deliberate planning. Dynamic interactions occur frequently. They may be spontaneous face-to-face conversations with local civilians during dismounted patrols, unsolicited visitations by local leaders to a base or outpost, or encounters with refugees or displaced persons.

1-44. Leaders prepare their subordinates at all levels before and during deployment to conduct impromptu interactions as a react-to-contact battle drill. Preparation for Soldier and leader engagement starts as early as initial entry training when Soldiers begin internalizing the Army Values found in ADP 1. Displaying respect for others and communicating honestly inevitably increases the likelihood of positive outcomes in any human interaction. Training for law of land warfare, rules of engagement, and culture as well as role-playing exercises prepare Soldiers and leaders to have successful dynamic interactions.

1-45. Unplanned SLE benefits from spontaneous interactions that allow greater understanding of the operational environment (OE), attitudes of local populations, to include specific audiences, and process it into time-sensitive feedback to other IRCs. This can be flags, banners, graffiti, or symbols (political, religious, celebration, protest, or mourning) on display (or not); attitude towards U.S. or allied units and personnel (fear, indifference, hostility, friendly); what, if any, commercial activity is there (illicit or open, shortages or abundance, prices increasing or stable).

TYPES OF SOLDIER AND LEADER ENGAGEMENT

1-46. SLE can be categorized by purpose and audience. Some types of engagements that Army units or personnel routinely conduct are described in table 1-2 on page 1-8.

Table 1-2. Example types of Soldier and leader engagements

Types	Description
Exploratory or introductory engagement	Engagements enable all sides in a discussion to learn more about each other.
Key-leader engagement (KLE)	KLE focuses on individuals within a unit's area of operations or area of interest who have been identified as holding positions of power, having significant influence on the behavior of other actors or audiences, or able to make binding commitments or implement change.
Civil engagement	Deliberate or spontaneous activity or interaction between CA forces and nonmilitary individuals or entities designed to build relationships; reduce or eliminate civil interference and causes of instability; gather, confirm, or deny information; foster legitimacy; or promote cooperation and unified action.
Police engagement	Police engagement is a type of information exchange that occurs between police personnel, organizations, or populations for the purpose of maintaining social order.
Face-to-face	While any engagement can be face-to-face, face-to-face is a PSYOP term denoting interpersonal communication in contrast to group or mass communication (see paragraph 2-23).
Cyber/online engagement (such as emails, teleconference, social media)	Soldiers and leaders conduct engagements on the Internet. Helpful factors include informality; ownership to prevent anonymity; and outlining problem, purpose, discussions, and recommendations to create positive cyber engagements.
Media engagement	An interaction (face-to-face or remotely) between Soldiers and leaders with members of the media to fulfill public affairs objectives.
Negotiation	Process that involves discussion and bargaining between two or more parties to discover common ground, reach an agreement, or resolve a conflict.
Traditional communication events	Joining a fair, festival, or celebration allows Soldiers and leaders a trusted and familiar way to communicate and share the experience.
AO area of operations CA civil affairs PSYOP psychological operations	

SOLDIER AND LEADER ENGAGEMENT ACROSS ARMY STRATEGIC ROLES

1-47. The Army's four strategic roles are to shape the operational environment, prevent conflict, prevail in large-scale combat operations, and consolidate gains. SLE broadly contributes to each of the strategic roles across the conflict continuum and all operational phases.

1-48. The chief of mission, usually the ambassador, is the highest U.S. authority in a foreign country during peacetime and the highest civil authority in war. As the senior official, the chief of mission will have an established U.S. government communications strategy within which all military engagements must be nested. Coordination with the public affairs (PA) and PSYOP elements embedded in the Embassy can facilitate inclusion of specific engagement authorities in a Department of State and Office of the Secretary of Defense-approved program or order. With the required authorities, attached PSYOP forces can execute specific engagement efforts with local-national leaders and influencers on behalf of both the ambassador and the commander on the ground. Since the PA and PSYOP forces do so in coordination with both the embassy and the U.S. commander, the overall engagement is synchronized and de-conflicted prior to execution, as well as having high-level authorization.

1-49. PSYOP forces conduct military influence and shaping operations and other influence activities as part of operations during overseas joint campaigns. PSYOP forces are trained, manned, and equipped to conduct

operations at the joint task force, corps, division, and brigade levels and to advise commanders on the psychological effects of operations, plan and execute influence activities, and, in collaboration with the intelligence community, assess any effects. PSYOP forces advise commanders on the positive and negative effects that military activities have on local populations and specific targets, and lead the commander's SLE efforts. The analysis of what military actions can influence the OE, to what degree, and in what manner contributes significantly to a prudent and successful decision-making process. (See FM 3-53 for more on PSYOP operations).

1-50. Commanders leverage available assets and understand how SLE can be incorporated toward mission success across the conflict continuum. Paragraphs 1-51 through 1-59 describe how SLE contributes to shaping operations, prevention operations, large-scale combat, and the consolidation of gains. Commanders apply the principles of SLE (see paragraphs 1-11 through 1-35) to planning and training forces to engage audiences and counterparts as a line of effort in all types of operations.

SHAPE

1-51. Army operations to shape an OE help dissuade adversary activities. These operations are designed to achieve regional goals short of military conflict. Shaping operations bring together all the activities intended to promote regional stability and to set conditions for a favorable outcome in the event of a military confrontation. Shaping activities include security cooperation and forward presence to promote U.S. interests, developing allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and providing U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. Regionally aligned and engaged Army forces are essential to achieving objectives to strengthen the global network of multinational partners and preventing conflict. These military operations and activities produce specific effects among audiences necessary to meet U.S. strategic objectives. As such, SLE has a significant role in shaping operational environments and, at times, may be the decisive line of effort.

1-52. During shaping operations, SLE may be employed to support the following efforts or activities:
- Security cooperation.
- Building partner capacity and information sharing.
- Military support to public diplomacy.
- Efforts to achieve influence that promote stability, cooperation, and partnership among allies and potential allies, as well as foster legitimacy of U.S. and coalition operations and activities.
- Efforts to achieve influence that dissuades adversaries from gaining a malign or disruptive advantage or informs and inoculates the local populace against enemy or adversary propaganda.
- Sustaining and reaffirming partnerships.
- Planning and coordinating future combined operations.

Competition

In peacetime, Army forces engage with other nations to demonstrate capabilities, increase interoperability, and improve opportunities for access and partnership. An example is U.S. Army Indo-Pacific Soldiers displaying their helicopters to senior Indonesian defense officials during Garuda Shield, a bilateral military exercise sponsored by U.S. Army Indo-Pacific and hosted by the Indonesian Armed Forces. Approximately 1,200 personnel from U.S. Army and Indonesian Armed Forces conducted a series of training events focused on peace support operations. Major components include a staff exercise and a field training exercise supported by aviation, which includes specialized medical training on tactical casualty care and live fire exercises.

PREVENT

1-53. Army operations to prevent include all activities to deter an adversary's undesirable actions. An extension of operations to shape, these operations are designed to prevent adversary opportunities to further

exploit positions of relative advantage by raising the potential costs to adversaries of continuing activities that threaten U.S. interests. Prevent activities are generally weighted toward actions to protect friendly forces, assets, and partners, and to indicate U.S. intent to execute subsequent phases of a planned operation.

1-54. During operations to prevent, SLE may be employed to support the following efforts or activities:

- Initiate partnered elements of the theater campaign plan; that is, initiate those elements that require or rely on unified action partner involvement.
- Efforts to achieve persuasive influence that dissuade adversaries from undertaking actions that threaten U.S. interests.
- Efforts to defend key or specific audiences from adversary influence, manipulation, or mobilization.
- Strengthen unity of effort among unified action partners and project a unified front against adversary actions and intentions.
- Develop coordinated plans and communication synchronization with unified action partners.
- Defense support to public diplomacy.
- Strengthen support from unified action partners against increasing adversarial pressure.
- Countering adversarial use of propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation.
- Combined exercises and training.
- Eliminate or reduce civilian interference with the conduct of operations.

> ### Crisis
> Army forces must deter or respond to situations that challenge the status quo. In the case of Operation DRAGOON RIDE, U.S. Army Europe conducted a series of convoys of armored vehicles assigned to the 2nd Cavalry Regiment and 18th Military Police Brigade. This maneuver across 1,800 kilometers through six European countries was a show of force and solidarity with North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies in response to Russian aggression in Ukraine. Engagement by Soldiers and leaders included local gatherings, festivals, and parades were held and accompanied by local television and other media interview, livestreams, and appearances before returning to Rose Barracks, Germany.

CONDUCT LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS

1-55. During large-scale combat operations, Army forces focus on the defeat and destruction of enemy ground forces as part of the joint team. Army forces close with and destroy enemy forces in any terrain, exploit success, and break their opponent's will to resist. Army forces attack, defend, conduct stability tasks, and consolidate gains to attain national objectives.

1-56. Divisions and corps are the formations central to the conduct of large-scale combat operations. They are organized, trained, and equipped to enable subordinate organizations. The ability to prevail in ground combat is a decisive factor in breaking an enemy's will to continue a conflict.

1-57. During large-scale combat operations, SLE may be employed to support the following efforts or activities:

- Influence civilian populations to adhere to population and resource control (such as curfews, movement restrictions) measures to minimize civilian interference and civilian casualties.
- Correct or counter misinformation.
- Counter propaganda and disinformation.
- Synchronizing engagement and messages with unified action partners.
- Sustaining or strengthening support from unified action partners against enemy attacks in all domains, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment.

- Consequence management or response to incidents or crises.
- Augment or reinforce combined arms operations to increase the intensity of coercive influence applied against the enemy.

Conflict

Even the most vicious close-quarters combat requires Soldier and leader engagement. During combat operations in the Marianas campaign of World War II, Army and Marine forces conducted engagements by loudspeaker, leaflets, and face-to-face to encourage the evacuation and surrender of civilian and enemy troops, respectively. Extraordinary measures were taken to include those resulting in the award of the Navy Cross Award for Heroic Soldier and Leader Engagement:

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Private First Class Guy L. Gabaldon, United States Marine Corps Reserve.

For extraordinary heroism while serving with Headquarters and Service Company, Second Marines, Second Marine Division, in action against enemy Japanese forces on Saipan and Tinian, Mariana Islands, South Pacific Area, from 15 June to 1 August 1944. Acting as a Japanese Interpreter for the Second Marines, Private First Class Gabaldon displayed extreme courage and initiative in single-handedly capturing enemy civilian and military personnel during the Saipan and Tinian operations. Working alone in front of the lines, he daringly entered enemy caves, pillboxes, buildings, and jungle brush, frequently in the face of hostile fire, and succeeded in not only obtaining vital military information, but in capturing well over one thousand enemy civilians and troops. Through his valiant and distinguished exploits, Private First Class Gabaldon made an important contribution to the successful prosecution of the Campaign and, through his efforts, a definite humane treatment of civilian prisoners was assured. His courageous and inspiring devotion to duty throughout reflects the highest credit upon himself and the United States Naval Service.

CONSOLIDATE GAINS

1-58. Army operations to consolidate gains include activities to solidify any temporary operational success, set the conditions for a sustainable environment, and allow for a transition of control to civil authorities. Consolidation of gains is an integral and continuous part of armed conflict and is necessary for achieving success across the range of military operations. Army forces deliberately plan with unified action partners to consolidate gains during all phases of an operation. Early and effective consolidation activities are a form of exploitation conducted while other operations are ongoing to enable the achievement of lasting favorable outcomes in the shortest time.

1-59. During operations to consolidate gains, selected representatives of certain specialties (for example, PSYOP, PA, civil affairs) are employed to conduct engagement in support of the following efforts or activities, among others:

- Assisting the legitimate civil authority to shape themes and messages that increase transparency and bolster legitimacy.
- Addressing or thwarting misinformation or disinformation immediately.
- Providing defense support to public diplomacy.
- Explaining continued U.S. or coalition presence and activities.
- Strengthening information capacity of local partners through training, equipping, and advising.

This page intentionally left blank.

Chapter 2

Roles and Responsibilities

2-1. As commanders, staff, individuals, and units conduct SLE, they use discipline and professionalism in day-to-day interactions to amplify positive actions, counter enemy propaganda, and increase good will and support for their mission. These interactions provide the most convincing venue for conveying positive information, assuaging fears, refuting rumors, and mitigating information for effect, propaganda, disinformation, and misinformation. Personal interactions often prove crucial in garnering local support for Army operations and reducing friction and mistrust.

2-2. Commanders empower subordinates to lead at their levels through mission command. At every level, those conducting SLE are responsible to Army Values, professionalism, and supporting national objectives and the current mission.

THE COMMANDER

2-3. Commanders are their units' key engagers because their position and authority invest them with the greatest degree of credibility and access to undertake engagements. They do more than simply model appropriate actions. During operations, commanders optimize interactions with a wide array of audiences (such as the local populace, unified action partners, governmental leaders, and potential allies) through regular engagement. Doing so enables commanders to—

- Engender the trust and confidence of the local populace or other audience.
- Bolster confidence in and consensus behind effective and mission-supportive local leaders.
- Deliver messages.
- Quickly address or counter misinformation, disinformation, or propaganda.
- Ensure Soldiers and subordinate leaders effectively engage the populace in their areas.

2-4. Commanders foster a culture of engagement to accomplish their mission and fulfill their intent as well as exhibit and uphold Army Values. This culture of engagement buoys Soldiers' confidence to engage many audiences, especially the populace in the AO. Commanders foster a culture of engagement through—

- Guidance in the development of a robust communication strategy.
- Defining and reporting critical information requirements.
- Organization of the staff.
- Leveraging IO, public affairs, foreign disclosure, civil affairs, and PSYOP personnel for advice and assistance.
- Leading by example (such as actively conducting engagements).
- Establishing and upholding training requirements (cultural, language, and negotiation training).
- Ensuring resources are provided to staff (manning, funds, and time).

2-5. Commanders ensure their staff develops engagement efforts that supports their communication synchronization plan. They develop a comprehensive engagement plan with their PSYOP planner, IO officer, civil affairs (CA), the supporting foreign disclosure officer, and public affairs personnel. If available, foreign area officers, cultural or political advisors, and relevant unified action partners also assist. Similarly, commanders leverage other expertise, such as interpreters, to execute SLE.

2-6. Commanders consider the following questions when integrating SLE into operations:

- What is the unified narrative and how can my unit's actions and engagements support it?
- How can SLE most effectively contribute to achieving objectives or the desired end state?
- Who needs to be influenced, how, and why?

- How might the counterpart to an engagement seek to influence you or your unit?
- Who is the right engager for a specific engagement?
- What other factors (such as location, timing) contribute to the success of a specific engagement?
- What obstacles prevent achieving objectives and how can actions and engagements eliminate or mitigate them?
- What training is needed to enhance SLE proficiency?
- Have the nine principles of SLE been taken into account? (See Chapter 1 for the nine principles.)

THE STAFF

2-7. An effective SLE program is only possible if a single individual, element, cell, or section is assigned responsibility. Assigned or supporting PSYOP staff planners can plan, manage, and assess the commander's SLE efforts in their influence role in support of the command's larger engagement synchronization and inform and influence activities. When the unit lacks assigned PSYOP personnel, SLE may be led by the IO officer, civil affairs personnel, public affairs, or the IO working group as a corporate effort.

2-8. The appointed SLE proponent will ensure synchronization across all engagements through participation in the IO working group. The IO working group is comprised of core members with representatives from the operations staff section, intelligence staff section, civil affairs staff section, public affairs, PSYOP, other IRC representatives, and subordinate IO officers or designated representatives. The purpose of this working group is to advise the commander and operations officer on the most effective integration and synchronization of IRCs—as well as IO units augmenting or supporting the operation—to achieve the scheme of IO. More detailed information about the IO working group can be found in FM 3-13 and ATP 3-13.1.

2-9. The entire staff contributes to SLE planning, preparation, execution, and assessment. Depending on the mission and situation, each member of the staff may be responsible for conducting SLE, often alongside unified action partner equivalents; e.g., the intelligence officer will likely engage with partner intelligence officers or personnel and sustainment troops with vendors and contractors. This is codified in some cases as the liaison maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action (JP 3-08). Like the commander, the staff considers who needs to be influenced, the best means and methods to engage the specific audience, and the desired outcomes of the engagement.

2-10. SLE is a shared responsibility among the staff. Commanders allocate the necessary resources (especially manning) to accomplish the mission. The lead staff proponent is responsible for, among other things—

- Identifying and assessing all audiences that the unit must engage with to meet the commander's end state and the relevant actors who are beneficial to the effort.
- Maintaining a system of tracking SLE (See appendix B for examples).
- Showing how the unit's engagements interrelate, reinforce the approved narrative, and support the commander's intent.
- Consolidating SLE after-action notes and outcomes into a standard operating procedure (SOP)-approved information system.
- Disseminating key findings, commitments, and best practices up, down, and laterally.
- Leading SLE assessment and taking appropriate actions based on the results.

2-11. Each staff section undertakes certain duties and responsibilities in regards to SLE. Paragraphs 2-12 through 2-23 outline responsibilities for each staff section.

2-12. The assistant chief of staff, personnel (G-1) or battalion or brigade personnel staff officer (S-1) identifies and recommends assignment of unit personnel who have the talent (appropriate language and cultural skills, knowledge, behaviors, attributes, and preferences) to conduct SLE among foreign audiences.

2-13. The assistant chief of staff, intelligence (G-2) or battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer (S-2) is responsible for—

- Assessing the degree to which the threat could affect engagement efforts.
- Articulating the standards, precedents, or cultural norms that are likely to meaningfully impact the engagement.
- Assessing the impact of other operational environment characteristics on SLE.
- Preparing briefings/debriefings of security forces.
- Providing recommendations on relevant actors in the AO (human intelligence reports, high-value individual cards, all-source analysis).
- Network diagraming relationships between key groups and sub-groups in the AO.
- Developing collection plans to support and assess engagements.
- Tasking intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms to support information gathering in support of SLE.
- Briefing/debriefing the SLE team.

2-14. G-3 or S-3 handles—

- The effective integration of SLE into current operations.
- Submitting requests for forces or augmentation if appropriate expertise is lacking.
- The ways that other capabilities can be synchronized to complement and reinforce SLE.
- How best to provide force protection.
- Identifying changes to unit operations requiring efforts to inform audiences of actions to minimize interference and dis/misinformation.

2-15. The fires section integrates SLE into targeting process through targeting working groups and board.

2-16. The knowledge management section—

- Develops systems to manage key SLE information to ensure it is widely available for use by other staff elements and subordinate units
- Develops a SOP-approved SLE information system

2-17. The plans section identifies—

- Future areas of operation (to assist in identifying potential audiences and relevant actors by the IO working group).
- Need to reengage specific audiences via assessment wargame analysis.

2-18. The G-4 or S-4 oversees—

- Equipment needed to support SLE execution.
- Services or supplies required.
- Analysis and forecast of logistics requirements for projects and engagements.
- Identification of unit capabilities in support of SLE missions.
- Creation of concept of support for overarching SLE mission.
- Allocation of resources throughout AO.
- Running estimates for enduring operations.

2-19. The G-6 or S-6 is responsible for communications needed to support SLE execution, whether face-to-face or virtual.

2-20. The provost marshal office ensures—

- Proper security planning of SLE to include conduct physical security inspection.
- Access of visitor(s) if SLE conducted within headquarters area.

2-21. The public affairs section—

- Prepares to record and document activities (if required).
- Provides higher headquarters' and unit public affairs themes, messages, and talking points to support SLE.

- Reviews previous engagements.
- Facilitates and enables civilian media engagement, coverage, and interviews to support SLE.

2-22. G-9 or S-9—

- Ties unit SLE into civil affairs programs, projects, and activities.
- Makes recommendations on relevant actors in the AO (civil information reports, PMESII-PT Analysis, CA situation reports).
- Provides the G-2 (or S-2) information gained from civilians in the area of operations.
- Coordinates with the IO officer to ensure disseminated information is not contradictory.
- Coordinates with the public affairs officer on supervising public information media under civil control.
- Identifies and assists the G-6 (or S-6) with coordinating military use of local information systems.
- Supports non-CA-directed or -led engagements with CA expertise.

2-23. The foreign disclosure officer ensures—

- Commander and staff know what disclosure authorities are in place by country, category of information, and classification authority.
- Effective and efficient procedures are in place for the review and approval of information desired for disclosure.
- Commander and staff understand and do not violate the national disclosure policy against conveying false impressions.

2-24. More broadly, the staff, either through the IO working group or a separate SLE working group—

- Develops the unit's engagement strategy to reinforce approved themes and messages.
- Integrates, synchronizes, and deconflicts deliberate engagements.
- Allocates resources and support.
- Collects, analyzes, and maintains engagement data.
- Coordinates refinement of future engagements.
- Directs re-engagement.

DEVELOPS OVERALL ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY

2-25. An engagement strategy is a comprehensive and adaptive program of interactions across all levels and audiences that reinforces mission accomplishment and achieves the commander's intent. The strategy must nest with higher headquarters' engagement activities and, ultimately, with national strategic objectives. As a minimum, it should include the following:

- Analysis and assessment of the operational environment with specific emphasis on its cultural and informational aspects.
- Identification of desired effects of SLE.
- Relevant audiences, actors, and key leaders.
- Development of spheres of influence, identifying which person or element is responsible for engagements with a designated audience.
- Development of engagement objectives.
- Frequency of engagements.
- Determination of how each engagement reinforces or complements all others.
- Choice of engagement type, such as—
  - Media engagements.
  - Key leader engagement (known as KLE).
  - Traditional communication events.
  - Civil engagements conducted by CA forces.
  - Police engagements.
  - Unified action partner engagements.

- Selection of appropriate physical activities to reinforce engagements.
- Selection and application of engagement tools and resources.
- Development of branches and sequels or alternative approaches.
- Training and rehearsal times and locations.
- Assessment plan.
- Tracking of commitments.
- Development of reporting protocols

CRAFTS COMMANDER'S NARRATIVE TO REINFORCE APPROVED THEMES AND MESSAGES

2-26. The commander frames the narrative the unit will communicate. The staff, led by the IO officer, crafts the verbiage and then refines it based on the commander's review and feedback. A narrative is an overarching expression of context and desired results. It focuses primarily on shaping perceptions of relevant audiences in the AO. Not only does it provide rationale to audiences affected by military operations, but the narrative also serves as a guide to units so that their actions, words, and images appropriately align. The final result is a unit whose actions support and reinforce the narrative and ensure its consistency, viability, and effectiveness.

2-27. This narrative accounts for and nests with approved themes and messages, which come down from the strategic level through public affairs and PSYOP channels. A theme is an overarching concept or intention, designed for broad application to achieve operational objectives. A message is a more narrowly-focused communication directed at a specific audience to support a specific theme.

INTEGRATES, SYNCHRONIZES, AND DECONFLICTS PLANNED ENGAGEMENTS

2-28. SLE must be viewed comprehensively and synergistically like other planned actions and activities. Engagements should never be one-off events but rather planned as webs of interactions and conversations that advance, amplify, enhance, and affirm intended consequences or, conversely, decelerate, mitigate, or diminish unintended consequences. An effective engagement plan also requires vigilant monitoring and constant updating to avoid overlaps or gaps and ensure consistency of messaging.

PROVIDES RESOURCES AND SUPPORT

2-29. Engagements are not typically resource intensive and only require personnel, transportation, and time. However, since the Army does not resource SLE element, unless commanders request and receive external augmentation, they must identify manning for SLE elements from existing resources. Most elements lack the personnel to habitually resource engagement without losing the ability to execute their assigned functions. The engagement team must research local customs and traditions regarding meetings of various types, such as business (formal and informal), general meetings, and other types of meetings. Depending on the type of engagement and the culture in which it occurs, there may be a requirement for refreshments or the exchange of small gifts. In the case of traditional communication, the cost of hosting a local gathering, for example, may include the cost of meals, transportation, and lodging for the attendees and possibly even stipends to encourage wider attendance.

COLLECTS, ANALYZES, AND MAINTAINS ENGAGEMENT DATA

2-30. Engagements yield critical information that facilitates analysis. Data such as who attended the engagement, what was said and by whom, what grievances or concerns were aired, what commitments or promises were made, and even what non-verbal cues were noted are all important to capture, catalog, and subsequently analyze. (See paragraph 3-47 for more information about the role note takers play in supporting this task and Appendix B for examples.)

COORDINATES REFINEMENT OF FUTURE ENGAGEMENTS

2-31. Based on a synthesis of the engagement data collected, the lead staff proponent for SLE as part of the IO working group, refines the engagement plan, synchronization matrix, and actual execution of future

engagements. Being culturally attuned is a fundamental tenet of effective engagement strategies. The input of a cultural advisor or other regional expert may prove helpful. In many cultures, meaningful results can only occur after a series of introductory interactions to build trust.

DIRECTS RE-ENGAGEMENT

2-32. Building trust and confidence, ensuring that actions are harmonized with words and images, influencing the local populace away from the influence of the enemy or adversarial forces—all require continual engagement and re-engagement and a keen eye toward where the next engagement or re-engagement needs to occur and why. The staff proponent for SLE has the primary responsibility to cull, assess, and prioritize which engagements require follow-up and ensuring it happens; however all Soldiers and leaders, based on their interactions, determine when re-engagements are necessary and inform their chain of command.

SPECIALIZED UNITS AND PERSONNEL

2-33. Every unit is responsible for shaping its operational area, and while SLE is an embedded capability within every unit, there are times when external support from trained experts or specialized forces is warranted, even essential to achieving outcomes necessary for mission accomplishment. Throughout the SLE process, expertise provided by PSYOP and CA forces or personnel can make the difference between success and failure. In execution, the use of indigenous advisors or spokespersons, as well as translators, ensure that messages and talking points are delivered with greater cultural empathy and accuracy. Planned SLEs, in particular, benefit from careful selection of the lead engager. Commanders should select organic personnel (regardless of specialty or assigned duties) who have the cultural background, travel experience, education, or other unique factors relevant to SLE. If the requisite expertise is lacking from within, commanders look externally to find the right person. The extra time it takes to find this individual is typically outweighed by their ability to deliver the desired results. Commanders and staffs weigh their priorities, resources, and timelines as they determine how and who to incorporate from outside the unit. The following groups are potential options for external support:

- PSYOP forces and personnel.
- CA forces.
- Foreign area officers.
- Foreign disclosure officers.
- Linguists.
- Security force assistance brigades.
- Cultural, political, and other advisors.
- Military police.
- Musicians.
- Indigenous advisors and spokespersons.
- Unified action partners.
- New partners developed through SLE.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND PERSONNEL

2-34. PSYOP Soldiers primarily conduct engagement to influence selected individuals and groups. As part of a dedicated influence capability, PSYOP Soldiers are selected, trained, educated, equipped, and organized to plan, execute, and assess influence-oriented engagement with targets and audiences. This includes planning engagements with foreign populations, leaders, key communicators, and others to achieve specific objectives.

2-35. PSYOP planners and Soldiers plan and execute military information support operations within the parameters of a Secretary of Defense-approved program or some type of order that provides specific parameters on engagement with approved and prohibited targets and audiences. Office of the Secretary of Defense-level documents provide guidance on Department of Defense (DOD) influence activities on engagement that also applies to non-PSYOP forces. An Office of the Secretary of Defense-prohibited

individual or group for PSYOP forces is also typically prohibited to other U.S. forces unless the Secretary of Defense, or designated authority, provides a specific exception—which would be rare. For more information on DOD policy, refer to CJCSI 3110.05F and DODI 3607.02. The following vignette is an example of a prohibited SLE target.

Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani

It is best to remain *unengaged* when a key leader's influence is congruent with Army forces' engagement objectives. An example is Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the spiritual leader of Shia Islam and an important influence for U.S. efforts to establish stability during Operation Iraqi Freedom. During the invasion and subsequent consolidation phase, al-Sistani was widely viewed as a neutral force for regional stabilization and this was respected by Shia and Sunni Iraqis. For that reason, PSYOP forces operated under strict orders to not address him in any way nor cite him in their messages. Commanders quickly applied this restriction to their forces out of concern that any mention of al-Sistani would cause him to be viewed as other than a neutral broker for peace in Iraq.

2-36. In the case of a key leader, a PSYOP Soldier may seek to put out information of interest to people the leader influences, but a longer term goal is to influence the leader for a variety of reasons, such as to—

- Support U.S. objectives.
- Build rapport for follow-on influence efforts.
- Use the leader as a means of influencing broader groups and other key leaders.
- Provide legitimacy and credibility to U.S. influential messages by spreading the content via a trusted source.

2-37. For PSYOP forces, face-to-face communication is one of the means and techniques to conduct engagement. During planning and influence series development, a key output is a face-to-face encounter outline, which highlights issues PSYOP forces should address, to include particular themes, as well as talking points and topics to avoid. The series packet (comprising psychological actions and messages directed at a specific target or audience), along with the face-to-face outline, then goes to a select few command staff members for review and comment before the commander approves it for execution. Once the series is approved, PSYOP forces then have an official mandate and guidance to address an issue. This is particularly important when confronting politically sensitive or controversial issues in that the outline provides not only PSYOP forces with specific guidance, but other forces and units as well. That guidance can serve as the basis for developing talking points for the rest of the command, and serves as a control measure to help achieve consistent, predictable results. When addressing issues during unplanned encounters in the normal course of operations, PSYOP Soldiers frequently rely on general guidance or guidance from applicable series. Consequently, an important advantage PSYOP Soldiers have over other forces is that they are prepared to conduct engagement at any time to knowledgably discuss a wide range of issues.

2-38. PSYOP staff planners and unit leaders assist in managing and assessing a unit's overall engagement activities. This ensures consistency across operating forces, prevents conflicting effects with other inform and influence activities, and remains within Office of the Secretary of Defense guidelines. For PSYOP forces, part of assessment is to determine the psychological effects of deliberate actions to include SLE. SLE can have significant effects regardless of the messages conveyed. Decades of operational data demonstrate that face-to-face communication is among the most effective means of influencing a target or audience and continues to be an important influence tool. Refer to FM 3-53 for more information about PSYOP forces execution of engagements.

CIVIL AFFAIRS FORCES AND PERSONNEL

2-39. Army CA forces are the DOD's primary force specifically trained and educated to shape foreign political-military environments by working through and with host nations, regional partners, and indigenous populations. These forces, and the operations they conduct, are the commander's asset to purposefully engage

nonmilitary organizations, institutions, and populations. CA forces plan, prepare for, execute, assess, and transition civil affairs operations at all levels of war.

2-40. CA forces are designated forces and units organized, trained, and equipped to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military operations. The mission of CA forces is to mitigate or defeat threats to civil society, conduct responsibilities normally performed by civil governments across the range of military operations, or to enable civil-military operations to shape the civil environment and set the conditions for military operations.

2-41. Fundamental to civil-military operations and civil affairs operations is the establishment and maintenance of relationships with civil authorities, the general population, and other organizations. SLE provides one of the surest means to accomplish both the cultivation of these relationships and their continued viability.

FOREIGN AREA OFFICERS

2-42. Foreign area officers are commissioned officers from any of the armed services who are regionally focused experts in political-military operations. They possess a combination of strategic focus and regional expertise with political, cultural, sociological, economic, and geographic awareness, and foreign language proficiency in at least one of the languages in their specified region. Army foreign area officers typically serve at the geographic combatant command or Army service component command staff levels. They advise senior commanders and leaders on political-military issues and relations with other nations, provide cultural expertise to forward-deployed commands conducting military operations, build and maintain long-term relationships with foreign leaders, develop and coordinate security cooperation plans, execute security assistance programs with host nations, and report on national or regional political, military, and economic information to the U.S. government.

2-43. In order to accomplish their duties and fulfill their command's mission, foreign area officers routinely conduct SLE, either as the lead engager or in support of others. Their expertise is also invaluable when preparing others for SLE. Their knowledge of local cultural, social, and political customs and practices make them ideal as role players during SLE rehearsals.

FOREIGN DISCLOSURE OFFICERS

2-44. Foreign disclosure officers are those U.S. government civilian or uniformed military personnel who are authorized and tasked to plan for, recommend, and effect the disclosure of classified military information (known as CMI) and/or controlled unclassified information (known as CUI) to an authorized representative of a foreign government or international organization. Foreign disclosure officers are the principal advisor to the commander and staff in this area and must be fully integrated members of the engagement team and or IO working group.

LINGUISTS

2-45. Linguists bring specialized expertise in the language or languages of the populace in the AO. They provide translation and interpretation support to all phases of SLE. Typically, different people perform translation than do interpretation. Translators focus on the technical task of translating one language to another, with emphasis on ensuring that the language is clear and accurate. They use dictionaries and other reference material to aid their translation. In contrast, interpreters convert one language to another and vice versa in real time. They must be attentive listeners, able to hear what is being said in one language while rendering it in another, and knowledgeable of the subject or issues about which they are interpreting. Leaders must closely monitor the role of host-nation or third-country national linguists in SLE to avoid any potential personal bias that may be counter to U.S. policy.

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE BRIGADES

2-46. Geographically aligned security force assistance brigades have intrinsic and current knowledge to help support commanders developing an effective unified narrative.

CULTURAL, POLITICAL, AND OTHER ADVISORS

2-47. Depending on the nature of operations, the complexity of the OE, and the degree of unified action partner involvement and collaboration, commanders may have a range of advisors providing specialized expertise and consultation. These might include political-military or foreign policy advisors, cultural advisors, socio-behavioral advisors, or other subject-matter experts.

2-48. Foreign policy expertise is provided by U.S. State Department political advisors. Political advisors are assigned to the U.S. military service chiefs, the regional unified combatant commands, select subordinate operational commands and task forces, the functional commands, and the National Guard Bureau.

2-49. Cultural advisement tends to be situation- and mission-dependent and may require full-time positions on a staff. Cultural expertise is typically contracted and filled by U.S. personnel who emigrated from the country or region in which operations are occurring or are members of the local populace aligned with U.S. interests.

2-50. Similarly, socio-behavioral or other advisors are added to staffs depending on mission requirements. For example, during Operations IRAQI and ENDURING FREEDOM, commanders down to brigade level had access to human terrain teams comprised of personnel from the social science disciplines (the Human Terrain System and its teams were discontinued in 2014).

MILITARY POLICE

2-51. Police engagement can be formal or informal. Police engagement may be an activity as part of deliberate information gathering, targeting, or collection efforts or can be conducted as a reactive response to an episodic event.

2-52. Formal police engagement gains support or information or conveys a message. It requires preparation, coordination, and post-engagement reporting. Military police or criminal investigation division personnel may serve as the key communicators within a sphere of influence that includes host-nation or multinational police leaders, or they may support a separate key communicator. At home station installations, military police and criminal investigation division agents conduct formal police engagements with communities to collect information and to develop solutions to mitigate or prevent crime or disorder.

2-53. Informal police engagement occurs when military police interact with other police entities or populations. Military police identify criminal networks, crime-conducive conditions, and other factors in the OE that can destabilize an area. Informal police engagement gathers information through passive collection techniques and talking with the population or police partners. Military police must be cognizant of these opportunities and ensure that this information is reported and fused with other collected information. For additional information on police engagement, see ATP 3-39.10.

MUSICIANS

2-54. Army bands are an IRC that can create desired effects at a specific time and place through music performances. Army bands can provide commanders with an advantage by influencing the attitudes and behaviors of relevant audiences.

2-55. Bands communicate through performances that align with and support the commander's intent. Army Musicians understand talking points and study local culture, habits, and ways of communicating. Army band performances are Soldier and leader engagements that are non-threatening and are delivered with confidence and competence. For more information refer to ATP 1-19.

UNIFIED ACTION PARTNERS

2-56. Interagency partners should be informed and potentially participate in SLE based on their knowledge and understating of the operational environment. This could include the United States Agency for International Development, other governmental agencies, Department of State, and intelligence community partners.

2-57. Partner nations can be vital to supporting SLE as they might be more knowledgeable of local culture and customs, or may be indigenous to the population.

INDIVIDUAL SOLDIERS, CIVILIANS, AND LEADERS

2-58. Individual Soldiers, civilians, and leaders often find themselves having to conduct unplanned SLE, particularly dynamic interactions with the local populace. Their ability to do so competently and confidently could mean the difference between success and failure, not only of the engagement itself but the larger operation or mission.

2-59. The necessity to conduct SLE at a moment's notice is why commanders create a culture of engagement in their units and make SLE a routine training event. Like reacting to any other contact, Soldiers and Civilians ensure that they understand and rehearse SLE basics on a reoccurring basis. They extend lessons learned through individual and unit training to the interactions they have outside work and vice versa. They understand that even impromptu meetings, engagements, or interactions benefit from applying fundamentals that only get better with practice. For more information on individual, unit, and institutional training on SLE, see Appendix A.

Chapter 3

Engagement Planning and Preparation

3-1. SLE is a component of IO planning. The IO working group refines desired effects and develops initial engagement strategies as a supporting IRC that can contribute to one or more command objectives. These objectives, in turn, support the scheme of IO and the unit's concept of operations and mission.

3-2. An engagement strategy is a series of planned engagements with subjects over a defined period, coordinated with other activities to help leaders and Soldiers achieve desired effects. The purpose of engagement planning is to increase the likelihood of engagement success.

SOLDIER AND LEADER ENGAGEMENT AND ARMY DESIGN METHODOLOGY

3-3. Army design methodology (ADM) applies critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar problems and approaches to solve them. Often the most challenging aspect of an operational environment (OE) is the people within it and the dynamics between and among them (See ADP 5-0 and ATP 5-0.1).

3-4. ADM is intended to be collaborative and benefits from diverse perspectives and open and ongoing dialogue, which SLE can uniquely provide. In each of the steps associated with ADM, commanders and staffs consider SLE or aspects associated with SLE. These steps include framing the OE, framing problems, framing solutions, and reframing.

3-5. When framing the OE and framing problems, commanders and staffs consider where human conflict, friction, or points of tension exist, both in the present and with respect to the desired end state (that is, relevant actors' responses). An examination of the various narratives that exist within the OE leads to an understanding of where they align, where they compete, and how they support or degrade the command's unified narrative.

3-6. When framing solutions that lead to attainment of the desired end state, commanders and staffs consider the ways SLE can create bridges between current and future conditions. While SLE alone rarely solves the most complicated problems confronting a unit, engagement can lay the foundation for breakthroughs that make attainment of the end state more likely.

3-7. SLE may provide insights that lead to reassessment and reframing. Conversely, they may be a means by which commanders ensure reframed solutions are implemented successfully and made more enduring.

SOLDIER AND LEADER ENGAGEMENT AND THE MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

3-8. Table 3-1 on page 3-2 lists some of the considerations the IO officer or element includes during each step of the military decision-making process (MDMP) to ensure the effective integration and synchronization of SLE. For a fuller discussion of IO and the MDMP, see FM 3-13 and ATP 3-13.1.

Table 3-1. Considerations during the military decision-making process

MDMP step	SLE considerations and actions
Receipt of mission	• Ensure running estimate includes pertinent information on SLE (for example, civil considerations, facts and assumptions, specified and implied tasks, and high-payoff engagement nominations). • If SLE is necessary to provide information critical to subsequent planning, the commander's initial guidance and warning order convey this fact. • Identify SLE resources allocated from higher headquarters (including forces).
Mission analysis	• Prepare information overlays that visualize potential actors (key leaders or decision makers) and audiences for engagement. • Identify organic SLE required resources and their availability. • Assess hazards and risk associated with SLE. • Support intelligence staff development of templates, databases, social network diagrams, and other products that portray information about threats or other key groups or audiences in the area of operations and relevant factors about each (language, ethnicity, political or tribal affiliation, preferred methods of receiving or conveying information). • Identify high-value and high-payoff engagements for SLE. • Determine if SLE is an implied task and if any constraints might inhibit subsequent SLE execution. • Ensure commander-approved themes, messages, and talking points are available to personnel tasked with conducting SLE. • The IO working group analyzes enemy, adversary, and other key actor narratives in the OE. It develop necessary products to communicate competing narratives and potential points of leverage or advantage.
Course of action development	• Include desired effects and potential key leaders for SLE within the scheme of IO. • Identify hazards, develop and emplace controls, and ensure the residual risk associated with SLE is approved at the prescribed level of command. • Develop measures of performance and measures of effectiveness for SLE as a means to assess attainment of the supported IO objective, as well as drive information requirements.
Course of action analysis and wargaming	• Determine if planned SLE effectively synchronizes with other IRCs in support of each COA. • Identify challenges in timing and execution of SLE, as well as other COA strengths and weaknesses. • Examine how the enemy or adversary will react to or counter SLE efforts and develop counteractions. • Examine how neutral actors will react to changing narratives within the OE and develop mitigation strategies.
Course of action comparison	• Assess relative impact of SLE on each COA. • Refine SLE to better support specific COAs. • Modify COAs to better leverage SLE.
Course of action approval	• Articulate to the commander how SLE enhances the preferred COA. • Provide input to warning order if SLE is time sensitive or requires early initiation.
Orders production, dissemination, and transition	• Refine SLE plan based on commander's final guidance. • Write appropriate sections of the base order and IO appendix.

COA	course of action	IO	information operations
MDMP	military decision-making process	OE	operational environment
SLE	Soldier and leader engagement		

SOLDIER AND LEADER ENGAGEMENT AND THE SCHEME OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS

3-9. IO begins with a clear and concise statement of where, when, and how the commander intends to employ synchronized IRCs to create effects in and through the operational environment to support the overall operation and accomplish the mission. Based on the commander's planning guidance, the IO officer or designated representative develops a separate scheme of IO for each course of action the staff develops.

3-10. Creating complementary effects in the OE is essential to the success of any operation; therefore, SLE will invariably factor into each course of action scheme of IO. Among the reasons are—
- SLE is a readily available IRC down to the lowest-level unit.
- SLE can produce near-term, measurable effects in the cognitive dimension of the information environment.
- SLE can deliver meaningful results employing few resources—at minimum, it requires only two people: the lead engager and a note taker.
- SLE allows commanders, in particular, direct control of outcomes in support of their intent.

SOLDIER AND LEADER ENGAGEMENT INTEGRATION AND SYNCHRONIZATION

3-11. The IO working group employs, analyzes, and assesses a number of inputs in order to execute and refine the scheme of IO to support operations. While all inputs are necessary to conduct IO effectively, several have particular importance to the execution of SLE:
- National level guidance pertaining to the overarching narrative, legitimacy, and justification of the mission.
- Higher headquarters orders and guidance, as well as the commander's intent, concept of operations, guidance, and approved narrative provide specific guidance on the conduct of SLE.
- The combined information overlay includes facts, figures, and assessments about the AO that will help shape SLE planning and execution.
- A cultural calendar helps determine opportune or inopportune windows in which to conduct SLE or defer to a more appropriate time.
- PSYOP target audience analysis aids in the identification of individuals or groups and ongoing or planned messaging efforts
- Public affairs and PSYOP themes, messages, and talking points as well as themes to avoid.
- The IO synchronization matrix depicting planned SLE.

3-12. An important output of the IO working group is a refined list and schedule of engagements. While the synchronization matrix tracks individual interactions, it should be backed up with additional matrices or charts that show how they interrelate in the aggregate. Rarely are engagements discrete events or one-offs. The outcomes of one SLE feed into or prompt another. Since they all support the scheme of IO, they must be threaded together synergistically, with one amplifying or complementing all others.

THE ENGAGEMENT PROCESS

3-13. The engagement process for SLE uses the operations process of plan, prepare, execute, and assess. Each step of the engagement process involves a set of actions or activities that are necessary for successful SLE to occur (see table 3-2 on page 3-4). The IO officer or designated representative, aided by the IO working group, has responsibility to integrate IRCs, including SLE, into operations and coordinates with the designated staff focal point for SLE to ensure engagements are synchronized with all other IRCs.

Table 3-2. The engagement process

Process Step	Actions or Activities
Plan	• Identify the problem or opportunity the engagement is intended to solve or leverage and the desired effects of the engagement • Conduct or review formal and informal psychological operations target audience analyses • Identify the specific audience and subjects of the engagement • Analyze the engagement variables • Identify the interests at stake • Identify the best alternative to a negotiated agreement and zone of possible agreement • Generate potential options and associated standards • Identify the desired outcome and measures of performance and effectiveness • Assess available leaders to support planned engagements
Prepare	• Develop background information on subjects (target folders) • Review approved narrative, themes, and messages and craft appropriate talking points, authority to commit • Identify lead engager, note taker, and interpreter, if required • Select the venue and arrange for other logistical aspects of the engagement • Establish the agenda • Wargame and rehearse
Execute	• Conduct introductions • Build trust • Set expectations • Discuss and negotiate • Make commitments or agreements • Conclude
Assess	• Debrief • Analyze outcomes in relation to measures of performance and effectiveness • Determine whether reengagement is necessary

3-14. The SLE planning process primarily applies to deliberate planned engagements. Unplanned engagements also succeed from planning, not in their specifics, but in the application of battle drills focused on how to react to contact with different groups of people such as neutral local leaders, curious populace, or adversarial, but not hostile, groups (see Appendix B for more on preparing for unplanned SLE).

PLANNING AN ENGAGEMENT

3-15. The primary actions and activities that occur during SLE planning are listed in table 3-2. Further methods, techniques, and resources are explained below.

3-16. A key variable in SLEs is the range of cultures and accompanying customs that may be encountered. Soldiers and leaders must be prepared to engage and interact within those customs or risk undermining the ability to build trust. In some circumstances participating in a cultural custom may present a moral dilemma or require the engagement leader to violate policy. For example, offense may be taken if an alcoholic drink is refused where a prohibiting General Order is in effect; politely request a substitute. Soldiers and leaders might often engage with other leaders or people of influence whose moral character may be questionable. Circumstances such as these must be anticipated and where possible a response planned.

IDENTIFY THE PROBLEM

3-17. ADM has likely already identified the macro problem that commanders are attempting to solve through operations. In the contemporary OE, these problems are highly complex and have many subordinate or related problems attached to them. Commanders apply the entire range of capabilities, systems, people, and functions to solve each problem or set of problems. SLE is one capability that applies people to solve problems or leverage opportunities that are either anticipated or arise as operations occur. Using ADM, the problem at hand can be identified from multiple viewpoints and defined as precisely as possible. Doing so ensures that the SLE, when conducted, can directly address the problem or leverage the opportunity to maximum benefit.

CONDUCT OR REVIEW TARGET AUDIENCE ANALYSES

3-18. IO planning groups have several options for gathering analysis of their intended counterpart. PSYOP personnel conduct target area analysis of foreign targets and audiences they seek to influence, while public affairs personnel analyze the U.S. and the international audiences they seek to inform. Soldiers and leaders responsible for conducting engagement assess social networks, group dynamics, and key leaders' personalities to refine or update their plans.

3-19. PSYOP target audience analysis provides essential insights into how best to engage targets and audiences, such as preferred ways to receive information, language and dialect, biases, status within the wider community, vulnerabilities, and connections to other potential targets and audiences.

IDENTIFY SPECIFIC AUDIENCE AND SUBJECTS OF THE ENGAGEMENT

3-20. SLE is about engaging the most appropriate person or group of people at the right place and time to affect planned or current operations favorably. Sometimes the most appropriate person or group is the one that presents itself in real time. Other times, it is an individual or group that is deliberately identified and carefully cultivated. There is no set number of engagements that need to occur. They occur as necessary to advance the mission and commander's intent and achieve the desired end state.

3-21. Considerations that go into deciding who needs to be engaged include identifying the person or group that—
- Can best help solve the problems confronting the unit or optimize an opportunity.
- Has knowledge or a skill set of value to the commander or lead engager.
- Provides a network link to produce a means to get to another individual or group.
- Has influence or sway over others whose behavior needs to change.
- Can dispel incorrect or clarify confusing information.

3-22. Upon identifying the audience, commanders and staff incorporate the results of the PSYOP target area analysis and/or social network analysis to determine the sequence and scope of the intended engagement. Regarding sequence, consider additional individuals or audiences that, if engaged before or after the current SLE, help influence the outcome. Based on the relationship of these individuals or audiences to the relevant actor (for example, deferential, antagonistic, or influential), seek to arrange a series of engagements that encourages others to assist in efforts to influence him. Regarding scope, consider what issues should be addressed with the relevant actor at what time.

3-23. Plan how much and what type of information the lead engager will disclose during each engagement. The engagement team can increase the likelihood of incremental achievement in SLE by considering the various audiences and issues likely to be addressed over the period of an operation or campaign. This lessens the likelihood of overcomplicating an engagement or disclosing information that decreases leverage at a subsequent engagement.

The Anbar Awakening

Soldier and leader engagement occurs at different speeds and with different priorities from the immediate and local to the eventual and regional. There will be stress and conflict that can be ameliorated by echelons communicating and coordinating their engagement objectives using a top-down, bottom-up refined assessment process. A successful example of this is what became known as the Anbar Awakening.

In 2006, Army Captain Travis Patriquin, the civil affairs officer for 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division's and Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Deane, commander of 1st Battalion, 35th Armor began meeting with local sheikhs to secure their support for planned police recruitment drives in Ramadi, Iraq. Their first effort enlisted 80 candidates and grew steadily thereafter. Deane's outreach paid particular dividends as he developed a relationship with Ahmed Abu Risha and his elder brother Abdul Sattar, the leader of the Albu Risha tribe. Deane was the first coalition commander to realize Sattar's potential influence in Anbar and Baghdad. The Albu Risha long had been active against al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) but had been overlooked in the coalition's Sunni engagement efforts because of the tribe's lower-tier status. As one of the few surviving senior members of the ill-fated Anbar People's Committee, Sattar was well known throughout the tribes. Coalition leaders underestimated Sattar because the Albu Risha's influence (*wasta*) was not well known beyond Ramadi. The lines between the tribes and the insurgency were often hazy, and it was fortuitous for the coalition that the flexible Deane and Patriquin were on hand to explore and navigate these complex networks as Sattar's influence grew during the summer and fall.

Deane and Patriquin expanded their cooperation with the increasingly influential Sheikh Sattar, who organized an assembly of tribal sheikhs to oppose AQI. Their higher headquarters, the division-level Multi-National Force-West (MNF-W), had reservations about 1st Brigade's tribal outreach and about the coalition's overall prospects in Anbar. The senior Marine intelligence officer in Anbar produced a bleak assessment declaring the coalition and ISF were "no longer capable of militarily defeating the insurgency in Al Anbar." According to this report, the coalition had too few troops in Anbar to overcome the insurgency and U.S. units were unable to establish security beyond their bases. MNF-W concluded that both the Iraqi central and local governments had collapsed in Anbar and AQI filled the vacuum to become the strongest force in the province. In MNF-W's judgment, it was a "situation beyond repair." The report was quickly leaked to the American media and cast doubt on the increasingly unpopular campaign in Iraq. Deane's brigade commander, Colonel Sean MacFarland noted, "Because [of] these cautionary notes up at the MNF-W Headquarters, it was a little bit more difficult for me to convince my bosses to come down and embrace the sheikhs."

Four days after MNF-W's report concluding that Anbar was lost, Sattar's tribal alliance, known as the Anbar Emergency Council, went to war with AQI, just as the Anbar People's Committee had unsuccessfully done previously. On 21 August, AQI leaders Abu Bakr and Abu Uthman ordered an attack on the newly established Jazeera police station north of the Euphrates, an Iraqi Security Force outpost emplaced with the Albu Risha's support. The attack badly injured 6 Iraqi soldiers and killed 11 of the 30 policemen stationed there. Rather than quit, as had often happened before, the Iraqi police, newly confident in their U.S. military support, insisted on keeping the police station open. On the same day, AQI terrorists led by Rasheed Abu Zaayen, who had been released from U.S. detention at Camp Bucca the previous day, assassinated the leader of the Albu Ali Jassim tribe, Sheikh Khaled Ali Albu-Jassim, a former Iraqi

general and local political leader. The brazen attack on the tribally-endorsed police station combined with the murder and desecration of Sheikh Khaled's body created a tipping point. Outraged sheikhs from the Al Anbar tribes gathered on 31 August to declare an anti-AQI front. On 3 September, Deane reported to MacFarland that the Anbar Emergency Council and its armed wing, the "Anbar Revolutionaries," were ready to publically side with the coalition. This potent force of police, army officers, and local tribesmen, bolstered by former insurgent groups, had a stake in securing their homes and were well-positioned to provide 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division with intelligence about insurgent networks.

As battles raged across Ramadi that September, MacFarland became convinced that supporting tribal groups like the Anbar Revolutionaries was essential for growing the local police to secure the city. When he reported these developments to the MNF-W headquarters, however, he was met with hesitation and skepticism. The lineal Anbari sheikhs, heirs by birthright to tribal lines of succession, had fled to Jordan and been replaced by their more junior clansmen who remained. Deane and Patriquin engaged the tribal leaders who stayed in Iraq, while senior coalition leaders supported detached figureheads who were in Jordanian exile, creating a tension between two tribal outreach strategies that endured well into the following year.

The Awakening had an immediate impact on the security situation and transformed Anbar from an insurgent stronghold into an area where US forces conducted offensive and stability operations. Coalition and Iraqi forces cleared and held Ramadi and, eventually, the Euphrates River Valley and denied AQI its western support zone. The Awakening re-established Iraqi government control and allowed reconciliation between Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and Iraq's alienated Sunnis and became the model for securing other provinces and developing their local governments.

Note. Around 2010, the definition of "target" was revised to specify that a target is an entity or object *that performs a function for the adversary–considered for possible engagement or other action* (JP 3-60). JP 3-13 defines a target audience as an individual or group selected for influence engagements.

ANALYZE THE ENGAGEMENT VARIABLES

3-24. SLEs are interpersonal interactions that can be understood through detailed analysis. The defining characteristics can be identified and understood through the application of the engagement variables to provide a framework for analysis of situations similar to METT-TC or PMESII-PT rather than sequential steps like the troop leading procedures (see table 3-3 on page 3-8). Analysis and application of the variables help determine what is appropriate for the situation and do not prescribe what to do and when. Soldiers can use the variables during each stage of a negotiation: in planning, to provide categories of considerations; during execution to give insight into behaviors—"moves" available to both the U.S. lead engager and counterpart; and in the after action review to provide criteria to assess performance or the generated outcome.

Table 3-3. Engagement variables

Variable	Definition and considerations
Interests	• Needs, goals, motivations of the parties to the SLE. • Orient the Soldier and leader engagement to satisfy or achieve interests. • Distinguish between interests and positions
Alternatives	• Courses of action any single party can do without the cooperation of the other party. • Determine which of the alternatives is the BATNA. • Estimate the counterparty's BATNA. • Distinguish between alternatives and options.
Options	• Potential agreements or components of those agreements. • Lead engagers invent options to meet interests (ours as well as possibly. and theirs well enough to prevent them from exercising their BATNA).
Standards of legitimacy	• The rationale for an option to be considered fair or appropriate. • Standards must be culturally appropriate to the parties in the SLE.
BATNA	best alternative to a negotiated agreement	SLE	Soldier and leader engagement

IDENTIFY THE INTERESTS AT STAKE

3-25. Interests are the objectives of parties to the SLE. Interests include needs, goals, and motivations. It is important to distinguish interests from positions. Positions are things a party may request in an attempt to address interests. Interests are the reason for positions. Positions can be thought of as a task in support of a purpose, or interest. The lead engager has greater flexibility to achieve success by seeking not to secure positions, but to meet his commander's interests.

3-26. Every SLE should support the unit's mission and current operation and have a clear purpose, desired effects, and known potential outcomes. An introductory SLE intended to build rapport with a specific actor or audience may have an outcome simply to schedule a follow-on engagement and is stated as such in the plan. Follow-on SLEs may be to achieve specific outcomes, to simply maintain the counterpart as a source of information, or to have access to an individual for communicating to an audience that the unit does not. SLEs maintain relationships with relevant actors to have future support when needed.

3-27. Just as the commander has interests at stake in any SLE, so too does the audience (or counterpart). The lead engager must seek to understand the counterpart's interests to avoid surprise during the SLE and to generate potential agreements or outcomes suitable to both. Not understanding or acknowledging the counterpart's interests may result in an SLE that does not accomplish the objectives at hand or even worsens rapport. One can estimate the interests of the counterpart by revisiting the target area analysis and/or conducting civil reconnaissance. Commanders and staff continue to refine estimates throughout the preparation process and during the conduct of the SLE.

ARTICULATE THE BEST ALTERNATIVE TO A NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT AND ZONE OF POSSIBLE AGREEMENT

3-28. As with interests, one should seek to identify both parties' alternatives to an agreement. In planning, estimate what will cause the counterpart to walk away ("What will they do if they do not reach an agreement with me?").

3-29. Negotiations are a type of SLE with interpersonal or group interactions involving outcomes that are important to the participants. Alternatives, in this framework, are things any single party can do without the cooperation of the other party. To follow-through on a threat is an example of exercising an alternative to an agreement. One party may seem to have more alternatives initially, so it is important to identify and evaluate alternatives before conducting a SLE.

3-30. The best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) identifies the alternative that each party in a negotiation will choose in the event it cannot attain its desired outcome. The lead engager must identify this best alternative and accept that it will not significantly impact mission accomplishment. A BATNA can be conditions, situations, numeric quantities, or alternate solutions to be pursued through subsequent SLE with the same or other parties.

3-31. The zone of possible agreement (ZOPA) identifies the area where the desired end state lead engager overlaps with that of the audience or subject of the engagement. In this overlapping area, both sides can agree to the parameters of a solution or outcome. So long as the solution resides within the ZOPA, it satisfies the engagement's purpose and avoids the need for the BATNA. Figure 3-1 depicts the relationship between BATNA and ZOPA.

3-32. ZOPA is most useful to engagements that focus on one issue. Envisioning a ZOPA along a single dimension restricts a SLE to that issue and may preclude other or more creative options. While the ZOPA concept can be helpful to provide a visual representation of a potential solution set, it can cause a negotiator to arbitrarily select an outcome within the ZOPA and miss agreements that include different possibilities.


Figure 3-1. Relationship between best alternative to negotiated agreement and zone of possible agreement

<div style="border:1px solid black; padding:10px;">

Obstacle Emplacement

An example of these engagement concepts at work can be shown through two company grade officers preparing for a deliberate defense:

An engineer platoon leader is assigned to emplace a counter-mobility obstacle for a tank platoon. The tank and engineer platoon leaders at first disagree over the type and location of the obstacle to be emplaced. The tank platoon leader, wanting to achieve a particular obstacle effect, wants 12 rows of triple-standard concertina wire across a 1000m front (this is her negotiating position regarding the obstacle). The engineer, having in mind a different obstacle effect and having limited resources to deploy, wants to emplace a single row of triple-standard concertina across a 300m front (this is his position). One approach to resolving the disagreement might be haggling—each platoon leader making small concessions to the other until they agree to emplace six rows across a 550m front or something similar. In this example it might be obvious that the platoon leaders should discuss not just the breadth and depth of the obstacle, but (1) the obstacle effect desired by the tank platoon leader (the interest behind her position), (2) doctrinal concept that obstacles should be tied to terrain to achieve a desired effect, (3) resources available for emplacement, and (4) the missions and priorities of the engineer platoon leader (the interests behind his position). If they realize that what the tank platoon requires is a blocking obstacle and that the engineer platoon must use its concertina at another location, they might decide to use an anti-tank ditch instead—achieving a better blocking effect (near-total) with even less concertina (none). But they cannot arrive at such a solution if neither platoon leader ever inquires as to the other's intent (interests).

</div>

GENERATE POTENTIAL OPTIONS AND ASSOCIATED STANDARDS

3-33. Options are potential agreements (or components) that represent a course of action the parties may agree to pursue. Options differ from alternatives because each party must commit to the course of action for it to remain viable. During SLE, a party may suggest individually, or generate collaboratively, options that meet the interests of the parties. To be prepared for this eventuality, one must generate potential options prior to the SLE. Once proposed, the parties are likely to test options against the criteria of their respective interests. As such, options must satisfy both parties' interests enough to prevent them from exercising their respective BATNA.

3-34. Inventing creative options is a critical aspect of any SLE that requires agreement from both parties. If one assumes the situation is zero-sum—merely a matter of deciding how to compromise between respective positions—agreement becomes difficult and agreements actually made may be suboptimal for all. By focusing on interests, rather than positions, and thinking creatively about ways to meet those interests, the lead engager can invent options that increase value for one party at no cost to the other, if not increase value for all.

3-35. After generating options, one should seek to associate sources of legitimacy with each potential option. Sources of legitimacy, hereafter referred to as standards, provide the rationale for an option being perceived as fair or appropriate. While parties to an SLE should test options against how well they meet their interests, they must also test options against relevant standards. Examples of relevant standards include laws, policies, official guidance, existing agreements, precedents, benchmarks, generally accepted practices, or mutually agreed upon principles. These standards must be culturally appropriate. Across cultures, fairness is a powerful social norm.

3-36. The function of standards in a SLE is twofold: legitimizing options with standards makes it easier for one to agree without feeling tricked or unfairly treated; and, when equipped with standards, one can defend an agreement to others who can influence the situation, such as a commander or tribal or business leader. One may use the SOP or a field manual as a source of legitimacy for task accomplishment; Army regulations (ARs) as a standard for an award recommendation; or a locally accepted dispute resolution practice as a source of legitimacy for a component of a cease-fire or peace agreement.

IDENTIFY THE SOLDIER AND LEADER ENGAGEMENT'S DESIRED OUTCOME AND MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS

3-37. Having generated potential options, one can now identify the SLE's desired outcome. In the case of an introductory SLE intended to build rapport with a specific actor or audience, the outcome might simply be to schedule a follow-on engagement. Where there exists sufficient rapport to reach an agreement, the desired outcome might be a framework deal, a memorandum of agreement, or a final agreement. There may be more than one desired outcome, but they should be kept to a minimum to avoid creating an unwieldy engagement that tries to accomplish too much with a single interaction. Outcomes are articulated in terms of measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs). (See ATP 5-0.3 for more information on operation assessment.)

3-38. In the case of engagements, one example of a MOP may be the number of engagements with an individual or group while MOEs are evaluated using analytical tools that compares changes in subject's position in relation to relevant baseline narratives in the OE. MOPs measure task accomplishment and answer the question "are we doing things right?" Common MOPs for SLE are the number of engagements by type with a particular individual or group, and resulting commitments made by the unit that were executed as part of an agreement with the individual. MOPs can include exchanging respective interests or even option generation.

3-39. MOEs measure attainment of the intended outcome or the creation of a specific effect, and answer the question "are we doing the right things?" If the objective of an SLE is to get the subject to agree to a list of terms, the MOE is the number of terms agreed upon and, later, fulfilled by actions.

ENGAGEMENT PREPARATION ACTIVITIES

3-40. The primary actions and activities that occur during SLE preparation include choosing types of engagements used for particular individuals or groups because different venues may be more successful for each subject. For instance, informal dinners may be most effective with one subject whereas formal negotiations or conferences may be more effective with another. Examples of types of engagements are informal meetings (meals, parties, unannounced visits) or formal events (negotiations, conferences, invitational visits).

DEVELOP RELEVANT ACTOR FOLDERS

3-41. A physical or virtual folder is a repository of information about an audience or actor. The SLE staff proponent prepares these folders with assistance from the rest of the staff. There are no required or established documents a folder must contain; it can include worksheets, preparation sheets, photographs, biographies, writings, or other documents that enable the lead engager to conduct an SLE with a requisite knowledge about his counterparts and to achieve the SLE's desired outcomes (See Appendix B for examples).

REVIEW NARRATIVE, THEMES, AND MESSAGES AND CRAFT APPROPRIATE TALKING POINTS

3-42. Supporting the operational narrative and tactical themes and messages is necessary to ensure Army units conduct all activities consistently and coherently. Being consistent and coherent helps to foster trust and confidence in what U.S. forces are doing and supports attainment of the desired end state. SLE, in particular, is a specialized means to reinforce approved themes and messages and assess whether audiences are receiving them as intended. For further information on themes and messages and the operational narrative, refer to FM 3-13 and ATP 3-13.1.

3-43. Soldiers and leaders who undertake SLE must familiarize themselves with the substance and particulars of the narrative and the supporting themes and messages. This familiarization is essential to framing talking points specific to each SLE. To aid in this process, themes, messages, and talking points are typically part of an operation order or plan and reiterated in the worksheets or preparation sheets in every relevant actor folder (See SLE guidance and themes and messages in operation order paragraph 3, k, (10), under coordinating instructions and in Annex L - Information Collection). (Figure B-1 on page B-3 provides an example SLE worksheet to record the engagement.)

3-44. Equally important as knowing what messages to send, the engagement team must also know what messages to avoid. Ensure the upcoming SLE fits into the broader SLE plan with respect to its scope and sequence. This prevents accidental or premature disclosure of information or the unintentional use of language or non-verbal cues that counter the desired outcome of the SLE.

3-45. Confirm the unit's ability to commit to any agreement within limits of authority or resources.

IDENTIFY LEAD ENGAGER, NOTE TAKER, AND INTERPRETER

3-46. The lead engager is sometimes the most senior individual but rank is not the deciding factor. Rather, the lead engager is selected based on a range of factors. Among these factors are—
- Most qualified based on knowledge, skills, and abilities.
- Proven ability to achieve results through interpersonal engagement.
- Specialized training in negotiation or cross-cultural communication.
- Prior rapport with the relevant actor.
- Possesses the requisite authority to make a commitment on behalf of the U.S. Army.
- Availability.

3-47. Every SLE includes a note taker. Use cultural considerations when determining note taking method (for example, visible note taker, recording device, allowing other party to review notes). The lead engager must stay focused on the engagement itself and be attentive to the counterpart. The note taker ensures the SLE is documented for historical purposes, as well as keeps track of the specifics of the discussion, particularly any agreements or commitments that are made by either or both sides. The note taker provides a second set of eyes and ears who can clarify if there are points of confusion or misunderstanding.

3-48. If required to bridge linguistic and cultural barriers, an interpreter completes the engagement team. An interpreter must be adept at translating one language to another and vice versa in real time. If possible, the interpreter should be skilled at translating each language idiomatically rather than literally; that is, the interpreter is able to put the speaker's words in common, everyday language using idioms that the other side will understand. Occasionally, including a second interpreter is helpful. The role of this interpreter is chiefly to assess the ability and accuracy of the primary interpreter.

SELECT THE VENUE AND ARRANGE LOGISTICS OF THE ENGAGEMENT

3-49. All aspects of SLE matter, as each aspect contributes to the overall effect the lead engager is striving to achieve. Chief among these aspects is the venue because it sets the tone of the engagement. Force protection of SLE participants and the surrounding population is a primary consideration when determining venue. When force protection conditions are permissive, additional considerations are possible. For example, if the purpose is to put the audience or subject of the engagement at ease, the venue would likely be a place in which they are comfortable, perhaps in their own facility or territory. Conversely, if planning a formal negotiation, then a formal tone in a neutral location is in order. Other aspects that should be considered and planned in advance include whether to—
- Include a meal or other form of refreshment.
- Offer an appropriate and proportional gift or other token, as permitted by law and regulation.
- Remove anything from the venue or engagement location that might be considered offensive or otherwise violate cultural norms.
- Add overt or subtle props or forms of messaging that reinforce the engagement's primary theme.
- Include other individuals who can influence the outcome of the engagement in line with its purpose and objective.
- Transportation of all actors to and from venue.

ESTABLISH AGENDA

3-50. The SLE worksheet (table B-1 on page B-1) provides space to map out the order of events in support of the agenda. The agenda is comprised of the key points to be conveyed to the audience or subject of the engagement and mapped against time to achieve the desired outcome or objective.

3-51. Create the agenda by considering the interests at stake and place into broad categories or issues. These categories become the major items in the agenda. To ensure nothing essential is left out, seek to answer the question "is there anything else we must discuss to reach an agreement?" After listing the agenda items, consider their sequence in the engagement. In some cases, it may be best to address difficult matters up front because any agreement is contingent upon resolution of that difficult matter. In other cases, it may be wise to address simpler matters first as a means of building rapport before addressing the most challenging matters.

WARGAME AND REHEARSE

3-52. Rehearsal and wargaming SLEs are vital to their success. Using the relevant folders, the SLE proponent identifies a candidate or candidates from the unit to act as the audience or subject of the engagement. The actors' responsibility is to mimic as accurately as possible the target audience they are representing, enabling the lead engager to put their engagement skills into practice and identify elements of the strategy such as agenda or talking points that may need to be adjusted.

3-53. The lead engager should practice answers to tough questions such as being asked for the BATNA or other positional information. Rehearse ways to respond truthfully to such a question in a manner that redirects the conversation or imposes a similar question or dilemma to the counterpart.

3-54. All other aspects of planned engagements are replicated as closely as possible to the event so that the lead engager, note taker, and interpreter can rehearse in realistic conditions, better anticipate problems and opportunities, and refine their approach before the actual event. The staff proponent for SLE serves as the primary evaluator of the rehearsal, assisted by other evaluators, if warranted, to provide feedback to the engagement team. Recording the rehearsal is also an effective means.

3-55. Unplanned engagements also benefit from rehearsals as an integral part of unit training in the manner of react-to-contact drills. These rehearsals are less about the specifics of engaging a particular person and more about applying proven tactics, techniques, and procedures to a wide range of possible engagement scenarios.

This page intentionally left blank.

Chapter 4

Engagement Execution

4-1.   Soldier and leader engagements are conducted with an objective, right-and-left boundaries, and a limit of advance. These are explicit or extrapolated from orders using mission analysis. SLE will succeed with as much information as possible on the other party (location, composition, disposition, and strength) and a plan to engage him and with what. We often speak of the "strategic corporal" when we want to explain the effects of the lowest tactical leader, but we should also remember the requirement to nest the higher intent as well. Just like priority intelligence requirements (known as PIRs) must be refined from strategic (will the enemy use chemical weapons?) to tactical (are they wearing masks?), we must do the same for engagements. Patrol leaders should be given reconnaissance objectives on the human, information, and physical dimensions of the OE. All of these must be planned top-down, bottom-up refined. Historically, the strategic political leadership has provided guidance or goals in the form of desired end-state refined by theater commanders and put into orders and restrictions by country teams and tactical leaders.

PRE-ENGAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS

4-2.   Preparation activities (discussed in the Chapter 3) comprise the bulk of the pre-engagement work that engagement teams—and those supporting them—undertake. Commanders ensure the lead engager knows and understands the approved information for disclosure in support of the event. The lead engager must be aware of the national disclosure policy against offering the false impression that subsequent disclosures will occur automatically. The day of the engagement, or in the hours preceding the engagement, additional considerations include the following:

- Review planning assumptions to ensure they are still valid and, if not, revise the plan accordingly.
- Double-check all logistical elements of the engagement to ensure transportation, supplies, and other resources are available per the plan.
- When permissible, check the venue and test any information devices to ensure readiness.
- Conduct route reconnaissance to and from the engagement venue site.
- Double-check the proper pronunciation of all names of involved parties.
- Ensure security forces have been issued special instructions to prevent unnecessary delay.

4-3.   The lead engager must take care to only make promises or other commitments that can be fulfilled (and the commander has agreed to). Likewise, the lead engager does not promise actions that require capabilities or resources you do not control. The lead engager is careful, as well, to not create a dependency unless required by the mission objective (for example, security) as it can lead to future expectations.

4-4.   Rather than stating a plan, ask what the needs are of the counterpart's constituency and match those against unit capabilities. Care must be taken when approaching the question regarding "need." The question of "what do you need" may be interpreted as "what do you want" which are often two different things. The engager should have an idea of the needs through engagement with CA (or review of CA reports) prior to the SLE. The engager should have sufficient information prior to the engagement to have a general idea of what the interviewee "needs" and will help guide the conversation in a productive direction.

4-5.   Appendix B provides a set of checklists for SLE, including a pre-engagement checklist. These checklists are not exhaustive and should be adapted or tailored to meet the specific needs of each unit or organization responsible for conducting SLE.

EXECUTING THE ENGAGEMENT

4-6. All engagements tend to unfold by accomplishing the following actions, in sequence:
- Conduct introductions.
- Build trust.
- Set expectations.
- Discuss and negotiate.
- Make commitments or agreements.
- Conclude.

4-7. The first three actions above relate to relationship and rapport building that occur throughout the process. It is common to return to these actions throughout the conversation and again at the end. Commanders and staffs avoid immediately jumping into discussions on substance right away.

CONDUCT INTRODUCTIONS

4-8. Introductions enable both sides of the engagement to exchange not only each other's names but also pleasantries that break the ice and set up the exchange that follows. During this step, both sides identify themselves and, if necessary, present their credentials. Soldiers and leaders use this part of the process to establish an initial rapport and demonstrate willingness to engage constructively. Also, Soldiers and leaders enact cultural practices and norms during introductions, such as offering or receiving refreshments.

BUILD TRUST

4-9. The lead engager seeks to find common ground, often by asking questions and listening to answers important to the individual or group engaged. Trust helps the parties disclose information they may not otherwise and permits the parties to create valuable options—rather than haggle on positions. Without trust, parties in a negotiation will not disclose their true interests without fear of losing an advantage. (see principles section in Chapter 1 of this manual for principles on building trust)

4-10. In most cultures, trust building requires more than a single engagement. It may be prudent to dedicate the entire first engagement to establishing connections and familiarity, and wait until later engagements when trust is built to discuss issues and concerns. Employing the engagement principles and framework discussed in Chapter 1 while applying Army Values will increase opportunities to build trust.

SET EXPECTATIONS

4-11. This phase allows one or both sides to state what they desire from the engagement. In many instances, that desired outcome will simply be establishing rapport and trust or a favorable impression of friendly intentions with regard to your counterpart. In other instances, it will be more involved and include an itemized declaration of intended or favored outcomes.

4-12. The counterpart has probably developed an agenda prior to the engagement. Prior to negotiating, reconcile these differing agendas to seek agreement regarding what will (or will not) be discussed and what each side desires to accomplish by the end of the engagement. Setting expectations is a negotiation about how the SLE itself will occur and can help build—or destroy—rapport.

DISCUSS AND NEGOTIATE

4-13. This phase is the heart of the engagement and involves extending and enhancing rapport or addressing agenda items in detail. While not every engagement seeks to yield a negotiated settlement, those that do strive to create mutually beneficial outcomes that advance both parties' interests and enhance the relationship.

4-14. Share the interests that underlie the desired outcome. Encourage the counterpart to reciprocate. When done incrementally, information sharing helps build the rapport necessary to disclose important interests.

4-15. Use brainstorming techniques together with the counterpart to generate options that satisfy both parties' interests. Brainstorming relies on different individuals' perspectives to develop an initial understanding of

the relevant variables and actors in an OE and builds on ideas. This group process allows others to further build on those ideas developed in the initial brainstorming secession (see ATP 5-0.1 for further detail).

4-16. Be willing to start with standards rather than options if both parties are reluctant to make the first offer. Ask questions about culturally appropriate standards as there may be some not yet considered and discuss standards that legitimize potential options. Ensure both parties can justify potential options to their constituents.

4-17. Be willing to walk away from a SLE to exercise the BATNA, but do not use walking away as a threat. Reminding the counterpart of potential impasses can be helpful to reorient the SLE. Remember to never commit to an agreement worse than the BATNA. The point of the engagement is not to get to yes; it is to satisfy identified interests. This is easy to forget while under stress and time constraint.

4-18. When and where possible, employing expertise in negotiation or conflict resolution, often found in CA units or within the legal advisor's office, can prove helpful, if not essential. In preparing for SLE, commanders and staff identify needed expertise and availability.

MAKE COMMITMENTS AND AGREEMENTS

4-19. As a minimum, an engagement results in a commitment to continue the dialog or agree to further consider what one side has said to the other. Involved engagements, conducted within traditional communication channels or venues, such as community or town hall meetings, and formal negotiations can yield more formal and complicated outcomes that must be navigated carefully, as well as documented and tracked.

4-20. Seek to employ culturally appropriate binding commitment practices to reduce the risk the counterpart will refuse to honor the terms of an agreement. In cultures with robust judicial systems, well-defined contracts are often sufficient. Other situations require means such as a public announcement in front of relevant stakeholders among whom the counterpart will not disappoint or embarrass by violating the terms of a deal. Alternatively, devise a system of incrementally delivering upon agreements as is done when providing payments in installments as work is complete.

4-21. Well-structured agreements are those where the value of a deal is to be created through the contract of how and when parties will deliver on their promises.

CONCLUDE

4-22. The final activity of the engagement allows for a brief summation and reiteration of the proceedings, especially any commitments or promises made, and an opportunity to reaffirm the purpose of the engagement and its value to both sides. This step also allows the lead U.S. engager to offer thanks or otherwise express gratitude.

POST-ENGAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS

4-23. The primary actions and activities that occur once an engagement is complete include:
- An informal after-action review.
- A formal communication of gratitude.
- Notes transferred to an approved information system.
- Follow-up on commitments.
- A formal after action review (AAR), to include formal assessment.
- Required reports submitted, and relevant personnel notified.

CONDUCT AN INFORMAL AFTER-ACTION REVIEW

4-24. As soon as possible after the conclusion of the SLE, the engagement team conducts an informal after-action review to capture immediate observations and impressions. Often the time and place for this action is during the ride back to the garrison or cantonment. The note taker during the SLE again acts as note taker to ensure all information about the event is consolidated in a single file. The team conducts a formative

assessment of the SLE, focusing primarily on assessing its execution (measures of performance). The summative evaluation that assesses the SLE's measures of effectiveness occurs during the formal AAR.

SEND A FORMAL COMMUNICATION OF GRATITUDE

4-25. Sending a written note on letterhead as notice of thanks or appreciation furthers rapport building and helps to cement the genuineness of the engagement team in the minds of those engaged. The nature of the communication depends on the audience, their position or station, the formality of the SLE, and other factors, but the more personalized the thank you, the better.

TRANSFER NOTES TO AN APPROVED INFORMATION SYSTEM

4-26. The information gathered during an SLE is invaluable, not only to the engagement team but to the entire staff and commander. Entering the notes into an SOP-approved information system ensures its availability across the staff and facilitates the sharing of this information to other relevant stakeholders. These notes should be logged as soon as possible to be available for the formal AAR. SLE notes are often required for a storyboard or commanders update brief by unit SOP.

FOLLOW-UP AND REPORT ON COMMITMENTS

4-27. One of the surest ways to foster trust with a relevant actor or counterpart is to keep promises and follow up on commitments. Conversely, one of the surest ways to tear it down is to break a promise or ignore a commitment made during an SLE. Another value of the notes taken during the engagement is to document all commitments specifically to ensure follow up. The lead engager is the person accountable for this action but depends on the rest of the engagement team for assistance, as well as select members of the staff. Unit SOPs should include a commitment tracker to monitor agreements between the unit and relevant actors. These are useful to assess the value of the relevant actor to the unit's desired end state as well as MOPs and MOEs.

CONDUCT A FORMAL AFTER ACTIONS REVIEW, TO INCLUDE FORMAL ASSESSMENT

4-28. A formal AAR accomplishes more than the informal after-action review conducted immediately after an SLE. While first impressions are important, they are sometimes subject to the emotion or exigency of the moment. An AAR within two to four days after the event allows those first impressions to mature and become contextualized. The formal AAR is also able to take advantage of the completed notes, which the note taker or other member of the engagement team has entered into the unit's approved information system. Finally, the formal AAR is an opportunity to conduct a summative assessment of the SLE, this time focusing on its effectiveness; in other words, whether or not it achieved its objective or desired outcome. The next chapter goes into further detail about assessing SLE. (See FM 7-0 for guidance on conducting an AAR.)

Chapter 5

Engagement Assessment

ENGAGEMENT ASSESSMENT METHODS

5-1.   Engagement can be assessed two ways. The first applies to planned engagements and examines the effectiveness of a given interaction as a discreet event. The second applies to SLE in conjunction with the complementary efforts of other information-related capabilities (IRCs) in support of an engagement strategy. This chapter focuses on engagement assessment or the effectiveness of a deliberate engagement in achieving its intended outcomes.

5-2.   Worksheets to prepare and track progress are in Appendix B.

LOGIC OF THE EFFORT

5-3.   The logic of any activity or operation is simply an articulation of how planners see that activity or operation unfolding. It essentially makes clear the process of action, reaction, and counteraction. Figure 5-1 provides a way to understand how the logic of the effort supports an assessment. That is, assessment confirms whether the hypothesis of the engagement proved valid.


Figure 5-1. The relationship between the logic of the effort and assessment

5-4.   The logic of the effort is an iterative process that establishes a hypothesis of change, tests that hypothesis, and then revises the logic and hypothesis accordingly. It is similar to bracketing indirect fire by making adjustments until rounds impact the target and fire for effect is directed. In the case of SLE, it helps to focus the execution of an SLE, enhance its chances of success, and conserve resources. It also applies to an engagement strategy to ensure desired effects are achieved with minimal resource expenditure.

ESTABLISHING A BASELINE

5-5. SLE planners and executors assess the effectiveness of an activity or the degree of change by establishing a baseline. Establishing a baseline for engagements is similar to registering an artillery target; it provides a reference from which adjustments can be measured.

5-6. Determining a baseline for deliberate SLE is challenging because it requires planners to understand the attitudes and motivations of the engagement subject on issues and these individuals often guard their interests. **An *engagement subject* is an individual or group selected for Soldier and leader engagement**. On the example SLE worksheet in figure B-1 on page B-3, there is space for capturing the relevant actor's most likely desired outcome and strategy. In similar fashion, their stance on a particular issue at the start of the engagement process is a matter of informed conjecture that is refined with additional information.

5-7. Additional information on counterpart attitudes, motivations, and interest can be obtained in some of the following ways:
- Conducting research on the relevant actor, particularly if the person has given speeches or other public communication, or been the subject or interviewee in news articles.
- Conducting preliminary or introductory SLE to cultivate rapport and gain insights into the relevant actor's position on a specific topic or range of topics.
- Engaging other individuals within the relevant actor's network and synthesizing their respective inputs.
- Asking the relevant actor directly, recognizing their response may not be fully transparent.

5-8. Once established, a baseline is used to measure progress. Refining a baseline occurs as more information is gathered.

SOLDIER AND LEADER ENGAGEMENT OBJECTIVE STATEMENT

5-9. An SLE objective statement incorporates and synthesizes multiple assessment measures. ATP 3-13.1 introduces a method for establishing IO objectives, MOPs, and MOEs that can be applied to SLE. The rubric crafts objective statements using Effect-Target-Action-Purpose (known as ETAP): the effect the SLE seeks to create, the relevant actor or audience to which this effect applies, the action or behavior the relevant actor needs to demonstrate, and the purpose of creating the effect and the desired action. Figure 5-2 provides an example of ETAP applied to SLE.

EFFECT	TARGET	ACTION	PURPOSE
Influence	Provincial police chief	To support new crime reporting program	In order to strengthen joint-combined efforts to thwart threat-funded criminal activity.
The specified <u>effect</u> described in doctrine	The <u>detailed description</u> of the target audience	The <u>behavior</u> the target audience needs to demonstrate	The planned <u>rationale</u> for the operational benefit the target's behavior will demonstrate by performing the action – directly linked to the commander's mission and/or intent

Figure 5-2. Example Soldier and leader engagement objective statement

MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE

5-10. MOPs examine task accomplishment and ask whether the engagement team has done things right. MOPs are straightforward for a planned SLE and involve assessing the mechanics of its execution. The following questions can help frame MOP assessment:
- Did the engagement start on time?
- Did the engagement follow the planned agenda?
- Did the lead engager employ and stick to approved talking points?
- Which talking points and topics were addressed?

- What agreements were made?
- Did the gift exchange—if approved—occur?
- Did the pre-engagement research about the relevant actor's interests or alternatives prove accurate?

Other questions may be applicable and will depend on the specific nature, conditions, and planned elements of the SLE.

5-11. MOPs relevant to the conduct of the SLE consider the degree to which the lead engager applied the engagement variables presented in Chapter 3. A good outcome is one in which there is either no agreement (BATNA preferable) or an agreement that—

- Meets U.S. interests and the counterpart accepts.
- Is the best of any options the engagement team could develop.
- Is better than the BATNA.
- Is viewed as fair and appropriate to all who can influence it.
- Involved an appropriate, realistic, and well-defined commitment.
- Created or extended the kind of relationship(s) desired by the commander.
- Is the product of effective communication (measured by the confidence in the above and employment of useful norms during the conduct of the SLE).

MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

5-12. MOEs assess whether the engagement was effective in producing the desired effect or if reengagement is necessary. It means determining whether the SLE fulfilled its objective, if another engagement is necessary, and whether other IRCs might have been more effective at achieving the desired outcome. MOEs are derived in tandem with the objective (see figure 5-3).

ACTIVITY	DESCIPTOR	SUBJECT	METRIC	BASELINE
Increase likelihood that	Provincial police chief will make	Decision about crime-reporting program	At least 3 public statements of support	Compared to the past public statements that questioned need for program
The direction-of-change / the delta	A restatement of the TARGET mentioned in the OBJECTIVE STATEMENT as an *adjectival phrase*	*Noun* related directly to the effect ACTION	*Threshold* of effectiveness	The history measures from which the current METRIC is determined to show statistical or *acceptable* significance

Figure 5-3. Example Soldier and leader engagement measure of effectiveness statement

INDICATORS

5-13. Units track the status of MOPs and MOEs using indicators. Indicators are observable items of information that help the engagement team or wider staff determine whether units conduct SLE to specified standards and generate the required effect or outcome. In terms of SLE, indicators are observables that occur primarily during the engagement itself. Examples can include such things as facial expressions, tone of verbal responses, hand gestures or other overt signals, and how others in the room respond. Tracking indicators requires attentiveness on the part of all members of the engagement team and may require additional team members to capture indicators. An observation plan with indicators and observers should be developed for engagements in the manner of a reconnaissance plan with named areas of interest, observers, and timings. Indicators and observers provide their observations to the note taker during the informal and formal AARs.

REENGAGEMENT

5-14. When attacking physical targets, assessment is essential to determining whether reengagement is necessary. The same is true when assessing SLE, perhaps even more so, because influencing change in a

relevant actor is among the most difficult challenges facing Army units, leaders, and Soldiers. If any MOE reveals desired effects are not fully met or the outcomes of the engagement are assessed to be different from the desired outcomes, reengagement is likely required.

5-15. There may be instances where reengagement is not the best choice to achieve intended outcomes. If assessment concludes that a particular actor or audience will not be sufficiently influenced by reengagement, then employment of another IRC or set of IRCs may yield the desired results. It may also be the case that rather than reengage the same actor or audience, a fresh engagement with another subject may produce the effects or outcomes necessary to achieve objectives.

Appendix A

Soldier and Leader Engagement Training and Resources

A-1. Careful exchanges of information, precise research on applicable laws and policies, securing resources, and conducting an engagement that results in an agreed outcome (similar to the training objectives a unit uses to plan an exercise) result from proper training and preparation. Mission rehearsal exercises or pre-deployment training must replicate planned or anticipated AOs to include entities or units adjacent to or in contact with the U.S. unit. Commanders and staffs research and resource engagement training and practice its conduct before and reinforce or refine throughout a deployment.

INDIVIDUAL AND UNIT TRAINING

A-2. This appendix lists the various joint and service schools available to assist individuals or selected groups and some of the approved self-development applications to train on SLE.

INDIVIDUAL TRAINING

A-3. Engagement training for individual Soldiers and civilians is largely self-directed. Army Universal Task List, task 150-IPO-1027, Conduct a Soldier and Leader Engagement, covers individual training.

A-4. The following are various ways that Soldiers and civilians can improve their interpersonal engagement skills:
- Treat every interpersonal interaction as an opportunity to practice engagement skills such as active listening, communicating clearly, and, when appropriate, negotiating toward a desired outcome.
- Deliberately engage individuals or groups with whom one does not have an established relationship, particularly individuals of differing background, culture, language, and worldview.
- If deployed or about to be deployed, learn basic phrases of the country in which the unit's AO is located.
- Use Bilateral Negotiation (BiLAT), a 3-D simulation where players can practice skills in conducting meetings and negotiations on the milGaming web portal.

A-5. Soldiers and leaders can enroll in and complete Army e-learning, self-development courses (Skillport/Smartforce), such as the following:
- Issue-focused negotiations.
- Fundamentals of cross-cultural communication.
- Listening essentials.
- Communicate with diplomacy and tact.

A-6. Additional course listings can be found on the Army Training Requirements and Resource System (ATRRS) website.

A-7. Soldiers and leaders can practice with friends and fellow Soldiers, over and above opportunities provided as part of unit training.

UNIT SOLDIER AND LEADER ENGAGEMENT TRAINING

A-8. An effective way for units to undertake SLE training is to formalize and collectivize individual training. For example, at home station, units do well to establish a formal and ongoing program of SLE. Such a program complements public affairs community relations and outreach efforts, which are designed to foster enduring, positive relationships with community partners.

A-9. Another means to enhance overall unit SLE proficiency is to integrate practice engagements into all exercises, as well as make these practice engagements a routine training event on the training calendar. Whether practicing dynamic or deliberate engagements, the key is to make them as realistic as possible; that is, to make their scenarios relevant to anticipated or planned future operations.

A-10. Combat training center rotations at the National Training Center, Joint Readiness Training Center, and Joint Multinational Readiness Center provide opportunities for units to conduct SLE (both planned and unplanned) with role players. Rotational training units routinely receive CA and PSYOP augmentation, which provides units with additional opportunities to learn from these subject matter experts and integrate them into their SLE planning, execution, and assessment.

A-11. As with all training, effective SLE training is only possible when it is assessed in real time by either recording practice engagements or having third-party observation and notetaking. Commanders should therefore make the purchase of a digital camera with recording capability a priority.

ARMY AND JOINT INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING

A-12. Paragraphs A-13 through A-24 describe specialized Army and joint courses in interpersonal engagement, cross-cultural communication, and negotiation are available.

ARMY TRAINING

A-13. The Army offers a range of courses on communication, culture, and negotiation, all of which can hone interpersonal engagement skills. Enrollment is typically through the ATRRS, although some training is requested directly with the deliverer.

A-14. The Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (known as DLIFLC) is a DOD language school run by the U.S. Army and staffed by all the services. The institute provides intensive instruction in foreign languages and the cultures associated with the languages. Courses are 26–64 weeks depending on the language's difficulty. Language and culture instruction increases proficiency, credibility, and effectiveness when conducting SLE by enabling direct interaction. The Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center conducts a language program manager's course to maintain a unit language training program and provides online training materials for pre-deployment and refresher training.

A-15. Courses are also available through DOD-contracted language training software, such as Rosetta Stone and Berlitz.

Information Operations Proponent (TRADOC)

A-16. The Information Operations Proponent (known as IOP) Office executes Total Army Force Modernization responsibilities across the DOTMLPF-P to meet the Army's requirement for the successful planning, integration, execution, and assessment of IO.

A-17. The Information Operations Proponent conducts the 12-week, 480-hour resident Information Operations Qualification Course (known as IOQC) of graduate-level education to produce IO and military deception (known as MILDEC) officers at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Students receive instruction on the integration and synchronization of IRCs to prevail in a multi-domain fight during large-scale combat operations with emphasis on tactics, targeting, and the operations process. Students learn to integrate IO within the military decision-making process by leading IO working groups, creating written products such as operation orders and combined information overlays, and synthesizing information for decision briefs.

A-18. The Reserve Component Information Operations Qualification Course is a 9-month, three-phase course taught by the 3rd Battalion, 124th Regiment (Information Operations), Vermont Army National Guard. Phase 1 is 40 hours of self-paced distance learning and Phase 2 is 28 four-hour periods (unit training assemblies) held weekly over a secure Defense Connect Online (DCO) with fellow students and instructors. Workload is similar to an online master's degree program, including presentations, papers, readings, exercises, and tests. Phase 3 is a 15-day (13 days of instruction and two travel days) resident exercise held at Camp Johnson, Vermont.

TRADOC Culture Center

A-19. The TRADOC Culture Center provides relevant and accredited cultural competency training education to Soldiers and civilians in order to build and sustain an Army with the right blend of cultural competency capabilities to facilitate a wide range of operations, now and in the future.

West Point Negotiation Project

A-20. The West Point Negotiation Project is a West Point Leadership Center activity, under the direction of the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York. The Project has no dedicated funds, faculty, or staff; however, it is able to conduct mobile training teams on negotiation on a limited basis. Training is tailored to the needs of the unit and can be conducted in one-, two-, or three-day increments. Requests should be emailed directly to the West Point Negotiation Project.

JOINT TRAINING

A-21. The most readily available joint training is that offered through the Joint Knowledge Online (JKO) web portal. While other services have specialized training in the areas of cross-cultural communication, negotiation, and interpersonal engagement, this training tends to be limited to members of each respective service. However, unit leaders are encouraged to contact other service schools and centers (such as the Air Force Negotiation Center) to determine whether attendance at these schools and centers is possible or exportable.

Joint Knowledge Online

A-22. JKO offers a range of virtual courses. A course listing can be found on the JKO website.

A-23. JKO offers Virtual Cultural Awareness Trainer (known as VCAT) courses, which are multi-media rich, self-paced online courses. These courses teach essential culture awareness and language familiarity, tailored to particular areas of operation and mission scenarios. As of August 2017, JKO offers 12 Virtual Cultural Awareness Trainer courses, covering 49 regions in Africa, the Middle East, South and Central America, and portions of the Caribbean and Asia.

A-24. Other courses available through JKO (many of which are also listed in ATRRS) that are relevant to SLE include—

- Commanders Communication Strategy Course / J3OP-US874.
- Conflict Management One: Principles / JMESI-US009.
- Conflict Management Two: Negotiation / JMESI-US010.
- Cross-Cultural Competence Trainer / J3OP-US744.
- Cross-Cultural Negotiations (CCN) - Civil Affairs / J3OP-US1254.
- Cross-Cultural Negotiations (CCN) - Force Protection Planning / J3OP-US1252.
- Cross-Cultural Negotiations (CCN) - Humanitarian Assistance / J3OP-US1253.
- Effective Communication / JMESI-US015.

EXTERNAL TRAINING

A-25. External training offers an alternative means to expand and enhance both individual and unit proficiency in interpersonal communication and engagement skills. These skills are essential to supporting military operations across the conflict continuum; more fundamentally, they benefit Soldiers and leaders in every aspect of their personal and professional lives. Therefore, to the extent allowed by policy and budget, commanders and leaders should actively direct Soldiers to participate (or support their participation) in external training in engagement, communication, negotiation, or other related subjects. Similarly, commanders should explore options to import training that strengthens these skill sets.

A-26. Some examples of external training for which commanders and operations officers should plan and budget include, but are not limited to—

- Courses taught at nearby colleges or universities.
- Classes offered by nonprofits agencies or entities.
- Seminars provided by approved for-profit training and education vendors.
- Classes or seminars offered in conjunction with a conference.
- Courses provided by government educational institutions (for example, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management Center for Leadership Development).

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

A-27. Individuals and leaders should create their own library of references and resources that enhance their ability to conduct SLE. The schools, courses, and programs listed earlier in this appendix are a good place to start, as each produces study aids, manuals, graphical aids, and other tools that promote greater competency in interpersonal engagement. For example, the West Point Negotiation Project website contains links to other websites that center on negotiation and cross-cultural communication, to include—

- Harvard Program on Negotiation.
- Air Force Culture and Language Center.
- Naval Postgraduate School Program for Culture and Conflict Studies.
- The Negotiator Magazine.

A-28. In turn, these websites point to other links and resources, most of them digital, which facilitates the creation of a digital library that every Soldier and leader within a unit or organization can access.

Appendix B
Soldier and Leader Engagement Checklists

CHECKLIST PURPOSE

B-1. Checklists provide a means of ensuring consistency in the execution of a task or the employment of a capability. The checklists in this appendix are provided as starting points and can be adjusted or expanded to better suit the needs of units or individuals responsible for SLE. Often the best time to refine checklists is immediately after an AAR in which the unit or individual acknowledges a shortcoming or error in the execution of an SLE and revises a given checklist as a means to prevent it in the future.

PRE-ENGAGEMENT CHECKLIST

B-2. The checklist in table B-1 provides an itemized list of activities or actions the unit, especially the members of the engagement team, accomplish before the actual engagement.

Table B-1. Example of pre-engagement checklist

Have the following actions been completed?
- Relevant actor or subject of the engagement identified; folder created and reviewed.   - Identify and mitigate internal and external threats.   - Engagement team identified (lead engager, note taker, and interpreter, as a minimum).   - SLE worksheet completed, to include BATNA and ZOPA.   - Logic of the SLE developed and hypothesis tested and refined.   - SLE objective (desired outcome), measures of effectiveness, and measures of performance developed.   - Planning assumptions validated; if not, plan revised accordingly.   - Location for SLE identified; spot-check conducted.   - Route reconnaissance to SLE venue completed.   - Technology tested and re-tested.   - Rehearsal conducted and assessed with all team members present; repeated as appropriate.
BATNA   best alternative to a negotiated agreement   SLE   Soldier and leader engagement ZOPA   zone of possible agreement

ENGAGEMENT CHECKLIST

B-3. The checklist in table B-2 provides an itemized list of activities or actions the members of the engagement team accomplish during the SLE proper.

Table B-2. Example engagement checklist

Have the following items been accounted and prepared for?
- Arrived on time (culturally dependent).
- Followed the outline of events; if deviation was necessary, noted the reasons why.
- Introduced self and the team; acknowledged counterpart and their team.
- Took initial steps to cultivate trust.
- Exchanged appropriate and comparable gifts, if authorized.
- Conveyed expectations and desired outcome, when appropriate.
- Considered the following best practices:
  - Avoid rushing through the meeting. Plan for enough time to accommodate the culture and avoid making the engaged audience feel they are low on the priority list. Prepare for small talk before discussing business. Take cues from the audience.
  - Ask permission to take photos of the engaged audience. Staffs can later use these photos to update personality profiles and relevant actor folders.
  - Never assume the engaged audience does not speak or understand English.
  - Practice active listening and carefully considered speech. Watch the audience's gestures, eyes, and body language, not those of the translator. Remember that maintaining eye contact may be confrontational or aggressive in many cultures.
  - Speak in short sentences. Do not recite a long paragraph and expect the translator to convey the message accurately. The engaged audiences should feel that they are being conversed with, not being lectured to. One to two sentences at a time is a good rule.
  - Avoid using military acronyms or graphic control measures, slang, and idioms. Keep the language simple.
  - Treat all members of the engaged audience with courtesy and respect.
  - Avoid elevating position or embellishing authority. Avoid making promises but follow up as soon as possible to not decrease the engaged audience's respect or lose credibility with them.
  - Know the body language from all parties. Ensure the body language does not negate the message.
- Note taker or scribes took notes, especially capturing grievances and any commitments made.
- Lead engager provided a summary or recap of the engagement.

POST-ENGAGEMENT CHECKLIST

B-4. The checklist in Table B-3 provides an itemized list of activities or actions the members of the unit, especially the engagement team, accomplish during the SLE proper.

Table B-3. Post-engagement checklist

Have the following been completed after the engagement?
- Informal after-action review conducted within 2–4 hours of event.
- Note takers finalized and consolidated notes and entered them into the unit's approved information system.
- Thank you note or message conveyed to the counterpart.
- Formal after-action review conducted to assess specific measures of performance and effectiveness, overall effectiveness of the engagement, and whether reengagement is required.
- Team followed up on commitments or promises made.

SOLDIER AND LEADER ENGAGEMENT WORKSHEET

B-5.   The example worksheet in figure B-1 includes space to list relevant themes, messages (in some cases, an SLE may focus on a single theme), and talking points.

Contact: Mayor Jefferson Davis Hogg AKA "JD" (family) or "Boss" (assoc.)		None	DTG: None	Copy 1 of 1
INTENDED OUTCOME: Local police join coalition forces at the 3 traffic check points you have established along MSR 7N				
INTENDED OUTCOME STRATEGY: Convince the Mayor that it is his responsibility to protect his citizens		**COUNTERPARTS PREDICTED INTENDED OUTCOME/STRATEGY:** Maintain security to reduce impact of the war on his citizens		
THEMES/MESSAGES: We collectively must promote a safe and secure environment with local Police/Government in the lead				
Talking Points supporting Intended Outcome: • Current situation in the city • Population's concerns • Challenges to governance • Uncontrolled flow of IDPs increases chaos and stress on population in the city		Order of Events: 1000: Introductions/small talk (new school/soccer) 1015: Discussion (security issues/policing strategy/IDP sit) 1045: Closeout (review commitments/determine follow-up actions) 1100: Exit		
Possible Impasse Issues: • Police not showing up for work/absenteeism • Continuing Arianan or criminal organization influence		Offers/zone of possible agreement: • Assist in training new police recruits • Support combined-manning of traffic check points • Facilitate coordination with U.S. interagency and NGOs to provide humanitarian support to the city		
TALKING POINTS supporting possible impasse issues • Your citizens are looking to you for support • U.S. military resources are limited, but with your support, other organizations can provide humanitarian assistance to him/police • Combined US/local police-manned traffic check points are essential to control the situation and reduce the impact of the war on citizens				
COUNTERPART'S BIO: • Has been mayor here for 10 years • 2 Sons in police force • Vehemently opposes Arianan invasion		COORDINATION MEASURES: • Money for training support (S-4/S-9) • Troop to Task (S-3/CDRs) • Link-up MPs with police (BSB)	EXIT STRATEGY: • Respect his religious obligation • Noon meal	
Previous Commitments Made • None (first meeting)		Commitments Made: (Today) • None	Commitments Kept: • Established 3 combined U.S./Local Police traffic check points	
ENGAGER'S BATNA: Checkpoints remain in place without U.S. military support COUNTERPART'S BATNA (predicted): U.S. forces provide continuous security at CPs and humanitarian assistance				
AKA	also known as	CP	command post	NGO	nongovernmental organization
BATNA	best alternative to a negotiated agreement	DTG	date-time group	S-3	battalion or brigade operations staff officer
BIO	biography	IDP	internally displaced person	S-4	battalion or brigade logistics staff officer
BSB	brigade support battalion	MP	military police	S-9	battalion or brigade civil affairs staff officer
CDR	commander	MSR	main supply route	U.S.	United States

Figure B-1. Example Soldier and leader engagement worksheet

This page intentionally left blank.

Appendix C

Engagement Targeting

ENGAGEMENT GUIDANCE MATRIX

C-1. The Army's targeting methodology develops options for units to engage targets, whether lethal or nonlethal across the range of military operations (see ATP 3-60 for more on targeting). This process is based on the phases of decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A). The D3A methodology is integral to the MDMP and helps the staff's targeting working group select which targets must be acquired and engaged. The D3A is usually focused on analyzing threat vulnerabilities, and a modified process specifically for SLE can identify the significant personnel in the AO who are crucial for creating effects in the information environment. This information is available via CA reporting.

C-2. SLE should not be confused with surveillance and reconnaissance missions with the purpose of information collection. Techniques for information collection during operations among populations are covered in ATP 3-55.4.

DECIDE

C-3. The decide phase is the most detail-oriented and time-consuming of the D3A functions. The majority of the effort focuses on in-depth analysis to identify which population audiences to engage. Staffs analyze the demographics and identify the key leaders in the AO as prospective engagements to produce the unit's SLE plan. This analysis occurs during intelligence preparation of the battlefield process with the G-2 or S-2 and G-9 or S-9 as part of mission analysis. A comprehensive study of an OE through human network analysis and an understanding of the potential second- and third-order effects (intended, unintended, primary, secondary, and tertiary) any engagements may have upon each network produces a list of targets. Commanders and engagement planners then decide which human networks to engage and how to engage them (see ATP 5-0.6 for more on human network engagement).

C-4. Engagement planners work closely with the G-9 or S-9 and intelligence staff to analyze the civil considerations that encompass the areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE) within the AO. The most important for engagement planning are organizations, people, and events to identify the key friendly and neutral individuals who can impact the unit's operations. Engagement analysis then cross-checks these considerations with political, military, economic, social, information, or infrastructure (PMESII) variables to further identify the local influencers who have specific knowledge and access to areas in the AO that are considered critical for mission accomplishment (see ATP 2-01.3 for more on engagement analysis).

C-5. Using the modified ASCOPE/PMESII-PT crosswalk, planners analyze specific key local influencers to create a high-priority engagement list (known as HPEL) by each phase of the operation. High-payoff engagements are then assessed based on targeting key individuals who are crucial for the success of friendly operations. The high-value engagements (known as HVEs) are considered those with neutral affiliation to friendly forces but are considered crucial for the enemy's success. Based on commander's guidance, engagement planners recommend how each high payoff engagement and high-value engagement are engaged in terms of the desired effects and engagement options.

C-6. The engagement process focuses on the criticality and effects of SLEs to achieve the friendly mission objectives and assess the engagements' overall effects on the OE. Knowing a SLE target's criticality and analyzing the probable effect an engagement will have on friendly operations allows planners to propose the most effective engagement options, such as who engages the target, the location, and timing of the SLE. Planners then set priorities, de-conflict with other units as needed and begin internal coordination for SLEs.

This includes aligning unit leaders to conduct specific SLEs based on available skills, knowledge, and attributes matched against mission requirements and objectives.

C-7.   The analysis results in an engagement guidance matrix for the commander to approve proposed SLEs. The guidance in the engagement matrix should include the following information:

- A high priority engagement list.
- Timing of the SLE.
- Who conducts the SLE and where (venue).
- How targets are engaged.
- Special instructions and information for the engagement target (translator requirements).
- Desired effects.
- SLE assessment criteria.

C-8.   The engagement guidance matrix sample in table C-1 provides guidance on what, when, and how relevant actors should be engaged.

Table C-1. Engagement guidance matrix (example)

Audience	Key Leader	When	Who/Where	How	Effect	Assessment	Special Instructions
HN population.	HN leaders.	Upon RSOI.	Senior leaders.	Tele/Face-to-face.	Secure spot Gauge mood.	Follow-on meetings established, POCs exchanged, essential requirements secured (such as police escort or port security).	Understand and use cultural norms. Be prepared for first meeting to only establish contact. Be cognizant of your own requirements and timeline.
Displaced civilians population.	NGO Leaders.	Upon RSOI.	Appropriate senior leader or staff partners (CA).	Face-to-face.	Inform or influence local, regional, or adversaries.	Messages received by targeted audience.	Understand mission, understand message, review past information on media.
HN population.	Regional or Embedded Media.	Special events.	Senior leaders or appropriate staff.	Face-to-face.	Inform or influence local, regional, or adversaries.	Messages received by targeted audience.	Understand mission, understand message, review past information on media.
HN government leaders.	DOS lead.	RSOI.	Senior leader.	Tele/Face-to-face.	Understand nation, mission, other capabilities, known entities and influencers.	Missions exchanged.	Understand ambassador and country team and regional concerns.
CA civil affairs DOS Department of State HN host-nation			NGO POC RSOI	nongovernmental organization point of contact reception, staging, onward movement, and integration			

C-9.   After commander's approval, the SLE plan and engagement guidance matrix are included in the orders production. Following order dissemination, personnel identified to conduct SLE begin planning to make initial contact with listed engagement targets in accordance with the engagement guidance matrix.

DETECT

C-10. Engagement planners direct the effort to detect the high-pay-off engagements and high value engagements who were identified during the decide phase. In order to detect the SLE target, planners must work closely with the IO officer, CA operations officer, G-9 or S-9, G-2 or S-2, other government agencies operating in the AO, and other key enablers who have access to population groups. Engagement planners develop SLE target folders for each high payoff engagement and high value engagement that include a photo, personal information, work and home addresses, phone numbers, social media presence, and any available biographical information. If specific individuals are not identifiable at this point, planners can identify the positions or titles of key individuals within a populace. Engagement planners submit requests for information via the G-2/S-2 to fill gaps in SLE target folders and update as needed.

C-11. Engagement target folders must contain the relevant themes and messages as well as talking points to assist unit leaders during the engagement. Engagement planners, as part of the information operations working group, work closely with the IO officer, the public affairs officer, and the PSYOP planners to tailor the unit's themes and messages to the target to achieve effects for that phase of the operation. Themes, messages, and talking points remain nested with the unit's objectives and adapted to the engagement target based on the qualifications or personality of the individual. Human intelligence collectors can assist engagement planners with this process.

DELIVER

C-12. The detect phase becomes delivery once the unit leader makes contact with the engagement target (telephonically, through social media, or in person) to conduct the SLE in accordance with the engagement guidance. The execution of the SLE may require additional decisions by unit leaders due to assessed levels of risk. Unit leaders must balance operational risk and tactical patience with the importance to achieve effects from the engagement. Such considerations include—

- Timing of the engagement during operations.
- Location of the engagement.
- Security requirements for the personnel involved with the SLE, including the target.
- Second and third order effects of the engagement, including safety of the target.
- Level of secrecy required to protect the target, especially if target is hesitant.
- Opportunities to document and/or publicize the engagement through media, military information support operations, or combat camera.

ASSESS

C-13. The assess phase occurs throughout targeting in a continuous process of monitoring and evaluating the situation within an OE and measuring the progress of an operation toward achieving the commander's objectives (see FM 6-0 for more on assessment in the operations process).The assessment process requires MOPs and MOEs to quantitatively and qualitatively evaluate progress toward meeting the objective and producing desired effects (see ATP 3-60 for more on assessment in targeting). MOPs are used to assess whether the SLE was executed as intended based on the engagement guidance or if the unit was capable of actually completing the SLE. MOPs provide the quantitative criteria for measuring task accomplishment through capturing actions taken, regardless of whether there is an immediate effect. Example MOPs for SLE include—

- Number of deliberate SLE successfully conducted in accordance with the engagement guidance matrix.
- Number of unit talking points used during the SLE.
- Number of unit commitments kept from SLEs that resulted in tangible results.

C-14. MOEs take longer to assess because units must analyze how the combined engagements are producing effects and change in the OE. MOEs are subjective in nature and requires leaders to assess the SLE. Example MOEs include the number of combined patrols executed or number of times partner has publicly supported the unit to local audiences. This qualitative measurement will provide the commander with indicators of whether further SLE will achieve desired effects. Lead engagers work with the engagement planners and the

unit IO officer to evaluate the engagement and determine its effects, if any, in the AO. Assessing the output of the engagement determines whether objectives were accomplished and whether to re-engage the target.

C-15. The assess phase facilitates whether new targets should be nominated based on information and contacts produced during the engagement. If the target provided substantial information, unit leaders must consider how the information could benefit other unit members, such as intelligence, fires, CA, or PSYOP. Unit leaders detail this information in the SLE report submitted to engagement planners for use in the targeting and information operations working groups. Engagement planners assess issues with unit themes, messages, and talking points based on leader feedback and the qualitative measurements to possibly develop alternative talking points with public affairs PSYOP officers for commander approval and dissemination.

ENGAGEMENT SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX

C-16. The sample engagement synchronization matrix in table C-2 assigns responsibilities to detect, deliver, and assess engagements with specific high pay-off targets. The high pay-off targets are listed in priority by category under the Decide column. Units and agencies are listed under the detect, deliver, and assess columns across from their assigned high pay-off targets with theirs allocated asset. This provides the engagement planners in the information operations working group the checks to ensure all assets are used and none are overburdened. The matrix can be prepared for a specific event or for each phase of an operation and can include multiple objectives, effects, and tasks, per echelon.

Table C-2. Example engagement synchronization matrix

JFC Objective: Influence the civilian population in the area of operations to comply with population and resource control measures to prevent DCs from interfering with military operations; Prevent civilian casualties.
JFC Desired Effect: Retain FoM; decrease civilian population movement along main routes during combat operations.
Corps/JTF Desired Effect: N/A.
Division Desired Effect: Decrease civilian population movement along main routes during combat operations by 30% compared to beginning of Phase II.
BDE Task 1: SLEs with local leaders to request assistance to influence population to stay in place (SLE Aud.: DCCP directors, civic leaders, NGOs).
Purpose: Host-nation leaders influence population to stay in place to prevent civilian casualties.
BDE Desired Effect: Main routes cleared of civilian population movement along during combat operations.
BDE Task 2: SLEs with NGOs to negotiate humanitarian aid locations in towns (SLE Aud.: NGOs, civic leaders, DCCP directors).
Purpose 2: NGOs establish humanitarian aid distribution facilities to influence population to stay in place to prevent civilian casualties.
BDE Desired Effect 2: Move and distribute humanitarian aid to civilian populace centers to influence to stay in place; prevent civilian casualties and refugees.

Decide			Detect			Deliver			Assess		
CDR's Desired Effects	Aud	Rel. Act.	Time	Unit	Means	Time	Unit	Asset	Asset	MOP	MOE
DCs to DCCP to allow FoM	DCs	NGO leaders	Upon RSOI	BDE	civil affairs team	Prior to LD	BDE	BDE DEP CDR	BDE DEP CDR	SLE with NGO leader	displaced civilians move to safe area

Aud.	audience	BDE	brigade
CDR	commander	DC	displaced civilian
DCCP	displaced civilian collection point	DEP	deputy
FoM	freedom of maneuver	JFC	joint force commander
JTF	joint task force	LD	line of departure
MOE	measure of effectiveness	MOP	measure of performance
NGO	nongovernmental organization	Rel. Act.	relevant actor
RSOI	reception, staging, onward movement, and integration	SLE	Soldier and leader engagement

C-17. The following steps complete the engagement synchronization matrix as part of the IO working group.

- Step One. Select or update the high priority engagement list. Targets are derived from the information operations working group list of high value engagements.

- Step Two. Determine and set priorities for information collection assets responsible to detect, confirm, or deny the validity of each HPT. State what unit or asset for each target. This information is entered into the "detect" portion of the engagement synchronization matrix (see table C-2).

- Step Three. Determine which asset or resource will be used to engage each target once confirmed by using the list of engagement assets and resources available. Enter this information into the "deliver" portion of the matrix. The effects and applicable aspects of cyberspace effects, electromagnetic warfare, and information related capabilities are considered depending on the commander's guidance and desired effects. Consider redundant means to engage each target. When determining an asset or resource for each target, the engagement guidance is also determined and entered. Determine for each delivery means when to engage the target (immediately, unplanned/as acquired, or planned) and the effects to be achieved by engaging the target including deceive, degrade, disrupt, destroy, manipulate, exploit, influence, inform, or neutralize the target.

- Step Four. Determine and prioritize which assets will assess how well the engagement was executed and whether desired effects were achieved on targets (MOP/MOE). Enter this information into the "assess" portion of the target synchronization matrix.

Both nonlethal and lethal assets may be included in the same matrix (Tables D-5 and D-6 of ATP 3-60 provide examples of a combined lethal and nonlethal target synchronization matrix).

This page intentionally left blank.

Appendix D

TAB E (Soldier and Leader Engagement) to Appendix 15 (Information Operations) to Annex C (Operations) to an Operation Order

D-1. Commanders and staffs use Appendix 15 (Information Operations) to Annex C (Operations) to describe how IO will support operations described in the base plan or order. The IO officer is the staff officer responsible for this appendix.

D-2. The TAB E (Soldier and Leader Engagement) to Appendix 15 (Information Operations) to Annex C (Operations) of an operation order (figure D-1) that appears on pages D-1 through D-3 is a guide and should not limit the information contained in an actual TAB E. Appendix 15 should be specific to the operation being conducted; thus, the content of a TAB E will vary greatly.

[CLASSIFICATION]

Place the classification at the top and bottom of every page of the operation plan (OPLAN) or operation order (OPORD). Place the classification marking at the front of each paragraph and subparagraph in parentheses. Refer to AR 380-5 for classification and release marking instructions.

<div align="right">

Copy ## of ## copies
Issuing headquarters
Place of issue
Date-time group of signature
Message reference number

</div>

TAB E (SOLDIER AND LEADER ENGAGEMENT) TO APPENDIX 15 (INFORMATION OPERATIONS) TO ANNEX C (OPERATIONS) TO OPORD [number] [code name] –[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]

(U) **References:** *Refer to higher headquarters' OPLAN or OPORD and identify map sheets for operation (optional). Add other specific references to information operations (IO), if needed. List documents essential to understanding the OPLAN/OPORD. List references concerning a specific function in the appropriate attachments.*

1. (U) Situation. *Include information describing the operational environment affecting Soldier and leader engagement (SLE) that paragraph 1 of the OPLAN/OPORD does not cover or needs expansion (for example, Exceptions to General Order #1, use of Commander's Emergency Relief Funds, exceptions to policy on gift exchanges).*

   a. (U) Area of Interest. *Describe the information environment as it relates to 10. Refer to Tab 1 (Combined Information Overlay) to Appendix 15 (Information Operations) to Annex C (Operations) and to Annex B (Intelligence), as required.*

   b. (U) Area of Operations. *Describe the area of operations. Refer to Appendix 2 (Operation Overlay) to Annex C (Operations) as required.*

      (1) (U) Information Environment. *Describe the physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions of the information environment affecting SLE. Refer to Tab 1 (Combined Information Overlay) to Appendix 15 (Information Operations to Annex C (Operations) as required.*

      (2) (U) Terrain. *Describe aspects of terrain that impact operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.*

      (3) (U) Weather. *Describe aspects of weather that impact operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required).*

<div align="center">

[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]

</div>

Figure D-1. Example TAB E to Appendix 15 of an operation order

---

[CLASSIFICATION]

OPLAN [number] [(code name)] [(classification of title)]

(5) (U) <u>Physical</u>. *Infrastructure, technology, and population.*

    i. (U) *Combined Information Overlay, Relevant Actors (Civilian, Political, Military).*

    ii. (U) *Key locations (internally displaced person locations, government facilities, infrastructure).*

(6) (U) <u>Informational</u>. *Content and flow of information.*

    i. (U) <u>Target Audience Profile and Background Information</u>. *A profile is completed on the target audience. It includes proper name and title, approximate age, family members, ethnicity, entourage, affiliation past and present, and spoken languages as well as character traits.*

    ii. (U) <u>Social Link and Interaction with other Relevant Actors</u>. *Relationship with other relevant actors, friendly forces, third party organizations, and adversaries.*

    iii. (U) <u>Cultural /Considerations</u>. *Hierarchy within tribes, ethnicity, religious and political affiliation.*

c. (U) <u>Enemy Forces</u>. *Refer to Annex B (Intelligence).*

d. (U) <u>Friendly Forces</u>. *Refer to base OPORD and Annex A (Task Organization).*

(4) U) <u>Friendly Information-Related Capabilities</u>. *List designation, location, and outline of plan of higher, adjacent, and other functional area assets that support or impact the issuing headquarters or require coordination and additional support. Identify relevant friendly and neutral actors and audiences. Identify friendly IO/information-related capability (IRC) assets and resources that affect subordinated commander IO planning. Identify friendly force IO vulnerabilities. Identify friendly foreign forces with which subordinate commanders may operate. Identify potential conflicts within the information environment, especially if conducting joint or multinational operations. Identify and deconflict SLE efforts with other IRCs.*

e. (U) <u>Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations</u>. *Identify and state the objective or goals and primary tasks of those non-Department of Defense organizations that have a significant role within the area of operations. Identify relationships between these organizations with relevant actors that must be deferred to or coordinated with. Refer to Annex V (Interagency Coordination) as required.*

f. (U) <u>Civil Considerations</u>. *Describe the critical aspects of the civil situation and their impact on operations. Identify and describe other organizations in the area of operations that impact the conduct of SLEs. List working groups with IO, civil affairs, and public affairs. Refer to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.*

g. (U) <u>Attachments and Detachments</u>. *List units attached to or detached from the issuing headquarters. State when each attachment or detachment is effective (for example, date-time group, on order, on commitment of the reserve) if different from the effective time of the OPLAN/OPORD. Do not repeat information already listed in Annex A (Task Organization).*

h. (U) <u>Assumptions</u>. *List any SLE-specific assumptions. Include assumptions on location of relevant actors.*

2. (U) <u>Mission</u>. *State the IO mission.*

3. (U) <u>Execution</u>. *Scheme of SLE: assessment, specified tasks to subordinate units, and key coordinating instructions in the subparagraphs below.*

a. (U) <u>Concept of Operations</u>. *The concept of operations is a statement that directs the manner in which subordinate units cooperate to accomplish the mission and establishes the sequence of actions the force will use to achieve the end state. It is normally expressed in terms of the commander's desired operational framework as discussed in ADP 3-0. It states the principal tasks required, the responsible subordinate units, and how the principal tasks complement one another (how the SLE supports the commander's end state, commander's communication strategy, and relevant IO objectives). The operation overlay and graphic depictions of lines of effort help portray the concept of operations and are located in Annex C (Operations).*

b. (U) <u>Scheme of Soldier and Leader Engagement</u>. *Provide the primary tasks of SLEs and the purpose of each by phase. Identify any links between SLE tasks to IO objectives listed in Appendix 15. Designate the SLE*

[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]

Figure D-1. Example Tab E (continued)

[CLASSIFICATION]

OPLAN [number] [(code name)] [(classification of title)]

coordinator or SLE manager on the staff, if not in unit standard operating procedures Describe SLE responsibilities determined during the MDMP and codified in Exhibit 1 (Soldier Leader Engagement Synchronization Matrix).. State the primary tasks of attached units conducting SLE supporting tasks, including security operations, and the purpose of each. Refer to Annex C (Operations) as required.

c. (U) Assessment. *Describe the priorities for assessment and identify the measures of effectiveness used to assess end state conditions and objectives. Refer to Annex M (Assessment) as required.*

d. (U) Tasks to Subordinate Units. *Each task must include who (the subordinate unit assigned the task), what (the task itself), when, where, and why (purpose). Highlight specific SLE requirements for subordinate units established in Exhibit 1 (Soldier Leader Engagement Synchronization Matrix). Use a separate subparagraph for each unit. List units in task organization sequence. Place tasks that affect two or more units in paragraph 3e (Coordinating Instructions).*

e. (U) Coordinating Instructions.

(1) (U) Commander's Critical Information Requirements. *List commander's critical information requirements. Identify priority information requirements and friendly force information requirements that SLE activities can assist in answering.*

(2) (U) Essential Elements of Friendly Information. *List essential elements of friendly information. List foreign disclosure guidance and operational security (OPSEC) requirements. Highlight the foreign disclosure officer and OPSEC in the planning process and have the unit's foreign disclosure officer and OPSEC officer(s) approval of SLE topics and points. Refer to Appendix 3 (OPSEC) to Annex E (Protection).*

(3) (U) Other Coordinating Instructions. *List in subparagraphs any additional coordinating instructions and tasks that apply to two or more units, such as the operational timeline and any other critical timing or events.*

4. (U) Sustainment. *Refer to base OPORD and Annex F (Sustainment).*

5. (U) Command and Signal. *Refer to base OPORD and Annex H (Signal).*

b. (U) Control.

(1) (U) Command Posts. *State the primary controlling command post SLE planning, coordination, execution, and assessment.*

(2) (U) Reports. *List SLE-specific reporting requirements for units after executing SLEs. Provide information an SLE Report Format, required information, digital location or recipient for report, and timeline for submission. Report any dynamic leader engagements with relevant actors identified on the engagement synchronization matrix (see Enclosure 1). Provide information and recommendations to add/delete personnel from relevant actor list based upon interactions and assessed influence on required audiences.*

c. (U) Signal. *Address any SLE-specific communications requirements. Provide instruction on battle rhythm events that cover SLE planning, execution, and assessment.*

ACKNOWLEDGE: *Provide instructions for how the addressees acknowledge receipt of the OPLAN/OPORD.*

[Commander's last name] [Commander's rank]

The commander or authorized representative signs the original copy. If the representative signs the original, add the phrase, "For the Commander." The signed copy is the historical copy and remains in the headquarters' files.

OFFICAL:

[Authenticator's name] [Authenticator's position]
Use only if the commander does not sign the original order.

ATTACHMENTS: *List lower level attachments (exhibits).*
Exhibit 1 – SLE Talking Points
Exhibit 2 – Leader Engagement Report

[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]

Figure D-1. Example Tab E (continued)

D-3. Figure D-2 provides an example of Exhibit 1 (SLE Synchronization Matrix) to Tab E. Figure D-3, on page D-10, provides an example of a leader engagement report.

| Message: USF here at the request of Atropia Government
TP: USF are here at the request of the Republic of Atropia
TP: USF will continue to support Atropian military forces maintaining stability within Vetlia Province

Message: Insurgent Groups are disrupting security and essential services in Vetlia Province
TP: The actions of Bilasuvar Freedom Brigade are causing harm and casualties to the people of Vetlia province
TP: The BFBs actions in the last month have caused 11 civilian deaths and 23 civilian injuries and disrupted humanitarian assistance
IR: Do you have any information about the Bilasuvar Freedom Brigade activities in Vetlia Province? | Message: USF are supporting ATR government and NGO humanitarian assistance to displaced civilians in Vetlia Province
TP: Humanitarian Assistance is available at the Vetlia IDP Camp near Albu Jahal
TP: The government of Atropia is managing this camp for all displaced persons
IR: Do you have any information about groups of displaced persons nee |

UNIT	CATEGORY	NAME (AND TITLE)	OCCUPATION	CITY / TOWN	PRIMARY ENGAGER	SECONDARY ENGAGER
3/52 ID	MILITARY	BG Esmat Ali Markub Al Fahdawi	346 (M) BDE (ATR) CDR	Vetlia Province	BCT CDR	BCT DCO
3/52 ID	POLITICAL	Mayor Abdal Javid Shadi Al Khalifawi	City Mayor	Albu Jahal (OBJ GREEN)	BCT DCO	BCT S-9
3/52 ID	SOCIAL	Director Laura Phillips	Borderless Doctors Director	Albu Jahal (OBJ GREEN)	BCT S-9	BEB CDR
2 BEB	INFRASTRUCTURE	CAPTAIN Abd Kathem Hussein	Chief of Police	Albu Jahal (OBJ GREEN)	BEB CDR	BEB XO
2-77 AR	MILITARY	COLONEL Saddiq ibin Ali Aubadi	1/346 (M) BN (ATR) CDR	Vetlia Province	BN CDR	BN S-3

AR	armor	CDR	commander	S-3	battalion or brigade operations staff officer
ATR	Atropian	COL	colonel	S-9	battalion or brigade civil affairs operations staff officer
BCT	brigade combat team	DCO	deputy commanding officer	TP	talking point
BD	borderless doctors	IDP	internally displaced persons	USF	United States forces
BEB	brigade engineer battalion	ID	infantry division	XO	executive officer
BFB	Bilasuvar freedom brigade	IR	information requirement		
BG	brigadier general	NGO	nongovernmental organization		
BN	battalion	OBJ	objective		

Figure D-2. Example Exhibit 1 (SLE Synchronization Matrix) to TAB E

LEADER ENGAGEMENT REPORT

REPORTING UNIT:
  • *To include Date & Time: Location.*

PERSON LEADING THE MEETING:
  • *To include interpreter: if one was present.*

ATTENDEES:
  • *List of all attendees.*

PURPOSE
  • *What is the objective of this meeting and what the effect to be achieved.*

ITEMS OF DISCUSSION
  • *The following key concerns/comments were discussed.*
  • *Importance of good information.*

OVERALL MEETING ASSESSMENT
  • *Assessment set against the purpose of meeting.*

RECOMMENDATIONS
  • *Supplementary meetings or higher level of involvement.*

  FOLLOW UP ITEMS
    • *Next scheduled meeting:*
    • *Commitments made by either party.*

NAME OF THE DRAFTER
  • *Date/Time report completed*

Figure D-3. Example Exhibit 2 (Leader Engagement Report) to TAB E

This page intentionally left blank.

Source Notes

This division lists sources by page number.

1-9 **Competition**. Leah Ganoni, "Celebrating 70 Years of Partnership at the Garuda Shield 2019 Opening Ceremony," Army News Service, 20 August 2019, https://www.army.mil/article/226007/celebrating_70_years_of_partnership_at_the_garuda_shield_2019_opening_ceremony.

1-10 **Crisis.** U.S. Army Europe Public Affairs, "Dragoon Ride: 2d Cav. Regt. Returns Home to Germany," Army News Service, 2 April 2015, https://www.army.mil/article/145670/dragoon_ride_2d_cav_regt_returns_home_to_germany.

1-11 **Conflict. Navy Cross Award for Heroic Soldier and Leader Engagement**. Navy Cross awarded to Private First Class Guy L. Gabaldon. Approved by the Secretary of the Navy 23 November 1960, https://valor.militarytimes.com/hero/8227.

2-7 **Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani**. Adapted from Anthony Cordesman, "Quietism and the U.S. Position in Iraq," Center for Strategic Studies report, 19 June 2008, https://www.csis.org/analysis/quietism-and-us-postion-iraq.

3-6 **The Anbar Awakening**. Joel D. Rayburn and Frank K. Sobchak, eds., *The U.S. Army in the Iraq War: Volume 1 Invasion, Insurgency, Civil War 2003–2006* (Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2019).

3-7. Engagement variables discussion. Neil A. Hollenbeck, "When Soldiers Negotiate: The Seven Elements of Negotiation." Written in 2012 for U.S. Military Academy cadets enrolled in the course Military Leadership (PL300). Available at https://www.westpoint.edu/leadership-center/west-point-negotiation-project/training-the-force.

3-10 **Obstacle Emplacement**. Provided by Maneuver Support Center of Excellence G-3 Director of Training Development.

This page intentionally left blank.

Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. The proponent publication for terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAR	after-action review
ADM	Army design methodology
ADP	Army doctrinal publication
AO	area of operations
ASCOPE	areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
ATP	Army techniques publication
AQI	al-Qaeda in Iraq
BATNA	best alternative to a negotiated agreement
CA	civil affairs
D3A	decide, detect, deliver, and assess
DA	Department of the Army
DOD	Department of Defense
FM	field manual
G-1	assistant chief of staff, personnel
G-2	assistant chief of staff, intelligence
G-3	assistant chief of staff, operations
G-4	assistant chief of staff, logistics
G-6	assistant chief of staff, signal
G-9	assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations
IO	information operations
IRC	information-related capability
MDMP	military decision-making process
MNF-W	Multi-National Force-West
MOE	measure of effectiveness
MOP	measure of performance
OE	operational environment
PA	public affairs
PSYOP	psychological operations
S-1	battalion or brigade personnel staff officer
S-2	battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer
S-3	battalion or brigade operations staff officer

S-4	battalion or brigade logistics staff officer
S-6	battalion or brigade signal staff officer
S-9	battalion or brigade civil affairs operations staff officer
SLE	Soldier and leader engagement
SOP	standard operating procedure
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
U.S.	United States
ZOPA	zone of possible agreement

SECTION II – TERMS

*engagement subject

An individual or group selected for Soldier and leader engagement.

*Soldier and leader engagement

Interpersonal interactions by Soldiers and leaders with audiences in an area of operations.

target audience

An individual or group selected for influence. (JP 3-13)

References

All websites accessed on 7 October 2021.

REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS

These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication.

AR 360-1. *The Army Public Affairs Program*. 08 October 2020.

DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. August 2021.

FM 1-02.1. *Operational Terms*. 9 March 2021.

RELATED PUBLICATIONS

These documents contain relevant supplemental information.

JOINT AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS

Unless otherwise indicated, DOD issuances are available at https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/DoD-Issuances/. Unless otherwise indicated, most joint publications are available online: https://www.jcs.mil/doctrine.

CJCSI 3110.05F. *Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*. 7 April 2017. This document is classified and available upon a secured network.

DODI O-3607.02. *Military Information Support Operations (MISO)*. 13 June 2016. Common access card required.

JP 3-08. *Interorganizational Cooperation*. 12 October 2016.

JP 3-13. *Information Operations*. 27 November 2012.

JP 3-60. *Joint Targeting*. 28 September 2018.

ARMY PUBLICATIONS

Most Army doctrinal publications are available online: https://armypubs.army.mil.

ADP 1. *The Army*. 31 July 2019.

ADP 3-0. *Operations*. 31 July 2019.

ADP 5-0. *The Operations Process*. 31 July 2019.

ATP 1-19. *Army Bands.* 28 July 2021.

ATP 2-01.3. *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*. 1 March 2019.

ATP 3-13.1. *The Conduct of Information Operations*. 4 October 2018.

ATP 3-37.15. *Foreign Security Force Threats*. 30 January 2020.

ATP 3-39.10. *Police Operations*. 24 August 2021.

ATP 3-55.4. *Techniques for Information Collection During Operations Among Populations*. 5 April 2016.

ATP 3-60. *Targeting*. 7 May 2015.

ATP 5-0.1. *Army Design Methodology*. 1 July 2015.

ATP 5-0.3/MCRP 5-10.1/NTTP 5-01.3/AFTTP 3-2.87. *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Operation Assessment*. 7 February 2020.

ATP 5-0.6. *Network Engagement*. 19 June 2017.

FM 3-13. *Information Operations*. 6 December 2016.

FM 3-53. *Military Information Support Operations*. 4 January 2013.

FM 6-0. *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*. 5 May 2014.

FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C. *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare*. 7 August 2019.

FM 7-0. *Training.* 14 June 2021.

WEBSITES

Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS) website.
https://www.atrrs.army.mil/atrrs2.aspx.

Joint Knowledge Online (JKO) website. https://jkodirect.jten.mil/Atlas2/page/login/Login.jsf.

milGaming web portal https://milgaming.army.mil/.

West Point Negotiation Project website. https://www.westpoint.edu/leadership-center/west-point-negotiation-project.

PRESCRIBED FORMS

This section contains no entries.

REFERENCED FORMS

Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate website:
https://armypubs.army.mil/.

DA Form 2028. *Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms*.

RECOMMENDED READINGS

This manual provides essential information concerning the conduct of SLE but doctrine always benefits from external military and nonmilitary resources that provide complementary information. The listing of publications in this section is not exhaustive but offered as a starting point for IO officers, staff officers in general, and commanders who seek to augment their basic knowledge of IO. This listing is in addition to the References list that begins on page References-1. Users of the ATP are advised that manuals are subject to revision or rescension and links are periodically updated.

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (CALL) PUBLICATIONS

Information Operations Quick Reference Guide: Lessons and Best Practices. Handbook 15-03. February 2015. https://call2.army.mil/toc.aspx?document=7283.

MDMP: Lessons and Best Practices. Handbook 15-06. March 2015. https://call2.army.mil/toc.aspx?document=7288.

Staff Officers Quick Reference Guide: Lessons and Best Practices. Version 3. Handbook 14-16. September 2014. https://call2.army.mil/toc.aspx?document=7279.

RAND PUBLICATIONS

Dominating Duffer's Domain: Lessons for the 21st-Century Information Operations Practitioner. Christopher Paul and William Marcellino. RAND Corporation, 2017. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1166z1.html.

Assessing and Evaluating DoD Inform, Influence, and Persuade Efforts: Guidance for Practitioners. Christopher Paul et al. Published in IO Sphere, Fall 2015, pp. 43–49. https://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP50917.html.

Assessing and Evaluating Department of Defense Efforts to Inform, Influence, and Persuade: Desk Reference. Christopher Paul, Jessica Yeats, Colin P. Clarke, and Miriam Matthews. RAND

Corporation, 2015.
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR800/RR809z1/RAND_RR809z1.pdf.

Assessing and Evaluating Department of Defense Efforts to Inform, Influence, and Persuade: Handbook for Practitioners. Christopher Paul, Jessica Yeats, Colin P. Clarke, and Miriam Matthews. RAND Corporation, 2015.
https://comm.eval.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=45b2d092-0c76-4a81-a13a-f1f0087c2dce.

Assessing and Evaluating Department of Defense Efforts to Inform, Influence, and Persuade: An Annotated Reading List. Christopher Paul, Jessica Yeats, Colin P. Clarke, & Miriam Matthews. RAND Corporation, 2015.
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR800/RR809z3/RAND_RR809z3.pdf.

Assessing and Evaluating Department of Defense Efforts to Inform, Influence, and Persuade: Worked Example. Christopher Paul. RAND Corporation, 2017.
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR809z4.html.

"On Strategic Communication Today: Enhancing U.S. Efforts to Inform, Influence, and Persuade." Christopher Paul. Published in *Parameters*, v. 46, no. 3, Autumn 2016, pp. 87–97.
https://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP66761.html.

FOREIGN MILITARY STUDIES OFFICE PUBLICATIONS

The University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies (known as UFMCS) (formerly the Foreign Military Studies Office - FMSO) provides a comprehensive Information Warfare/ Information Operations reading list at https://usacac.army.mil/organizations/ufmcs-red-teaming/schedules-and-handbooks.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

Getting Past No: Negotiating in Difficult Situations. William Ury. New York: Bantam Books, 1993.

Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving In. 2d ed. Roger Fisher and William Ury. New York: Penguin Books, 2011.

Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion. Robert B. Cialdini, Ph.D. New York: Collins Business, 2007.

"Ethical Leadership." Robert Starratt in *The Essentials of School Leadership*. Brent Davies, ed. Los Angeles: Sage, 2009.

This page intentionally left blank.

Index

Entries are by paragraph number.

Entries are by paragraph number.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

JAMES C. MCCONVILLE
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

MARK F. AVERILL
Acting Administrative Assistant
to the Secretary of the Army
2134808

DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve. Distributed in electronic media only(EMO).