TC 3-57.51

Civil Preparation of the Battlefield

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Headquarters, Department of the Army

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Civil Preparation of the Battlefield

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Preface

TC 3-57.51 constitutes current doctrine on how to systematically evaluate the effects of civil considerations on the operational environment. This publication—

- Describes how the commander and staff examine mission variables (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations [METT-TC]) and operational variables (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time [PMESII-PT]) to understand how these variables may affect operations.
- Describes how civil preparation of the battlefield (CPB) is a critical component of the military decision-making process and how CPB supports decision-making processes.
- Facilitates a common understanding of the foundational concepts and methods of the CPB process.

The principal audience for TC 3-57.51 is Civil Affairs (CA) Soldiers at all echelons and the leadership of those Soldiers who command Army CA forces. Trainers and educators throughout the Army may use this publication.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S., international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure that their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement (FM 6-27).

TC 3-57.51 uses joint terms, where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. TC 3-57.51 is not the proponent publication for any terms or definitions. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized, and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.

TC 3-57.51 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (or Army National Guard of the United States), and the U.S. Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of TC 3-57.51 is the U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS). Send comments and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (*Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms*) to Commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: AOJK-CAD, 3004 Ardennes Street, Stop A, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9610; by email to cadoctrine@socom.mil; or by submitting an electronic DA Form 2028.

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Introduction

This training circular, *Civil Preparation of the Battlefield*, is designed to provide the analytical framework and process that Civil Affairs (CA) formations and staffs execute in support of Civil Affairs operations (CAO) and as part of the intelligence, targeting, operations, and planning processes.

The overall purpose of this training circular is to introduce civil preparation of the battlefield (CPB) as a process that enables CAO, complements targeting, and supplements intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). This training circular defines the steps of CPB and integrates the CPB process with IPB to provide commanders a comprehensive understanding of the civil considerations within the operational environment (OE). This training circular is written specifically to be incorporated into Army design methodology but may be applied to or used by all Services or the joint force. However, the Marine Corps Planning Process is published in MCCMOS Circular 3.2, *Civil Preparation of the Battlespace*.

In using CPB, CA forces effectively describe how civil considerations impact friendly operations and can potentially affect adversary decision making. CPB focuses on civil considerations and assists in the development of courses of action (COAs) during the military decision-making process. While the CA staff or forces focus on the civil populace and civil considerations, it is the entire staff that determines the effects of friendly and adversary actions on the population.

CPB dovetails with steps one and two of the IPB process in determining how civil considerations within the OE can affect friendly and threat operations, how these operations may affect the civilian populace, and how the civil component can effectively enable operations.

CPB is the process of analyzing and evaluating civil information gained through civil network development and engagement, area studies, initial and deliberate assessments, and other processes, and integrating the resulting civil knowledge into CAO. See ATP 3-57.50 for more information on civil information management. This civil knowledge—

- Provides commanders with a greater situational understanding of the OE.
- Enables the commander's visualization of the battlefield.
- Provides options that improve decision making and enables information advantage.
- Allows planners to develop effective plans and operations.

CPB is framed utilizing the five stability sectors. This allows the CAO staff to orient the commander to different aspects of the civil component and provide options for the commander to address or utilize vulnerabilities and capabilities that have been identified.

Interaction with civil networks across the area of operations and area of interest provides commanders with a greater understanding of societal factors and allows staffs to create a more detailed map of the interactions of friendly and threat actors in the OE. Civil networks and the nodes in those networks are sources of civil information that provide access for CAO and points of leverage for the commander. Friendly civil networks provide the commander with an exponentially larger platform through civil reconnaissance and civil engagement than would otherwise be available. Engagement with civil networks also provides the commander with access to civil information coming from areas where the commander might not have a physical presence—including in virtual environments.

This understanding empowers commanders with the ability to plan and execute greater and more effective interdictions of threat activities through mobilized civil support. Greater situational understanding of culture and civil considerations also allows the identification of assets and risks to U.S. forces and the overall military campaign in the civil component of the OE. See ADP 3-0 for more information on Army operations.

Note: For the purpose of this training circular, culture is understood as the shared world view and social structures of a group of people that influences a person's and a group's actions and choices.

Ultimately, the CPB process enables CA to engage and leverage the civil component of the OE through the execution of CA core competencies across the competition continuum to find, disrupt, and defeat threats within the civil component to enable mission command, increase situational understanding, preserve combat power, and consolidate gains in support of the establishment of a secure and stable OE consistent with U.S. interests.

Chapter 1
Overview

The campaign plan and strategy must be adapted to the character of the people encountered.
—U.S. Marine Corps FMFRP 12-15, *Small Wars Manual (obsolete)*, 1940

PURPOSE

1-1. The role of Civil Affairs (CA) forces is to engage and leverage the civil component of the operational environment (OE) while enhancing, enabling, or providing governance (FM 3-57). Civil preparation of the battlefield (CPB) systematically analyzes and evaluates the operational variables of "political," "economic," and "social" in an area of interest (AOI) to determine opportunities and risks in an area of operations (AO), allowing the commander to enhance, enable, or provide governance and, ultimately, stability.

1-2. During the conduct of CPB, CA commands and units—

- Organize all of the PMESII-PT and METT-TC variables, the 16 political-military factors, and the areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE) factors to provide clarity on how these factors exist within the AO.

Note: The 16 political-military variables, also called "pol-mil," form a framework for analyzing an OE. In conjunction with research methodology, they develop a comprehensive base of knowledge about the country or AOI. When assessed in conjunction with one another, they form the start point for a multidiscipline analysis of the issues associated with civil considerations and CA activities abroad.

- Provide an understanding of stability dynamics based on the grievances (instability) and resiliencies (stability) of the local population identified by key influences and events that could affect the five stability sectors—security, justice and reconciliation, humanitarian and social well-being, governance and participation, and economic stabilization and infrastructure—as recognized in joint doctrine and across the U.S. interagency. See FM 3-07 for more information.
- Create a deliberate analytical process to define the OE by political, economic, and social variables for influencing populations and resources throughout the five stability sectors.
- Analyze opportunities and risk within the socio-political and economic variables of the OE.
- Analyze the political, economic, and social variables that motivate or incentivize individual or group behavior (money, ideology, and ego—with coercion a factor based on peer-pressure).
- Generate a civil information collection plan, a systematic scheme to optimize the employment of all available collection capabilities and associated processing, exploitation, and dissemination resources to satisfy specific information requirements regarding civil information. The plan is built around personalities or organizations and their access, influence, or control of populations and resources that effect friendly or enemy operations.
- Nest the analytical process with the requirements to support civil network development and engagement and civil knowledge integration.
- Analyze the effect of civilian populations on military operations and vice versa. For example, providing an analysis of how potentially displaced civilian movement routes and assembly areas affect lines of communications or the axis of advance or how displaced civilians can provide access to development opportunities with civil networks in the area.

1-3. To be effective, CPB must—

- Describe the civil considerations first then how the terrain, weather, and enemy affect friendly and threat operations.
- Be a continuous process that feeds into Army integrating processes.
- Define the commander's AOI within its geographic boundaries to focus collection and analysis within the AOI.
- Include relevant aspects of the OE for decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations.
- Support each step of the military decision-making process (MDMP) with CPB products.
- Support the operational framework considerations—physical, temporal, cognitive, and virtual.
- Facilitate the commander's ability to visualize the battlefield in general and the civil considerations in particular.

1-4. CPB is most effective and best aids the commander's decision making when the CA staff officer or CA element integrates the expertise and collected related civil information from the other staff sections and supporting elements to include in its analysis. This is especially true when operating in environments where the effects of the operational and mission variables are complex, multidimensional, and not easily determined.

1-5. A key aspect of CPB is the refinement of the civil common operational picture (COP). The conclusions and the products developed during CPB are continually refined throughout the operation. This information is incorporated into the running estimate as new information is obtained and further analysis is conducted during situation development. This refinement ensures the integration of the civil considerations into the command COP and the commander's decisions are based on the most current information available.

INTEGRATION WITH INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

1-6. The Civil Affairs operations (CAO) staff officer or CA element facilitates the CPB effort; however, this element cannot provide all of the information the commander requires for situational understanding. The intelligence staff officer assists not only with their contribution to the greater civil considerations picture but are partners in the staff integration of CPB, civil considerations and intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), and how the adversary is arrayed on the battlefield. The integration of the two products ensures a holistic view of the OE, reduces the initial time required for course of action (COA) development, and assists the commander in timely decision making. This CPB-IPB integration improves the quality and accuracy of each mutually supporting product. Figure 1-1 shows how CPB provides information to IPB during each step of the MDMP.



Figure 1-1. Civil preparation of the battlefield input to intelligence preparation of the battlefield

1-7. Through this integration, CPB provides a higher level of detail than would be required for operations in a broader, less complex AO. Effective CPB of an urban environment must include the integration of information from both traditional (civil reconnaissance, civil engagement, civil network development and engagement) and nontraditional (cyber, space, and specific intelligence) platforms and sources. Staffs rely heavily on the voluminous data produced. During planning, commanders and staffs should consider translation capabilities and the integration of unclassified sources with classified sources of information to build the COP. This integration of CPB and IPB information provides the critical information needed to gain situational understanding. Figure 1-2 shows the specific points of interaction between CPB and IPB.



Figure 1-2. Interaction of civil preparation of the battlefield and intelligence preparation of the battlefield

CIVIL KNOWLEDGE INTEGRATION AND CIVIL NETWORK DEVELOPMENT AND ENGAGEMENT

1-8. CPB is an integral part of civil knowledge integration during civil network development and engagement. Developing and engaging civil networks provides commanders with critical civil knowledge and capabilities to understand the OE and the ability to produce and assess effects in the civil component. Leaders must consider all variables that make up their OE—such as social variables that initiate and sustain conflict and those existing capabilities within the resident population that can be leveraged or enhanced to create stability. It is through CPB that commanders gain a more comprehensive understanding of the OE and how civil considerations and actions may impact missions.

THE FOUR STEPS

1-9. CPB is an iterative process with sequential steps. The following are the four steps of the CPB process and their associated outputs or products. Each step in the process is refined continuously to ensure that the CPB products are accurate and relevant to decision making. As each step is refined, the information is updated, ensuring the most current and accurate depiction of the civil component is available.

STEP ONE: DEFINE THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

1-10. This step is comprised of four substeps which define the OE:

- Define the AO and the AOI for further analysis.
- Define the political, economic, and social variables in the AO.
- Produce prioritized lists of political, economic, and social information gaps.
- Develop the civil information collection plan and requests for information.

STEP TWO: ANALYZE THE CIVIL COMPONENT OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

1-11. This step is comprised of three substeps which work to analyze the civil component of the OE for further planning considerations:

- Organize data across political, economic, and social variables (iterative).
- Analyze political, economic, and social variables in relation to the threat and their interactions.
- Produce an initial overlay of the civil component of the OE.

STEP THREE: GENERATE AND INTEGRATE CIVIL KNOWLEDGE

1-12. This step is comprised of three substeps which work to turn civil information into knowledge relevant to operational planning:

- Evaluate civil information for operational relevance.
- Describe opportunities and risks within the political, economic, and social layers of the OE.
- Develop a civil environment model and refine an overlay of the civil component of the OE.

STEP FOUR: INFORM THE THREAT TEMPLATE BASED ON POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL VARIABLES

1-13. This step is comprised of four substeps to provide actionable options for the commander to create effects in the civil component of the OE.

- Generate a civil event template.
- Integrate into the collection matrix.
- Develop a civil COA statement.
- Determine and prioritize targetable opportunities and risk.

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Chapter 2
Define the Operational Environment

Information is not knowledge.

—Albert Einstein

STEP 1-A: DEFINE THE AREA OF OPERATIONS AND AREA OF INTEREST FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS

2-1. Step 1-A starts upon the receipt of the mission and as part of the MDMP (figure 2-1, page 2-2). During step 1-A of the CPB process, CA elements identify for further analysis the significant political, economic, and social characteristics of, or activities within, the OE as well as the physical space the mission occupies. An OE is comprised of both an AO and an AOI.

2-2. An *area of operations* is an operational area defined by a commander for land and maritime forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces (JP 3-0). The AO comprises an external boundary that delineates adjacent unit AOs and includes subordinate unit AOs. Subordinate unit AOs may be contiguous or noncontiguous.

2-3. An *area of interest* is that area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory (JP 3-0). When defining the AOI, the CPB process must consider the fact that political, economic, and social systems are not limited by traditional geographic and political boundaries.

STEP 1-B: DEFINE THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL VARIABLES IN THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

2-4. Step 1-B is conducted to define the political, economic, and social variables within the AO. This step must account for the resident understanding of their systems. Each system should be analyzed and described in terms of organizations, personalities, capabilities, and resources.

2-5. When defining the political, economic, and social variables, it is important to conduct rigorous research based on historical contexts (organizations, personalities, capabilities, resources) within the AO. Academic rigor—based on applied social sciences including anthropology, sociology, rapid assessment ethnography, human geography, psychology, and political science—is an important aspect when conducting analysis to provide adequate depth and breadth which clearly defines these variables.

Note: For the purpose of this training circular, human geography is understood as the study of the different ways in which human societies develop and operate in relation to their physical environment.

2-6. Organize the information using various analytical tools such as ASCOPE, PMESII-PT, and the 16 political-military factors. Any systematic, repeatable approach can be used depending on the situation or what the unit is comfortable with using.

2-7. The result of step 1-B is a comprehensive collection and collation of data to ensure the development of a multidimensional understanding of the OE.



Figure 2-1. Civil preparation of the battlefield as part of the military decision-making process

FILTERING

2-8. CA forces filter to ensure that information used for further analysis is relevant to the mission and operating environment. In order to determine the relevance of the mass of information required to analyze, filtering criteria must be applied, which sorts information for further analysis or elimination.

2-9. It is prudent to not permanently delete information. Instead, put the information in an archive file where it can be retrieved later if there is a change in the civil environment or operational situation making the information relevant.

FILTERING CRITERIA

2-10. Filtering criteria is the gateway for determining whether or not information is retained or deleted. Basic filtering criteria and standards should be set by the senior CAO planner or CA noncommissioned officer in charge. There are a variety of considerations that can be used to determine filtering criteria. Basic filtering criteria are dynamic, should be subject to review, and will likely evolve with the mission. They should include the following:

- **Organizations.** Information related to organizations within the political, economic, and social variables.
- **Personalities.** Information related to formal and informal political, economic, and social interactions with entities and individuals in historical context.
- **Capabilities.** One of the basic filtering criteria used to determine what information is retained or discarded during analysis, the counterterrorism analytical framework is based on political, economic, and social variables. Figure 2-2, page 2-4, and figure 2-3, page 2-5, display the counterterrorism analytical framework and its methodology.
- **Resources.** A supply of money, material, staff, or other assets that can be drawn by a person or organization in order to function effectively.
- **Subject Matter.** Information related to the civil environment and other factors.
- **Location.** Information related to the AO.
- **Time and Time of Occurrence.** Information superseded by other reporting or processes must be changed.
- **Redundancy and Multiple Reports.** Information related to the same data or event should be used to confirm or deny that information or added if it possesses additional significant data.

IDEAS AND FACTS

2-11. The methods of social science research emphasize the use of both theory and data (ideas and facts). Theories attempt to explain how two or more general classes of phenomena (income inequality and political violence) are related. In most empirical research, data is collected to test theoretic generalizations and add standards or metrics to those outcomes. Theories that survive the testing process ("hold water") are used to explain particular events or to predict the outcome of future events.

RECORDING

2-12. Recording is simply taking the filtered information and putting it into written or graphical format arranged with other similar information. Part of the recording process should be a "log-in" of the incoming information, similar to a command or staff section operations center log, and placement of the information into a file structure of some kind. Additionally, recorded information should be displayed on a map or other graphical means to aid in the "analytic process" step. Regardless of recording means, build redundancies into the system, both electronic as well as hard copy (manual plot or periodic printout of information).



Figure 2-2. Counterterrorism analytical framework



Figure 2-3. Counterterrorism analytical framework methodology

STEP 1-C: PRODUCE A PRIORITIZED LIST OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL INFORMATION GAPS

2-13. Once the political, economic, and social variables have been defined through research, gaps should be identified within each. During this phase, a more thorough and detailed analysis of the identified gaps should be conducted as the conditions permit. During this step, gaps should be categorized and prioritized using validated facts and assumptions and based on the assigned mission.

STEP 1-D: DEVELOP THE CIVIL INFORMATION COLLECTION PLAN AND REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION

2-14. During this step, the prioritized gaps within the political, economic, and social variables are transitioned to validated information requirements that are integrated into CAO as well as the intelligence, targeting, and operations planning processes.

2-15. Step 1 of CPB focuses on collecting and categorizing civil information. It is executed as part of and concurrently with step 1 and step 2 of the IPB process. It is part of defining the OE and identifying and describing civil considerations, which are analyzed and evaluated in CPB step 2.

Chapter 3

Analyze the Civil Component of the Operational Environment

The alchemists in their search for gold discovered many other things of greater value.

—Arthur Schopenhauer

OVERVIEW

3-1. Understanding and effectively analyzing the impact of civil considerations on operations can enhance the staff's ability to select objectives; to locate, move, or control forces; and to recommend proper protection measures. The CA elements must leverage the rest of the staff, available units, and outside agencies, who have expertise in civil considerations, in both gathering and analyzing civil information. CA personnel are best equipped to understand how to leverage nonorganic units, agencies, academia, other organizations, or other Services that have relevant regional or cultural knowledge.

3-2. The CA element or staff officer assists commands in understanding the social, political, and economic variables within the AO and their effects on the mission. Tactical Army staffs use ASCOPE characteristics to analyze civil considerations that are essential in supporting the development of effective plans for operations. The focus of effort in this step is to evaluate and analyze the information collected during step 1. Analysis takes into consideration several factors including operational culture, stability and instability dynamics, and a study of geospatial and stakeholder's information. Finished products may include a civil environment factors and relevance matrix, an operational culture matrix, instability and stability factors matrices, geospatial imagery overlaid with civil data, a stakeholder matrix and map, and a key influencer matrix. All information collected must be continuously reviewed to provide a comprehensive view of perceptions and attitudes and to expose trends that help form the basis for predictive analysis.

STEP 2-A: ORGANIZE DATA ACROSS POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL VARIABLES (ITERATIVE)

3-3. During this step of the process, evaluation of the data is essential to organizing it properly (figure 3-1, page 3-2). Data evaluation occurs to determine reliability and relevance, as well as accuracy, based on the political, economic, and social variables. Collected data must be:

- Acquired and generated.
- Evaluated.
- Analyzed.
- Categorized.

EVALUATION

3-4. *Evaluating* is using indicators to judge progress toward desired conditions and determining why the current degree of progress exists. (ADP 5-0). Evaluation is used to determine the reliability of our information sources, the accuracy of the information they provide and relevance to operations. CA forces evaluate sources and information as part of the larger validation process to ensure the data is the most current and accurate available. Evaluating the relevance, source reliability, and accuracy of information is a step in the process that can be done "near simultaneously" with recording. In fact, if the CAO planner determines the information is inaccurate, then the information may be placed in the archive file vice recording it.



Figure 3-1. Data organization

3-5. In today's information age, there are numerous data and information sources available aside from the tactical efforts of civil reconnaissance and civil engagement. Understandably, civil reconnaissance and civil engagement—particularly civil engagement—are investments in resources but provide access to the individuals and groups that can be leveraged to support military operations.

3-6. Most civil information can be obtained through open source. Classified sources available to other communities can be utilized to further enhance understanding of the civil environment. In addition, close cooperation with embassy or consular officials can shed light on the civil environment. Regardless, methods to determine source reliability and data accuracy should be a part of standard operating procedures.

Relevance and Reliability

3-7. During evaluation, the relevance of the information with regard to requirements is confirmed; then the reliability of the information source or agency that provided the information is assessed. Also, evaluators should be wary of using single-source data and information in lieu of multiple sources to corroborate or substantiate information because of misinformation, biases, and singular points of view. This is problematic, especially when there is no previous experience with the source.

Accuracy

3-8. In addition to assessing source or agency reliability and credibility, CAO planners also determine the accuracy of the information provided by the source—this is an assessment of the probable truth or timeliness of the information. CAO planners do this by comparing the information provided with similar information obtained through various sources or agencies.

Evaluation Rating System: Civil Network and Node Reliability

3-9. CAO planners try to determine the "Value/Rating/Description" regarding the originator or source. This provides a way to characterize and evaluate the network and the reliability of each node in the civil network, ranging from near-complete reliability to reliability that cannot be judged because there just is not enough data about the origin of the information.

STEP 2-B: ANALYZE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL VARIABLES IN RELATION TO THE THREAT AND THEIR INTERACTIONS

THE ANALYTIC PROCESS

3-10. The analytic process requires the use of critical thinking, the synthesis of information, the description of the current civil environment, and the estimation of possible future outcomes. Inevitably, the key to the analytical process is the critical thinking that occurs in this step, which is continuous, thus allowing for trend identification, observation, and predictive analysis. The analytical process has three basic elements:

- Analysis.
- Synthesis.
- Estimation.

Analysis

3-11. The civil analyst determines the facts about the situation and then applies critical thinking skills to begin their analysis.

Know Yourself.

3-12. In order to be effective in the analysis portion of the process, the CA Soldier or analyst—who focuses on civil considerations for civil knowledge integration—needs to develop and maintain knowledge of the friendly, threat, and civil environments, understand the friendly scheme of maneuver, and understand the related social, political, and economic activities.

Know the Civil Environment.

3-13. The CA Soldier doing the analysis must quickly and accurately identify key elements of the situation in the civil environment; this may include determining key influencers. Key influencers are selected individuals, groups, assets, infrastructure, and socio-cultural factors (people, places, things), which could have a significant influence on friendly mission planning and execution. Key influencers are not limited exclusively to individuals or actors. On the contrary, a key influencer may include an annual holiday or event, a pilgrimage location, or another date reminiscent of something of cultural value. In sum, it is important to understand that key influencers are more than individuals or groups.

Test Your Hypotheses, Deductions, and Conclusions.

3-14. Once the civil analyst has laid the baseline described above, hypotheses propose various deductions and conclusions about aspects of the civil environment to establish a baseline. In this context, a hypothesis forms a tentative explanation about the civil environment or actions that CAO planners use to explain the civil dimension and opportunities or obstacles for friendly force success. Deduction is drawing conclusions about a specific case or situation based on a general set of facts and knowledge about the available information. Conclusions are the products of analysis and are often a combination of facts, opinions, and beliefs about the civil environment in this instance. When providing conclusions, it is important for CAO planners to identify the basis of that conclusion as grounded in facts, opinions, and/or beliefs. Once conclusions are drawn, the analyst determines the impact of these conclusions on what is known about the current situation and any potential changes.

Synthesis

3-15. Once the analysis has been completed, the analyst then synthesizes the results. This consists of identifying relationships between specific pieces of information and integrating those pieces with each other and with the current situation. The analyst looks for patterns in activity or the environment and then provides an updated view of the current situation.

Estimation

3-16. The CA analyst estimates by comparing the current conditions to future possibilities. In the case of the civil environment, the range of estimations extends from the most likely civil reaction/most advantageous civil reaction/most disruptive civil reaction matrix, all of which are key to step 4 of the CPB process. Each of these relates to effects and opportunities (similar to most likely COA/most dangerous COA).

ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS TOOLS

3-17. The CA analyst should consider the wide variety of tools for the analysis of the civil environment. Many of these are borrowed from the intelligence disciplines and the analyst should choose the tool according to what is being analyzed. The key is to establish standard operating procedures and train in the use of those tools in garrison or exercise environments. See ATP 2-33.4 for more information on analytic techniques.

Network Analysis.

3-18. The process of investigating social structures (institutions, groups, organizations) through the use of matrix and graph theory, which characterizes the networks as nodes and the ties, edges or links that connect them. In network analysis, ties are defined as information-carrying connections between an edge of a network; it is one of the connections between the nodes of the network. Edges can be directed, meaning they point from one node to the next. Links are the relationships between two nodes.

3-19. Network analysis is the primary tool used in civil considerations analysis as a means of gaining an understanding of the connectedness of a group, place, physical object, or system. It identifies relevant nodes, determines and analyzes links between nodes, develops the relative strength between the nodes, and identifies key nodes within a network. Network analysis facilitates identification of significant information about networks that might otherwise go unnoticed. For example, network analysis can uncover positions of power, show the cells that account for its structure and organization, find individuals or cells whose removal would greatly alter the network, and facilitate a measurable change in the integrity of the network over time.

3-20. All networks are influenced by and, in turn, influence the OEs in which they exist. Analysts must understand the underlying conditions; the frictions between individuals and groups; familial, business, and governmental relationships; and drivers of instability that are constantly subject to change. All of these factors evolve as the networks change shape, increase or decrease capacity, and strive to influence and control things within the OE, and they contribute to or hinder the networks' integrity and influence. Environmental framing is selecting, organizing, and interpreting and making sense of a complex reality; it serves as a guide for analyzing, understanding, and acting. Critical thinking requires analysts to develop a complete understanding of the OE and to solve the right problems and remain capable and willing to adapt to dynamic and even unpredictable conditions.

Nodal Analysis.

3-21. The process used to identify and methodically study each node—a specific person, place, or physical thing—within the network determines which is considered a reference node and how other nodes or networks are directly or indirectly connected.

3-22. As part of network analysis, this breaks down and evaluates the size, organization, leadership, individuals, and inter- and intrarelationships of groups within a network. It can be used to emphasize the parts that make up the group, location, or information on a specific group or groups or individual(s) within a group or larger network.

3-23. Analysis should include three broad categories of civil information: physical environment and infrastructure, individuals and groups, and cultural factors.

Physical Environment and Infrastructure.

3-24. This analysis covers both natural and manmade factors in the environment with the focus on those aspects having a significant influence on friendly operations. On the civil environment side, much of the same information developed or being developed by geospatial intelligence, engineers, and other personnel is used, so it is important to leverage this ongoing work. Aspects of the physical environment and infrastructure can be key influencers.

3-25. While there is no single way to properly display the civil physical environment, a geospatial graphic is a useful tool to simplistically display such information. Other graphic tools to help provide greater relevancy are a scale, a north-facing pointer, multiple colors to denote boundaries, an overlay of military and/or police boundaries, topographical features, and so on. These graphics are computer generated from geographic information systems (GIS) tools that are available to the analyst.

3-26. Another approach to capture civil information relating to the physical environment and infrastructure is to utilize the civil factors and relevance matrix. The civil factors and relevance matrix is a living document intended to develop throughout the CPB process with information updated as required. The civil factors and relevance matrix should be completed for each component of ASCOPE and PSMESII through a "crosswalk" where each area is analyzed individually. The CAO planner or analyst focused on civil considerations when analyzing the area might ask:

- **Areas/Political.** What is the political situation in the AO? What are the political boundaries? What is significant?
- **Areas/Military.** What military (or paramilitary) capabilities are in the AO? What are the military boundaries? What is significant?
- **Areas/Economic.** What are the key and decisive areas of economic activity?
- **Areas/Social.** What is the social climate in the AO? What are the key and decisive social factors that affect the AO (ethnic enclaves, crime districts, and so on)?
- **Areas/Information.** How is information collected and/or disseminated in the AO? What are the key and decisive information requirements in the AO?
- **Areas/Infrastructure.** What are the key and decisive elements of infrastructure in the AO? Where are the key and decisive elements of infrastructure located?

Individuals and Groups.

3-27. The next broad category of information to consider is individuals and groups. This analysis emphasizes that there should be an attempt to focus on individuals and groups that have a significant impact on friendly operations. Individuals and groups can be key influencers that are both positive (help facilitate friendly goals/operations) and negative (hinder or violently oppose friendly goals/operations) influences within the OE. Also, CAO planners try to determine intangibles such as motivations, interests, and goals—a difficult task at best. Like the physical environment and infrastructure, CAO planners often use information about individuals and groups developed or being developed by intelligence personnel. However, CAO planners must be sure to examine the significance of information from a civil environment perspective. There are also numerous open-source intelligence tools and software applications available to support this effort.

Activities and Association Matrices.

3-28. Two techniques that can be used in this type of analysis are the activities and association matrices. An activities matrix links individuals to events and organizations. From a civil environment perspective, CAO planners list PMESII-PT type activities along the bottom axis of the matrix and use the product to determine who the "players" are in the civil environment. An association matrix links people to other people but certainly could include groups as well. This product could be used in the civil environment to help determine the often-complex interpersonal relationships that exist among stakeholders that can influence friendly operations. However, social network tools such as Gephi, Pajek, and R provide more accurate results.

Social Network Analysis.

3-29. Social network analysis is defined as the process of investigating social structures through the use of networks and graph theory. It characterizes networked structures—also called relations—in terms of nodes and the ties, edges, arcs, or links that connect them. Social structures are often depicted through social network analysis and include social media networks, memes spread, information circulation, friendship and acquaintance networks, business networks, knowledge networks, difficult working relationships, social networks, collaboration graphs, kinship, disease transmission, and sexual relationships. These networks are often depicted as graphics known as sociograms in which nodes are represented as points and are linked as represented by their connecting lines. These graphics provide a means of qualitatively assessing networks by varying the visual representation of their nodes and edges to reflect attributes of interest.

Stakeholder Analysis Techniques.

3-30. As defined in joint terminology, a *stakeholder* is an individual or group that is directly impacted by military operations, actions, and/or outcomes, and whose interests positively or negatively motivate them toward action (JP 3-61). When analyzing stakeholders in the civil environment, there is no hard and fast methodology. New stakeholders may emerge with changes in the situation and the environment, stakeholders may change sides, and friendly actions can have negative and unintended effects on friendly stakeholders. Stakeholder analysis should begin with a brainstorming session within the targeting working group (including senior leadership if possible) or during a CA unit's planning process. This way, CAO planners can whiteboard all the individuals and organizations who may be affected by operations. Once the larger pool of stakeholders is identified, CAO planners begin to align their level of interest and involvement in the civil environment.

Stakeholder Matrix.

3-31. A stakeholder matrix is a tool that can be used to dissect significant stakeholders in the environment; it lays out each stakeholder's interests in the civil environment (businesses, political influence, religious status) to assess the type and extent of impact that the stakeholder can have on both friendly actions and the civil environment as a whole and to develop mitigation/enhancement measures that friendly forces may want to implement to facilitate their goals and objectives.

Stakeholder Map.

3-32. Stakeholder mapping is the visual representation of a stakeholder analysis (figure 3-2), organizing those people according to the key criteria that CAO planners will be managing them with during the operations. Once the analyst focused on civil considerations understands who the significant stakeholders are—their motivations, interests, and the type of impact they can have on friendly operations—the analyst focused on civil considerations can then consider the relative level of power they have to influence the civil environment and/or friendly operations and what level of interest they maintain in the operations and/or the civil environment. Mapping stakeholders according to their influence (power) and interest allows CAO planners to paint a picture of the type of engagement needed to have with them. Also, CAO planners consider stakeholders can wield formal and/or informal power. For example, a mayor may have formal governing power but may have little influence within the civil environment. Conversely, a religious leader may have significant influence in the civil environment but no governing power. The stakeholder map might help an analyst focused on civil considerations make a call on the type, level, and frequency of engagement required with a stakeholder in the civil environment; this is especially important if it is determined that the stakeholder is a key influencer.



Figure 3-2. Stakeholder map

Cultural Factor Analysis.

3-33. The third broad category of civil analysis information is cultural factors. Here, the civil considerations analyst is trying to take abstract and intangible concepts of culture and determine the nature and scope of its impact. Culture is the shared world view and social structures of a group of people that influences a person's and a group's actions and choices. There can be much overlap between cultural factors and the other two broad categories of civil information, and this should be part of the synthesis element of the analysis.

3-34. All operations impact the environment in which they are conducted. Similarly, the OE has an impact on friendly forces operations. Significant cultural factors can be key influences as powerful as the tangible key influencers (physical environment or infrastructure and individuals or groups).

3-35. There is no singular approach to applying a cultural lens to the data collected in step 1. Every situation requires careful consideration based on commander's guidance and the nature of the unit's operations. CAO planners should endeavor to apply cultural perspective to the information they have gathered. The behavior or actions of others should be interpreted in the frame of that person's culture. The point of this approach is to minimize mirroring or viewing the information from a biased mentality. Applying a cultural lens to the ASCOPE/PMESII data results in a greater understanding of key and relevant cultural factors affecting operations.

3-36. Operational culture factors derived from this effort are compiled and included in the analysis of the civil environment and relevance matrices.

STABILITY DYNAMICS

3-37. CPB is a flexible, analytical framework that can be used to provide a strategic (macro) to tactical (micro) view of an AO. Similarly, accounting for stability dynamics can be scoped toward the macro- and microlevel. The key difference between macro- or microfocused views relates to the level of effort in gaining an awareness of local perceptions—it takes more effort to collate, assimilate, and comprehend the meaning of multiple local perception data from multiple areas versus targeted singular efforts for specific local areas.

3-38. As part of understanding the stability dynamics, it is important to understand the five stability sectors recognized in joint doctrine and across U.S. interagency community.

3-39. In most cases, CAO planners look to understand stability dynamics at a microlevel. This includes understanding the grievances (instability) and resiliencies (stability) of the local population, and identifying key influences and identifying events that could affect stability and instability.

3-40. CPB depicts the civil situation and better defines the civil dimension through the lenses of political, economic, and social variables of the OE. To that end, population surveys (atmospherics) focused on stability dynamics are very important endeavors, requiring careful consideration and even more vigilant planning when operating in remote areas where little or no information exists on local perceptions.

3-41. In many instances, atmospherics can be obtained through a variety of sources; for example, unit situation reports, U.S. Embassy sources (Embassy reporting, U.S. Agency for International Development, and so on), United Nations sources, leader engagements, and tactical conflict surveys. This atmospheric data is compiled and ordered with events and key influencers where events are initially considered neutral until acted upon by key influencers, which determine whether events are perceived as grievances or resiliencies.

3-42. The analysis of instability/stability factors is an iterative process. During CPB, CAO planners should populate the instability and stability factors matrices (figure 3-3) to the best of their ability.

Grievances	Events	Key Influences: Means and Motivations
What are core grievances and societal vulnerabilities identified?	Potential contributions that could contribute to an increase in instability?	What are the influences, means, and motivation that contribute to an increase in instability?
• Lost economic opportunity. • Societal vulnerability to crime. • Political corruption.	• Credit default. • Martial law. • Foreign invasion.	• Chairman gaining powers— assumption and abuse of power. • Populace and resources control/Revolutionay Guard Military Council economic mismanagement.

Resiliencies	Events	Key Influences: Means and Motivations
What processes, relationships, or institutions enable the society to function normally and peacefully? Are there any resiliencies that have been or are being undermined?	What potential or anticipated future situations could create an opening for key influences to further reinforce stability?	What are the influences in the society that preserve and strengthen stability? What means do they possess? What are the motives and actions taken?
• Natural resources (oil). • Well-educated population. • Strong foreign diaspora.	• Sporting events. • Freedom of Sir Thomas Moore and John Goodfellow.	• Sir Thomas Moore—revered by the population.

Figure 3-3. Instability factors matrix

3-43. Instability results when grievances overwhelm societal resiliencies and/or the ability of the government to mitigate these factors. CAO planners should consider the following to assist in assessing grievances within the AO (figure 3-4). Does the issue:

- Align with U.S. Government interests and/or military objectives?
- Decrease support for the government?
- Increase support for malign actors?
- Disrupt the normal functioning of society?

Potential sources of instability.	Instability Criteria			Source of Instability	Prioritization
	Does this issue decrease support for the government's legitimacy? Explain.	Does this increase support for malign actors? Explain.	Does this issue disrupt the normal functioning of society? Explain.	Does the issue meet any instability criteria?	Is the source of instability a priority grievance for the local populace?
• Corruption. • Abuse of power. • Loss of economic opportunity. • Martial law. • Disenfranchised population.	Yes, government is generally low as seen by by the recent protests. Government is not seen as legitimate.	No, the government is seen by the people as the malign actor.	Yes, the government has not functioned normally during the last few years.	Yes.	Yes, many diaspora left the island for lack of economic opportunity.

Figure 3-4. Source of instability matrix

3-44. Too often, efforts to alleviate instability obscure existing societal resiliencies (stability). The analysis of resiliencies must complement overall stability assessments and be strongly considered in planning operations. CAO planners should consider the following to assist in assessing resiliencies within the AO (figure 3-5). Does the issue:

- Increase support for the government?
- Decrease support for malign actors?
- Increase societal and institutional capacity and capabilities?

3-45. The information derived from instability/stability analysis is included in the civil environment factors and relevance matrix before proceeding to step 3 of the CPB process.

Potential sources of stability.	Stability Criteria			Source of Instability	Impact to Mission
	Does this issue increase support for the government's legitimacy? Explain.	Does this decrease support for malign actors? Explain.	Does this issue increase societal and institutional capacity and capabilties? Explain.	Does this issue meet any stability criteria?	Is the source of instability a priority grievance for the local populace?
• Foreign diaspora. • Reverence for Sir Thomas Moore. • Oil reserves. • Educated population.	No, government is seen as illegitimate.	Yes, assuming the Revolutionary Guard Military Council is seen as the malign actor.	Yes, diaspora remittances are a critical enabler during economic downturn.	Yes.	Yes, many diaspora left the island for lack of economic opportunity.

Figure 3-5. Source of stability matrix

IDENTIFY KEY INFLUENCERS

3-46. CAO planners should use area studies, assessments, and all previous analysis as starting points. Key influencers can be determined by asking the following questions: What are the sources and nature of the key influencers that can affect friendly force operations? By what manner/means can the key influencer apply its influence on friendly operations? How quickly can a key influencer's impact be applied to affect friendly operations? What is the magnitude (width, depth, number of people/groups, how much, how far) of the key influencer's effect? What is the effect of the key influencer not engaging with the unit? How firm is the key influencer's hold on power? If answers to the above questions indicate the key influencer could significantly impact friendly operations, then that influence should be included in the civil environment model.

Determine a Key Influencer's Motivations and Goals.

3-47. For individuals and networks, this may be difficult to determine, and an analytical "best guess" may have to suffice until the target can be further developed. In a dynamic environment, motivations and goals may shift—a key influencer may have both short and long term goals and distinguishing between the two sets may be important for determining how the key influencer might enhance or degrade friendly operations. For intangible factors such as a key influencer's "thing" or "place," there may not be any inherent motivations and goals. However, the motivation and/or goals of stakeholders as they apply to the key influencer's "thing" or "place" may be worth noting. Techniques which could be used to determine motivations and goals include:

- Identifying relationships/dynamics between key influencers and their environment (people, places, things).
- Identifying key influencers' conflicts and their sources to include grievances, ethnic/religious tension, competition for natural resources, and so on.
- Identifying sources of resiliency—what structures, assets, means, and so on sustain the key influencers and are used to retain position/power/legitimacy.
- Determining key influencers' desired end states—friendly, rival/threat, and environment. CAO planners look at both short and longer term goals.

Determine a Key Influencer's Abilities, Capabilities, and Means.

3-48. Information used to identify key influencers can be used and paired with a description of preferred actions and options. Determining "means" includes identifying tangible assets (people, places, things) that the key influencers can employ, as well as intangible assets that give the key influencers their means such as religious legitimacy. The sources of resiliency and relationships/dynamics between key influencers and their means identified above may translate into critical means in this step.

Evaluate a Key Influencer's Potential Impact on Friendly Operations/Objectives.

3-49. This is an assessment of key influencers' potential COAs: why, how, what, when, and where the key influencers can degrade or enhance friendly operations and to what extent. During COA development of the MDMP, this information helps to develop specific actions/tasks to either mitigate or take advantage of key influencers' effects on friendly operations and the civil environment.

ASSESS AND VALIDATE

3-50. Part of the analytical process involves the assessment and validation of individual nodes or networks within the population. Assessment and validation is a prestep to the evaluation step of analysis. An "entity" is a target made up of either a node or network. "Entity development" is the systematic examination of a potential entity (systems, components or individuals) to determine the necessary type and duration of an analysis or action that must be exerted to create an effect consistent with the commander's specific objectives. Entity assessment and validation are parts of the analytic process that ensures all entities meet the objectives and criteria as required for analysis for accuracy and reliability. Also, entity assessment and validation are parts of the process that assesses the priority of nodes or civil network networks (figure 3-6).

Assess and Validate Procedures

Pre–Assessment and Validation

Initial Entity Development

- Nodes of civil networks associated with the data collected for analysis are confirmed for assessment and validation.
- **Entity Assessment and Validation.** Analysts assess and validate or vet originators prior to doing initial evaluations.
- **Entity Identification.** Entities are cross-referenced against unit databases first. Other units and agencies are queried regarding these nodes or civil networks to identify and collect any additional information.

Further Entity Development to Support Entity Assessment and Validation

- At this point, the entity data (information or "baseball card") is carried forward and prepared for validation.
- **Receive Updates.** Information on these originators is added to the current unit's civil network databases.

Entity Folder Completion Procedures

- Upon completion of the database review and update, civil network node information is put into entity folders for use by the analytical assessment and validation working group (A2VWG).
- **Closing the Identification for Assessment and Validation.** Once the originations are identified and the information is updated, the civil networks and nodes and their information is evaluated according to standards.

Entity List Management

- Postidentification, the A2VWG prioritizes the civil network and nodes. This prioritization disregards if the originator is a node or network.
- The A2VWG ensures that these prioritized entities are evaluated for reliability and accuracy.
- The A2VWG ensures that the prioritized entity list is shared with other units and agencies, ensuring transparency and allowing for additional input regarding the prioritization of the civil network or nodes by these units and agencies.

Validation of Civil Networks or Nodes

Validation Procedures

Validating is an analytical function that helps mitigate operational risk by assessing the accuracy of the civil network or node based on previous activity or accuracy and reliability of past data.

- Entity identification and the use of the appropriate naming convention.
- Entity location.
- Entity function (civil network or node is a key influencer, network, or other).
- Entity description.
- Functional characterization of the entity.
- Entity significance focused on its significance (to the unit and/or other agencies).
- **Critical Entity Elements.** Ensure all known information regarding the entity is gathered.
- Target the entity for analysis.

Figure 3-6. Assess and validate procedures

RELIABILITY AND ACCURACY RATINGS

3-51. In addition to evaluating the reliability level of a civil network or node, or an agency, the accuracy of the data provided by that civil network or node is also evaluated, and then the information is rated for its inherent accuracy (figures 3-7 and 3-8). Note that a completely reliable civil network or node source can provide inaccurate data. This may be for a number of reasons such as the source has been provided inaccurate data from another network or node, or the civil network or node is not capable of determining the accuracy of their observations (but still believes their observation to be true and is not trying to be deceitful).

ESTIMATION TOOLS

3-52. This step of the analytical process can be the most challenging—taking what is known, based on the analysis, and making some predictions. What will take place in the civil environment in the future, factoring in both friendly and threat activity, and when and how will it take place? One way to capture and summarize an estimation for the civil environment is through a civil most likely/most disruptive/most advantageous graphic and narrative (a product of step 4 of CPB) that is similar to the threat most likely/most dangerous COA graphic and narrative developed by the intelligence section. One of the key differences is the consideration of "most advantageous." This aspect addresses the factors of leverage and influence of the population, separate from its incorporation into the most likely and most disruptive.

Value	Rating	Description
A	Reliable	• No doubt about the authenticity, trustworthiness, or competency of the source. • History of complete reliability.
B	Usually reliable	• Minor doubts. • History of mostly valid data.
C	Fairly reliable	• Doubts. • Provided reliable data in the past.
D	Not usually reliable	• Doubts. • Provided unreliable data in the past.
E	Unreliable	• Lacks authenticity and competency. • History of invalid data.
F	Cannot be judged	• Insufficient information to evaluate. • May or may not be reliable.

Figure 3-7. Characterize the civil network or node reliability

Value	Rating	Description
1	Confirmed	Logical, consistent with other relevant data, confirmed by independent sources.
2	Probably true	Logical, consistent with other relevant data, but not confirmed.
3	Possibly true	Reasonably logical, agrees with some relevant data, but not confirmed.
4	Doubtfully true	Not logical but possible, no other data on the subject, and not confirmed.
5	Improbable	Not logical, contradicted by other relevant data.
6	Cannot be judged	The validity of the data cannot be determined.

Figure 3-8. Evaluate the accuracy of the data provided

STEP 2-C: PRODUCE AN INITIAL OVERLAY OF THE CIVIL COMPONENT OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

3-53. In preparing products, take the results of your analysis and incorporate them into products that are tailored to satisfy the requirements of the customer, whether the customer is the commander, a supported commander, the operational planning team, CA teams, or coalition and/or interorganizational partners. The user or customer requirements drive the product parameters. As early as possible during analysis, CAO planners determine who will use the product(s) and formats that they can readily receive and digest based on bandwidth. The product must also stand alone as much as possible—meaning the product is complete, clear, and concise enough that the user or customer does not need the analyst to be present in order to understand and use the product as intended.

3-54. At a minimum, those products should produce a civil overlay relevant to a modified combined obstacle overlay, a civil COP, as well as the identification of civil networks in the AOs and areas of interest. These products are then integrated into step 2 of the IPB in order to produce a more comprehensive modified combined obstacle overlay and threat overlay for the command.

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Chapter 4

Generate and Integrate Civil Knowledge

The only people who see the whole picture are the ones who step outside the frame.

—Salman Rushdie

OVERVIEW

4-1. Civil information becoming civil knowledge is the end result of the CPB. Civil information is derived from the analysis done in step 2 providing evaluated civil network information as civil information. The process ultimately generates civil knowledge that supports and enables the development and execution of CAO and is used to support and feed into IPB and the MDMP.

4-2. Using the results from step 2 as well as inputs from concepts of operations, trend analyses, and the civil component capabilities assessment, the civil analyst depicts the relevant aspects of civil information and its effect on military operations by producing a civil environment model. This model facilitates a deeper, shared understanding of the OE and supports and enables the development and execution of CAO.

4-3. A civil environment model may require multiple overlays that typically depict key terrain or infrastructure within the AO such as churches/mosques, market centers, hospitals, government centers, political boundaries, ports, airfields, movement corridors, population centers, clan/family boundaries, dislocated civilian camps, and significant artifacts/monuments. A geospatial graphic may serve as the best example.

Note: CPB is unique but is done concurrently with step 3 of IPB. However, step 3 of IPB focuses on the evaluation of the threat only.

STEP 3-A: EVALUATE CIVIL INFORMATION FOR OPERATIONAL RELEVANCE

4-4. When evaluating the information generated from step 2 for operational relevance, the focus must remain on the threat and its interaction and influence with the political, economic, and social variables within the OE developed during MDMP. This is also where updated guidance within the MDMP and IPB are reassessed to validate their relevance.

STEP 3-B: DESCRIBE OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS WITHIN THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL VARIABLES OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

4-5. In order to identify opportunities and risks within the political, economic, and social variables, a review of the gaps generated in step 1 must be evaluated against the analysis conducted in step 2 relative to organizations, personalities, capabilities, and resources.

4-6. Predictive analysis templates threat activity and trends within the political, economic, and social variables that can affect the credibility of each COA. Using actionable intelligence, the staff templates activities and trends that present opportunities, which build toward more advantageous COAs or mitigate risks.

4-7. The output of step 3-B is a list of both opportunities and risks which can be used in step 3-C to determine what is targetable.

STEP 3-C: DEVELOP A CIVIL ENVIRONMENT MODEL AND REFINE AN OVERLAY OF THE CIVIL COMPONENT OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

4-8. A civil environment model depicts a system of key influences. This includes a narrative describing the civil environment that is specific to the AO, a list of key influencers and relevant factors produced from analytical methods, such as stakeholder and geospatial analysis, and a civil COP or graphic depicting those key influencers or relevant factors.

4-9. CPB provides an evaluation and interpretation of information about key influencers to discern catalysts of behavior and the context that shapes behavior. The description of the environment and civil or social norms shape the civil environment model that informs the commander's understanding of key influencers by detailing societies, populations, and other groups of people including their activities, relationships, and perspectives. The purpose is to model civilian life and activities to serve as a baseline for planning. The civil environment model is particularly relevant to COA development and COA war game steps within the MDMP.

4-10. Modeling the civil environment includes the graphic representation of social and cultural information for a given area presented spatially (on a map) and temporally (as a snapshot in time). Modeling multiple snapshots would be used to identify trends. The content of the narrative should be derived from previous analysis but should consist of all relevant civil factors that may extend beyond items such as physical boundaries. For example, a CA team's AO would likely be comparatively small and may consist of a number of towns or villages connected by a road and/or rail network sharing similar customs, traditions, legal systems, and so on. This environment would be described so that it considers relationships and activities of the population, civil network analysis—looking at the interpersonal, professional, and social networks tied to key influencers—as well as small and large group dynamics, and physical environment factors.

4-11. The results of step 3 are refined civil environment factors, identified trends, and relevant inputs to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The results of step 3 also include relevant inputs to targeting and attack matrices that include all step 2 analysis and step 3 refinements. It summarizes the most important aspects of the civil environment affecting unit operations by producing a civil environment model (figure 4-1), a refined civil threat template for integration into step 3 of the IPB process, and recommended civil component priority intelligence requirements, friendly force information requirements, and essential elements of friendly information—for integration into the staff's recommended commander's critical information requirements.



Figure 4-1. Civil environment model: Utopia

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Chapter 5

Inform the Threat Template Based on Political, Economic, and Social Variables

The best qualification of a prophet is to have a good memory.

—George Savile, Marquess of Halifax

OVERVIEW

5-1. The focus of this step is to utilize the information and analyses from previous steps to determine potential civil actions within the AO. Step 4 is executed concurrently with step 4 of the IPB, which determines possible threat COAs. Civil actions are described by modeling the independent will of the population and key influencers relating to friendly and malign actions within the AO. CAO planners develop an initial assessment of possible civil actions in a particular area within the supported unit's battlespace. This assessment is further refined and used during the COA analysis step of MDMP. These actions serve to paint a more complete picture of the OE focused on indigenous people and their leadership but also on any international or nongovernmental organizations or other stakeholders in the AO (battlefield, village, district, and province). Failure to fully identify and develop all valid threat COAs may lead to the development of an information collection strategy that does not provide the information necessary to confirm what COA the population or stakeholders may take and may result in friendly forces being caught by surprise and possibly disadvantaged. The CAO planner should identify all significant civil considerations—this refers to those civil considerations similarly identified as OE significant characteristics—to portray the interrelationship of friendly forces, population activities, and the threat.

Note: Step 4 is executed to inform the threat template based on the political, economic, and social variables and their support to product development for use in step 3 of MDMP. This step is performed in conjunction with step 4 of IPB.

STEP 4-A: GENERATE A CIVIL EVENT TEMPLATE

5-2. CAO planners update existing CPB products as necessary and develop the civil event template during deliberate planning. Civil actions are accounted for during COA analysis depicted as most likely/most disruptive civil actions. The following considerations may be applied to determine civil actions: historical patterns of the populace, conditions the populace is trying to achieve, and/or agendas or objectives of key influencers. These civil actions may influence a decision maker's approach to mission accomplishment. The civil event template results in a graphic and narrative depicting most likely and most disruptive civil actions and the civil event matrix, which is a graphic and narrative depiction of the actions that may occur at a given time within the AO, that is integrated into the IPB event matrix. The civil events would develop a fully comprehensive COP that is depicted on the situation template and event template.

STEP 4-B: INTEGRATE INTO THE COLLECTION MATRIX

5-3. Based on information requirements generated in step 3, the CAO planners integrate these requirements into the civil information collection matrix in order to help address information gaps.

STEP 4-C: DEVELOP CIVIL COURSE OF ACTION STATEMENT

5-4. The staff develops COA statements specific to the civil component of the OE based on COAs that the intelligence staff officer developed for each threat COA. These statements are derived from the CPB process and should be in narrative format and specifically account for the political, economic, and social variables within the OE.

STEP 4-D: DETERMINE AND PRIORITIZE TARGETABLE OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS

5-5. Once opportunities and risks have been identified, the staff will evaluate them based on the counterterrorism analytical framework model to determine prioritization based on the commander's guidance. Each opportunity and risk must also be evaluated against its applicability and potential effects on a friendly force's ability to accomplish their missions.

Note: Information on the counterterrorism analytical framework model can be found in chapter 5 of JP 3-26. Opportunities and risks may also be analyzed using the filtering techniques and criteria described in chapter 2 of this training circular.

5-6. These outputs provide the commander and staff with refined information requirements to be incorporated into priority intelligence requirements, friendly force information requirements, and essential elements of friendly information for informing the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance synch matrix and civil information collection plans. These recommended information requirements should also inform the target synchronization matrix and the attack guidance matrix. See ATP 3-60 for more information on targeting products. Inevitably, opportunities and risks identified should inform targetable COAs for friendly forces once mission analysis and CPB are completed.

Glossary

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

A2VWG	analytical assessment and validation working group
AO	area of operations
AOI	area of interest
ASCOPE	areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
CA	civil affairs
CAO	civil affairs operations
COA	course of action
COP	common operational picture
CPB	civil preparation of the battlefield
FM	field manual
FMFRP	fleet marine force reference publication
GIS	geographic information systems
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlefield
MCCMOS	Marine Corps Civil-Military Operations School
MCTP	Marine Corps techniques publication
METT-TC	mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations [mission variables] (Army)
MDMP	military decision-making process
PMESII-PT	political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time [operational variables]
JP	joint publication
OE	operational environment
TC	training circular
USAJFKSWCS	United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

SECTION II – TERMS

area of interest

That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory. Also called **AOI**. (JP 3-0)

area of operations

An operational area defined by a commander for land and maritime forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Also called **AO**. (JP 3-0)

civil affairs

(DOD) Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military operations. Also called **CA**. (JP 3-57)

civil affairs operations

(DOD) Actions planned, coordinated, executed, and assessed to enhance awareness of, and manage the interaction with, the civil component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; and/or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government. Also called **CAO**. (JP 3-57)

civil considerations

The influence of manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of military operations. (ADP 6-0)

civil considerations analysis

The methodical study of the influence of manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of military operations. (FM 3-57)

civil engagement

A deliberate or spontaneous activity or interaction between civil affairs forces and nonmilitary individuals or entities, designed to build relationships; reduce or eliminate civil interference and causes of instability; gather, confirm, or deny information; foster legitimacy, or promote cooperation and unified action. Also called **CE**. (FM 3-57)

civil information

(DOD) Relevant data relating to the civil areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events of the civil component of the operational environment used to support the situational awareness of the supported commander. (JP 3-57)

civil knowledge integration

The actions taken to analyze, evaluate, and organize collected civil information for operational relevance and informing the warfighting function. Also called **CKI**. (FM 3-57)

civil network development and engagement

The activity by which the civil network capabilities and resources are engaged, evaluated, developed, and integrated into operations. Also called **CNDE**. (FM 3-57)

civil network

A collection of formal and informal groups, associations, military engagements, and organizations within an operational environment that interact with each other with varying degrees of frequency, trust, and collaboration. (FM 3-57)

civil preparation of the battlefield

The systematic process of analyzing civil considerations in an area of interest to determine their effects on friendly, neutral, and enemy operations. Also called **CPB**. (FM 3-57)

common operational picture

(DOD) A single identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command that facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness. (JP 3-0) (Army) A display of relevant information within a commander's area of interest tailored to the user's requirements and based on common data and information shared by more than one command. Also called **COP**. (ADP 6-0)

course of action

1. Any sequence of activities that an individual or unit may follow. 2. A scheme developed to accomplish a mission. Also called **COA**. (JP 5-0)

essential element of friendly information

A critical aspect of a friendly operation that, if known by a threat would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation and therefore should be protected from enemy detection. Also called **EEFI**. (ADP 5-0)

evaluating

Using indicators to judge progress toward desired conditions and determining why the current degree of progress exists. (ADP 5-0)

event matrix

(DOD) A cross-referenced description of the indicators and activity expected to occur in each named area of interest. (JP 2-01.3)

event template

(DOD) A guide for collection planning that depicts the named areas of interest where activity, or its lack of activity, will indicate which course of action the adversary has adopted. (JP 2-01.3)

friendly force information requirement

(DOD) Information the commander and staff need to understand the friendly force and supporting capabilities. Also called **FFIR**. (JP 3-0)

intelligence preparation of the battlefield

(Army) The systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in an area of interest to determine their effect on operations. Also called **IPB**. (ATP 2-01.3)

intelligence requirement

(DOD) 1. Any subject, general or specific, upon which there is a need for the collection of information, or the production of intelligence. 2. A requirement for intelligence to fill a gap in the command's knowledge or understanding of the operational environment or threat forces. Also called **IR**. (JP 2-0)

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

(DOD) 1. An integrated operations and intelligence activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. Also called **ISR**. (JP 2-01)

military decision-making process

An iterative planning methodology to understand the situation and mission, develop a courses of action, and produce an operation plan or order. Also called **MDMP**. (ADP 5-0)

mission variables

Categories of specific information needed to conduct operations. (ADP 1-01)

operational environment

A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. Also called **OE**. (JP 3-0)

operational variables

A comprehensive set of information categories used to describe an operational environment. (ADP 1-01)

priority intelligence requirement

(DOD) An intelligence requirement that the commander and staff need to understand the threat and other aspects of the operational environment. Also called **PIR**. (JP 2-01)

stakeholder

In public affairs, an individual or group that is directly impacted by military operations, actions, and/or outcomes, and whose interests positively or negatively motivate them toward action. (JP 3-61)

target analysis

(DOD) An examination of potential targets to determine military importance, priority of engagement, and capabilities required to create a desired effect. (JP 3-60)

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23 November 2021

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